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author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2018-05-15 09:27:05 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2018-05-19 20:44:24 +0200 |
commit | af86ca4e3088fe5eacf2f7e58c01fa68ca067672 (patch) | |
tree | d01711e5fe7b1674c2929c473ead8047001ba886 /include | |
parent | 240da953fcc6a9008c92fae5b1f727ee5ed167ab (diff) | |
download | linux-af86ca4e3088fe5eacf2f7e58c01fa68ca067672.tar.bz2 |
bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack
Detect code patterns where malicious 'speculative store bypass' can be used
and sanitize such patterns.
39: (bf) r3 = r10
40: (07) r3 += -216
41: (79) r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) // slow read
42: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -72) = 0 // verifier inserts this instruction
43: (7b) *(u64 *)(r8 +0) = r3 // this store becomes slow due to r8
44: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0) // cpu speculatively executes this load
45: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0) // speculatively arbitrary 'load byte'
// is now sanitized
Above code after x86 JIT becomes:
e5: mov %rbp,%rdx
e8: add $0xffffffffffffff28,%rdx
ef: mov 0x0(%r13),%r14
f3: movq $0x0,-0x48(%rbp)
fb: mov %rdx,0x0(%r14)
ff: mov 0x0(%rbx),%rdi
103: movzbq 0x0(%rdi),%rsi
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 7e61c395fddf..65cfc2f59db9 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data { s32 call_imm; /* saved imm field of call insn */ }; int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */ + int sanitize_stack_off; /* stack slot to be cleared */ bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */ }; |