diff options
author | Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> | 2007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2007-05-11 05:38:25 -0400 |
commit | e54dc2431d740a79a6bd013babade99d71b1714f (patch) | |
tree | 16b0990d5c16946239a17b332f54b5918fb03305 /kernel/auditfilter.c | |
parent | 7f13da40e36c84d0d046b7adbd060af7d3717250 (diff) | |
download | linux-e54dc2431d740a79a6bd013babade99d71b1714f.tar.bz2 |
[PATCH] audit signal recipients
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditfilter.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditfilter.c | 48 |
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 3749193aed8c..6c61263ff96d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -311,6 +311,43 @@ int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall) return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall); } +static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask) +{ + int i; + + if (classes[class]) { + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) + if (mask[i] & classes[class][i]) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry) +{ + struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f; + + if (!arch) { + /* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch + * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */ + return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, + entry->rule.mask) && + audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32, + entry->rule.mask)); + } + + switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) { + case 0: /* native */ + return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, + entry->rule.mask)); + case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ + return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32, + entry->rule.mask)); + default: + return 1; + } +} + /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule) { @@ -429,6 +466,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule) err = -EINVAL; goto exit_free; } + entry->rule.arch_f = f; break; case AUDIT_PERM: if (f->val & ~15) @@ -519,7 +557,6 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_FSGID: case AUDIT_LOGINUID: case AUDIT_PERS: - case AUDIT_ARCH: case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: case AUDIT_PPID: case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: @@ -531,6 +568,9 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: break; + case AUDIT_ARCH: + entry->rule.arch_f = f; + break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: @@ -1221,6 +1261,9 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL if (!dont_count) audit_n_rules++; + + if (!audit_match_signal(entry)) + audit_signals++; #endif mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); @@ -1294,6 +1337,9 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL if (!dont_count) audit_n_rules--; + + if (!audit_match_signal(entry)) + audit_signals--; #endif mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); |