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authorAl Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>2007-10-07 00:24:36 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org>2007-10-07 16:28:43 -0700
commit291041e935e6d0513f2b7e4a300aa9f02ec1d925 (patch)
tree626b06b52d5ce0a41c7bf21ce4314e2a9fbe79ff /kernel/signal.c
parent7a5c5d5735e785a700a377a5fce913b8ad45a58f (diff)
downloadlinux-291041e935e6d0513f2b7e4a300aa9f02ec1d925.tar.bz2
fix bogus reporting of signals by audit
Async signals should not be reported as sent by current in audit log. As it is, we call audit_signal_info() too early in check_kill_permission(). Note that check_kill_permission() has that test already - it needs to know if it should apply current-based permission checks. So the solution is to move the call of audit_signal_info() between those. Bogosity in question is easily reproduced - add a rule watching for e.g. kill(2) from specific process (so that audit_signal_info() would not short-circuit to nothing), say load_policy, watch the bogus OBJ_PID entry in audit logs claiming that write(2) on selinuxfs file issued by load_policy(8) had somehow managed to send a signal to syslogd... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/signal.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/signal.c22
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 9fb91a32edda..792952381092 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -531,18 +531,18 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
if (!valid_signal(sig))
return error;
- error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
- if (error)
- return error;
-
- error = -EPERM;
- if ((info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info)))
- && ((sig != SIGCONT) ||
- (process_session(current) != process_session(t)))
- && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
- && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
- && !capable(CAP_KILL))
+ if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info))) {
+ error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (((sig != SIGCONT) ||
+ (process_session(current) != process_session(t)))
+ && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
+ && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
+ && !capable(CAP_KILL))
return error;
+ }
return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
}