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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-09-22 16:11:48 -1000 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-09-22 16:11:48 -1000 |
commit | 69c902f597c4bec92013a526268620fb6255c24a (patch) | |
tree | 4c7311d5befeaaa6a29fb2a9026eb9634be9d91e /fs | |
parent | b03fcfaef3538390cfb5e8d268fcdc5c828af1c7 (diff) | |
parent | 1013e760d10e614dc10b5624ce9fc41563ba2e65 (diff) | |
download | linux-69c902f597c4bec92013a526268620fb6255c24a.tar.bz2 |
Merge tag '4.14-smb3-fixes-from-recent-test-events-for-stable' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6
Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
"Various SMB3 fixes for stable and security improvements from the
recently completed SMB3/Samba test events
* tag '4.14-smb3-fixes-from-recent-test-events-for-stable' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
SMB3: Don't ignore O_SYNC/O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT flags
SMB3: handle new statx fields
SMB: Validate negotiate (to protect against downgrade) even if signing off
cifs: release auth_key.response for reconnect.
cifs: release cifs root_cred after exit_cifs
CIFS: make arrays static const, reduces object code size
[SMB3] Update session and share information displayed for debugging SMB2/SMB3
cifs: show 'soft' in the mount options for hard mounts
SMB3: Warn user if trying to sign connection that authenticated as guest
SMB3: Fix endian warning
Fix SMB3.1.1 guest authentication to Samba
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/cifs/connect.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/cifs/file.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/cifs/inode.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 26 |
6 files changed, 66 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c index 9727e1dcacd5..cbb9534b89b4 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c @@ -160,8 +160,13 @@ static int cifs_debug_data_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if ((ses->serverDomain == NULL) || (ses->serverOS == NULL) || (ses->serverNOS == NULL)) { - seq_printf(m, "\n%d) entry for %s not fully " - "displayed\n\t", i, ses->serverName); + seq_printf(m, "\n%d) Name: %s Uses: %d Capability: 0x%x\tSession Status: %d\t", + i, ses->serverName, ses->ses_count, + ses->capabilities, ses->status); + if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST) + seq_printf(m, "Guest\t"); + else if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL) + seq_printf(m, "Anonymous\t"); } else { seq_printf(m, "\n%d) Name: %s Domain: %s Uses: %d OS:" diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c index 180b3356ff86..8c8b75d33f31 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c @@ -461,6 +461,8 @@ cifs_show_options(struct seq_file *s, struct dentry *root) seq_puts(s, ",nocase"); if (tcon->retry) seq_puts(s, ",hard"); + else + seq_puts(s, ",soft"); if (tcon->use_persistent) seq_puts(s, ",persistenthandles"); else if (tcon->use_resilient) @@ -1447,7 +1449,7 @@ exit_cifs(void) exit_cifs_idmap(); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL - unregister_key_type(&cifs_spnego_key_type); + exit_cifs_spnego(); #endif cifs_destroy_request_bufs(); cifs_destroy_mids(); diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 8d38b22afb2b..0bfc2280436d 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -4154,6 +4154,14 @@ cifs_setup_session(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, cifs_dbg(FYI, "Security Mode: 0x%x Capabilities: 0x%x TimeAdjust: %d\n", server->sec_mode, server->capabilities, server->timeAdj); + if (ses->auth_key.response) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Free previous auth_key.response = %p\n", + ses->auth_key.response); + kfree(ses->auth_key.response); + ses->auth_key.response = NULL; + ses->auth_key.len = 0; + } + if (server->ops->sess_setup) rc = server->ops->sess_setup(xid, ses, nls_info); diff --git a/fs/cifs/file.c b/fs/cifs/file.c index 0786f19d288f..92fdf9c35de2 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/file.c +++ b/fs/cifs/file.c @@ -224,6 +224,13 @@ cifs_nt_open(char *full_path, struct inode *inode, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, if (backup_cred(cifs_sb)) create_options |= CREATE_OPEN_BACKUP_INTENT; + /* O_SYNC also has bit for O_DSYNC so following check picks up either */ + if (f_flags & O_SYNC) + create_options |= CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH; + + if (f_flags & O_DIRECT) + create_options |= CREATE_NO_BUFFER; + oparms.tcon = tcon; oparms.cifs_sb = cifs_sb; oparms.desired_access = desired_access; @@ -1102,8 +1109,10 @@ cifs_push_mandatory_locks(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile) struct cifs_tcon *tcon; unsigned int num, max_num, max_buf; LOCKING_ANDX_RANGE *buf, *cur; - int types[] = {LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES, - LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES}; + static const int types[] = { + LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES, + LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES + }; int i; xid = get_xid(); @@ -1434,8 +1443,10 @@ cifs_unlock_range(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, struct file_lock *flock, unsigned int xid) { int rc = 0, stored_rc; - int types[] = {LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES, - LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES}; + static const int types[] = { + LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES, + LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES + }; unsigned int i; unsigned int max_num, num, max_buf; LOCKING_ANDX_RANGE *buf, *cur; diff --git a/fs/cifs/inode.c b/fs/cifs/inode.c index a8693632235f..7c732cb44164 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/inode.c +++ b/fs/cifs/inode.c @@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ cifs_unix_basic_to_fattr(struct cifs_fattr *fattr, FILE_UNIX_BASIC_INFO *info, fattr->cf_atime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastAccessTime); fattr->cf_mtime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastModificationTime); fattr->cf_ctime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastStatusChange); + /* old POSIX extensions don't get create time */ + fattr->cf_mode = le64_to_cpu(info->Permissions); /* @@ -2024,6 +2026,19 @@ int cifs_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, stat->blksize = CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE; stat->ino = CIFS_I(inode)->uniqueid; + /* old CIFS Unix Extensions doesn't return create time */ + if (CIFS_I(inode)->createtime) { + stat->result_mask |= STATX_BTIME; + stat->btime = + cifs_NTtimeToUnix(cpu_to_le64(CIFS_I(inode)->createtime)); + } + + stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED | STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED); + if (CIFS_I(inode)->cifsAttrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSED) + stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED; + if (CIFS_I(inode)->cifsAttrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ENCRYPTED) + stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED; + /* * If on a multiuser mount without unix extensions or cifsacl being * enabled, and the admin hasn't overridden them, set the ownership diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index 5c16591a128e..6f0e6343c15e 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ assemble_neg_contexts(struct smb2_negotiate_req *req) build_encrypt_ctxt((struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt); req->NegotiateContextOffset = cpu_to_le32(OFFSET_OF_NEG_CONTEXT); req->NegotiateContextCount = cpu_to_le16(2); - inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) + 2 + inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) + sizeof(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context)); /* calculate hash */ } #else @@ -570,10 +570,11 @@ SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses) /* ops set to 3.0 by default for default so update */ ses->server->ops = &smb21_operations; } - } else if (rsp->DialectRevision != ses->server->vals->protocol_id) { + } else if (le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision) != + ses->server->vals->protocol_id) { /* if requested single dialect ensure returned dialect matched */ cifs_dbg(VFS, "Illegal 0x%x dialect returned: not requested\n", - cpu_to_le16(rsp->DialectRevision)); + le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision)); return -EIO; } @@ -655,15 +656,22 @@ int smb3_validate_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon) /* * validation ioctl must be signed, so no point sending this if we - * can not sign it. We could eventually change this to selectively + * can not sign it (ie are not known user). Even if signing is not + * required (enabled but not negotiated), in those cases we selectively * sign just this, the first and only signed request on a connection. - * This is good enough for now since a user who wants better security - * would also enable signing on the mount. Having validation of - * negotiate info for signed connections helps reduce attack vectors + * Having validation of negotiate info helps reduce attack vectors. */ - if (tcon->ses->server->sign == false) + if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST) return 0; /* validation requires signing */ + if (tcon->ses->user_name == NULL) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "Can't validate negotiate: null user mount\n"); + return 0; /* validation requires signing */ + } + + if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unexpected null user (anonymous) auth flag sent by server\n"); + vneg_inbuf.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(tcon->ses->server->vals->req_capabilities); memcpy(vneg_inbuf.Guid, tcon->ses->server->client_guid, @@ -1175,6 +1183,8 @@ SMB2_sess_setup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, while (sess_data->func) sess_data->func(sess_data); + if ((ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST) && (ses->sign)) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "signing requested but authenticated as guest\n"); rc = sess_data->result; out: kfree(sess_data); |