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authorIan Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>2012-01-04 09:34:49 +0000
committerKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>2012-01-04 17:02:03 -0500
commit9e7860cee18241633eddb36a4c34c7b61d8cecbc (patch)
treea09121556e76924e32188136379091dffb0223f2 /include/xen
parent73db144b58a32fc39733db6a7e1fe582072ad26a (diff)
downloadlinux-9e7860cee18241633eddb36a4c34c7b61d8cecbc.tar.bz2
xen/xenbus: Reject replies with payload > XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX.
Haogang Chen found out that: There is a potential integer overflow in process_msg() that could result in cross-domain attack. body = kmalloc(msg->hdr.len + 1, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH); When a malicious guest passes 0xffffffff in msg->hdr.len, the subsequent call to xb_read() would write to a zero-length buffer. The other end of this connection is always the xenstore backend daemon so there is no guest (malicious or otherwise) which can do this. The xenstore daemon is a trusted component in the system. However this seem like a reasonable robustness improvement so we should have it. And Ian when read the API docs found that: The payload length (len field of the header) is limited to 4096 (XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX) in both directions. If a client exceeds the limit, its xenstored connection will be immediately killed by xenstored, which is usually catastrophic from the client's point of view. Clients (particularly domains, which cannot just reconnect) should avoid this. so this patch checks against that instead. This also avoids a potential integer overflow pointed out by Haogang Chen. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com> CC: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/xen')
-rw-r--r--include/xen/interface/io/xs_wire.h3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/io/xs_wire.h b/include/xen/interface/io/xs_wire.h
index f0b6890370be..3c1877caaefc 100644
--- a/include/xen/interface/io/xs_wire.h
+++ b/include/xen/interface/io/xs_wire.h
@@ -88,4 +88,7 @@ struct xenstore_domain_interface {
XENSTORE_RING_IDX rsp_cons, rsp_prod;
};
+/* Violating this is very bad. See docs/misc/xenstore.txt. */
+#define XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX 4096
+
#endif /* _XS_WIRE_H */