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author | Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> | 2019-07-23 19:58:38 +0200 |
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committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2019-08-06 18:08:25 +0100 |
commit | 2b835e24b5c6f9c633ff51973581ee7ca7b3e8ec (patch) | |
tree | f3de91fbb738cccbdcfdda3754765cbb3bd24e0e /kernel/sys.c | |
parent | e21a712a9685488f5ce80495b37b9fdbe96c230d (diff) | |
download | linux-2b835e24b5c6f9c633ff51973581ee7ca7b3e8ec.tar.bz2 |
arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr
This patch is a part of a series that extends kernel ABI to allow to pass
tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than
0x00) as syscall arguments.
copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data
from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can
provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user,
we need to correctly handle such pointers.
Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr,
before performing access validity checks.
Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform the
checks, but then passes them as is into the kernel internals.
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
[will: Add __force to casting in untagged_addr() to kill sparse warning]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/sys.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions