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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2011-02-10 17:53:55 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2011-02-10 17:53:55 -0800
commitee24aebffb75a7f940cf52c8cf6910947b3130c0 (patch)
treeed1eafa8b1a30b078c9fa680aafbb49632921a0d /kernel/printk.c
parent67d019528e5c2693145217cf18a507689980d2a4 (diff)
downloadlinux-ee24aebffb75a7f940cf52c8cf6910947b3130c0.tar.bz2
cap_syslog: accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN for now
In commit ce6ada35bdf7 ("security: Define CAP_SYSLOG") Serge Hallyn introduced CAP_SYSLOG, but broke backwards compatibility by no longer accepting CAP_SYS_ADMIN as an override (it would cause a warning and then reject the operation). Re-instate CAP_SYS_ADMIN - but keeping the warning - as an acceptable capability until any legacy applications have been updated. There are apparently applications out there that drop all capabilities except for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in order to access the syslog. (This is a re-implementation of a patch by Serge, cleaning the logic up and making the code more readable) Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/printk.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/printk.c54
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c
index 2ddbdc73aade..36231525e22f 100644
--- a/kernel/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk.c
@@ -262,25 +262,47 @@ int dmesg_restrict = 1;
int dmesg_restrict;
#endif
+static int syslog_action_restricted(int type)
+{
+ if (dmesg_restrict)
+ return 1;
+ /* Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" for everybody */
+ return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER;
+}
+
+static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
+{
+ /*
+ * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
+ * already done the capabilities checks at open time.
+ */
+ if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
+ if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
+ return 0;
+ /* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a warning */
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
+ "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
{
unsigned i, j, limit, count;
int do_clear = 0;
char c;
- int error = 0;
+ int error;
- /*
- * If this is from /proc/kmsg we only do the capabilities checks
- * at open time.
- */
- if (type == SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN || !from_file) {
- if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
- goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */
- if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
- type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
- goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */
- }
+ error = check_syslog_permissions(type, from_file);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
error = security_syslog(type);
if (error)
@@ -423,12 +445,6 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
}
out:
return error;
-warn:
- /* remove after 2.6.39 */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
- "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated and denied).\n");
- return -EPERM;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len)