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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2017-09-06 16:19:18 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-09-06 17:27:24 -0700
commit2482ddec670fb83717d129012bc558777cb159f7 (patch)
tree5c6b4c474757e143f6bc3d3f4220371e9dd5123d /init
parentea37df54d2b7950d607800ee417a1d59b95068c2 (diff)
downloadlinux-2482ddec670fb83717d129012bc558777cb159f7.tar.bz2
mm: add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation
This SLUB free list pointer obfuscation code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. This adds a per-cache random value to SLUB caches that is XORed with their freelist pointer address and value. This adds nearly zero overhead and frustrates the very common heap overflow exploitation method of overwriting freelist pointers. A recent example of the attack is written up here: http://cyseclabs.com/blog/cve-2016-6187-heap-off-by-one-exploit and there is a section dedicated to the technique the book "A Guide to Kernel Exploitation: Attacking the Core". This is based on patches by Daniel Micay, and refactored to minimize the use of #ifdef. With 200-count cycles of "hackbench -g 20 -l 1000" I saw the following run times: before: mean 10.11882499999999999995 variance .03320378329145728642 stdev .18221905304181911048 after: mean 10.12654000000000000014 variance .04700556623115577889 stdev .21680767106160192064 The difference gets lost in the noise, but if the above is to be taken literally, using CONFIG_FREELIST_HARDENED is 0.07% slower. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802180609.GA66807@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'init')
-rw-r--r--init/Kconfig9
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 5f0ef850e808..78cb2461012e 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1576,6 +1576,15 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
allocator against heap overflows.
+config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
+ bool "Harden slab freelist metadata"
+ depends on SLUB
+ help
+ Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and
+ other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance
+ sacrifies to harden the kernel slab allocator against common
+ freelist exploit methods.
+
config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL
default y
depends on SLUB && SMP