diff options
author | Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> | 2017-10-16 11:16:55 -0700 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-10-18 13:21:13 +0100 |
commit | 28e33f9d78eefe98ea86673ab31e988b37a9a738 (patch) | |
tree | 88cb8fc5fb08851dabd5be6ec5080e1200989bc2 /kernel/bpf | |
parent | 48044eb490be71c203e14dd89e8bae87209eab52 (diff) | |
download | linux-28e33f9d78eefe98ea86673ab31e988b37a9a738.tar.bz2 |
bpf: disallow arithmetic operations on context pointer
Commit f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
removed the crafty selection of which pointer types are
allowed to be modified. This is OK for most pointer types
since adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() will catch operations on
immutable pointers. One exception is PTR_TO_CTX which is
now allowed to be offseted freely.
The intent of aforementioned commit was to allow context
access via modified registers. The offset passed to
->is_valid_access() verifier callback has been adjusted
by the value of the variable offset.
What is missing, however, is taking the variable offset
into account when the context register is used. Or in terms
of the code adding the offset to the value passed to the
->convert_ctx_access() callback. This leads to the following
eBPF user code:
r1 += 68
r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 8)
exit
being translated to this in kernel space:
0: (07) r1 += 68
1: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 +180)
2: (95) exit
Offset 8 is corresponding to 180 in the kernel, but offset
76 is valid too. Verifier will "accept" access to offset
68+8=76 but then "convert" access to offset 8 as 180.
Effective access to offset 248 is beyond the kernel context.
(This is a __sk_buff example on a debug-heavy kernel -
packet mark is 8 -> 180, 76 would be data.)
Dereferencing the modified context pointer is not as easy
as dereferencing other types, because we have to translate
the access to reading a field in kernel structures which is
usually at a different offset and often of a different size.
To allow modifying the pointer we would have to make sure
that given eBPF instruction will always access the same
field or the fields accessed are "compatible" in terms of
offset and size...
Disallow dereferencing modified context pointers and add
to selftests the test case described here.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8b8d6ba39e23..20f3889c006e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1116,7 +1116,12 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn /* ctx accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can * determine what type of data were returned. */ - if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { + if (reg->off) { + verbose("dereference of modified ctx ptr R%d off=%d+%d, ctx+const is allowed, ctx+const+const is not\n", + regno, reg->off, off - reg->off); + return -EACCES; + } + if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { char tn_buf[48]; tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); @@ -1124,7 +1129,6 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn tn_buf, off, size); return -EACCES; } - off += reg->var_off.value; err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type); if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a |