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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2018-10-22 10:21:38 -0500
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2018-11-08 00:14:21 -0600
commit25d202ed820ee347edec0bf3bf553544556bf64b (patch)
treeb4cfb10402b67f208c0dfe070150d7a066d58f04 /fs
parentd2f007dbe7e4c9583eea6eb04d60001e85c6f1bd (diff)
downloadlinux-25d202ed820ee347edec0bf3bf553544556bf64b.tar.bz2
mount: Retest MNT_LOCKED in do_umount
It was recently pointed out that the one instance of testing MNT_LOCKED outside of the namespace_sem is in ksys_umount. Fix that by adding a test inside of do_umount with namespace_sem and the mount_lock held. As it helps to fail fails the existing test is maintained with an additional comment pointing out that it may be racy because the locks are not held. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Fixes: 5ff9d8a65ce8 ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r--fs/namespace.c10
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 98d27da43304..72f10c40fe3f 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1540,8 +1540,13 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
namespace_lock();
lock_mount_hash();
- event++;
+ /* Recheck MNT_LOCKED with the locks held */
+ retval = -EINVAL;
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto out;
+
+ event++;
if (flags & MNT_DETACH) {
if (!list_empty(&mnt->mnt_list))
umount_tree(mnt, UMOUNT_PROPAGATE);
@@ -1555,6 +1560,7 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
retval = 0;
}
}
+out:
unlock_mount_hash();
namespace_unlock();
return retval;
@@ -1645,7 +1651,7 @@ int ksys_umount(char __user *name, int flags)
goto dput_and_out;
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
goto dput_and_out;
- if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) /* Check optimistically */
goto dput_and_out;
retval = -EPERM;
if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))