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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-09-22 16:11:48 -1000
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-09-22 16:11:48 -1000
commit69c902f597c4bec92013a526268620fb6255c24a (patch)
tree4c7311d5befeaaa6a29fb2a9026eb9634be9d91e /fs
parentb03fcfaef3538390cfb5e8d268fcdc5c828af1c7 (diff)
parent1013e760d10e614dc10b5624ce9fc41563ba2e65 (diff)
downloadlinux-69c902f597c4bec92013a526268620fb6255c24a.tar.bz2
Merge tag '4.14-smb3-fixes-from-recent-test-events-for-stable' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6
Pull cifs fixes from Steve French: "Various SMB3 fixes for stable and security improvements from the recently completed SMB3/Samba test events * tag '4.14-smb3-fixes-from-recent-test-events-for-stable' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6: SMB3: Don't ignore O_SYNC/O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT flags SMB3: handle new statx fields SMB: Validate negotiate (to protect against downgrade) even if signing off cifs: release auth_key.response for reconnect. cifs: release cifs root_cred after exit_cifs CIFS: make arrays static const, reduces object code size [SMB3] Update session and share information displayed for debugging SMB2/SMB3 cifs: show 'soft' in the mount options for hard mounts SMB3: Warn user if trying to sign connection that authenticated as guest SMB3: Fix endian warning Fix SMB3.1.1 guest authentication to Samba
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c9
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/cifsfs.c4
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/connect.c8
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/file.c19
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/inode.c15
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c26
6 files changed, 66 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c
index 9727e1dcacd5..cbb9534b89b4 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_debug.c
@@ -160,8 +160,13 @@ static int cifs_debug_data_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if ((ses->serverDomain == NULL) ||
(ses->serverOS == NULL) ||
(ses->serverNOS == NULL)) {
- seq_printf(m, "\n%d) entry for %s not fully "
- "displayed\n\t", i, ses->serverName);
+ seq_printf(m, "\n%d) Name: %s Uses: %d Capability: 0x%x\tSession Status: %d\t",
+ i, ses->serverName, ses->ses_count,
+ ses->capabilities, ses->status);
+ if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST)
+ seq_printf(m, "Guest\t");
+ else if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)
+ seq_printf(m, "Anonymous\t");
} else {
seq_printf(m,
"\n%d) Name: %s Domain: %s Uses: %d OS:"
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c
index 180b3356ff86..8c8b75d33f31 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsfs.c
@@ -461,6 +461,8 @@ cifs_show_options(struct seq_file *s, struct dentry *root)
seq_puts(s, ",nocase");
if (tcon->retry)
seq_puts(s, ",hard");
+ else
+ seq_puts(s, ",soft");
if (tcon->use_persistent)
seq_puts(s, ",persistenthandles");
else if (tcon->use_resilient)
@@ -1447,7 +1449,7 @@ exit_cifs(void)
exit_cifs_idmap();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
- unregister_key_type(&cifs_spnego_key_type);
+ exit_cifs_spnego();
#endif
cifs_destroy_request_bufs();
cifs_destroy_mids();
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index 8d38b22afb2b..0bfc2280436d 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -4154,6 +4154,14 @@ cifs_setup_session(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Security Mode: 0x%x Capabilities: 0x%x TimeAdjust: %d\n",
server->sec_mode, server->capabilities, server->timeAdj);
+ if (ses->auth_key.response) {
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "Free previous auth_key.response = %p\n",
+ ses->auth_key.response);
+ kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
+ ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
+ ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+ }
+
if (server->ops->sess_setup)
rc = server->ops->sess_setup(xid, ses, nls_info);
diff --git a/fs/cifs/file.c b/fs/cifs/file.c
index 0786f19d288f..92fdf9c35de2 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/file.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/file.c
@@ -224,6 +224,13 @@ cifs_nt_open(char *full_path, struct inode *inode, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
if (backup_cred(cifs_sb))
create_options |= CREATE_OPEN_BACKUP_INTENT;
+ /* O_SYNC also has bit for O_DSYNC so following check picks up either */
+ if (f_flags & O_SYNC)
+ create_options |= CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH;
+
+ if (f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+ create_options |= CREATE_NO_BUFFER;
+
oparms.tcon = tcon;
oparms.cifs_sb = cifs_sb;
oparms.desired_access = desired_access;
@@ -1102,8 +1109,10 @@ cifs_push_mandatory_locks(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile)
struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
unsigned int num, max_num, max_buf;
LOCKING_ANDX_RANGE *buf, *cur;
- int types[] = {LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
- LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES};
+ static const int types[] = {
+ LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
+ LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES
+ };
int i;
xid = get_xid();
@@ -1434,8 +1443,10 @@ cifs_unlock_range(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, struct file_lock *flock,
unsigned int xid)
{
int rc = 0, stored_rc;
- int types[] = {LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
- LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES};
+ static const int types[] = {
+ LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
+ LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES
+ };
unsigned int i;
unsigned int max_num, num, max_buf;
LOCKING_ANDX_RANGE *buf, *cur;
diff --git a/fs/cifs/inode.c b/fs/cifs/inode.c
index a8693632235f..7c732cb44164 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/inode.c
@@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ cifs_unix_basic_to_fattr(struct cifs_fattr *fattr, FILE_UNIX_BASIC_INFO *info,
fattr->cf_atime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastAccessTime);
fattr->cf_mtime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastModificationTime);
fattr->cf_ctime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastStatusChange);
+ /* old POSIX extensions don't get create time */
+
fattr->cf_mode = le64_to_cpu(info->Permissions);
/*
@@ -2024,6 +2026,19 @@ int cifs_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
stat->blksize = CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE;
stat->ino = CIFS_I(inode)->uniqueid;
+ /* old CIFS Unix Extensions doesn't return create time */
+ if (CIFS_I(inode)->createtime) {
+ stat->result_mask |= STATX_BTIME;
+ stat->btime =
+ cifs_NTtimeToUnix(cpu_to_le64(CIFS_I(inode)->createtime));
+ }
+
+ stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED | STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED);
+ if (CIFS_I(inode)->cifsAttrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSED)
+ stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED;
+ if (CIFS_I(inode)->cifsAttrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ENCRYPTED)
+ stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED;
+
/*
* If on a multiuser mount without unix extensions or cifsacl being
* enabled, and the admin hasn't overridden them, set the ownership
diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
index 5c16591a128e..6f0e6343c15e 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ assemble_neg_contexts(struct smb2_negotiate_req *req)
build_encrypt_ctxt((struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt);
req->NegotiateContextOffset = cpu_to_le32(OFFSET_OF_NEG_CONTEXT);
req->NegotiateContextCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
- inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) + 2
+ inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context)
+ sizeof(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context)); /* calculate hash */
}
#else
@@ -570,10 +570,11 @@ SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
/* ops set to 3.0 by default for default so update */
ses->server->ops = &smb21_operations;
}
- } else if (rsp->DialectRevision != ses->server->vals->protocol_id) {
+ } else if (le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision) !=
+ ses->server->vals->protocol_id) {
/* if requested single dialect ensure returned dialect matched */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Illegal 0x%x dialect returned: not requested\n",
- cpu_to_le16(rsp->DialectRevision));
+ le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision));
return -EIO;
}
@@ -655,15 +656,22 @@ int smb3_validate_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon)
/*
* validation ioctl must be signed, so no point sending this if we
- * can not sign it. We could eventually change this to selectively
+ * can not sign it (ie are not known user). Even if signing is not
+ * required (enabled but not negotiated), in those cases we selectively
* sign just this, the first and only signed request on a connection.
- * This is good enough for now since a user who wants better security
- * would also enable signing on the mount. Having validation of
- * negotiate info for signed connections helps reduce attack vectors
+ * Having validation of negotiate info helps reduce attack vectors.
*/
- if (tcon->ses->server->sign == false)
+ if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST)
return 0; /* validation requires signing */
+ if (tcon->ses->user_name == NULL) {
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "Can't validate negotiate: null user mount\n");
+ return 0; /* validation requires signing */
+ }
+
+ if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unexpected null user (anonymous) auth flag sent by server\n");
+
vneg_inbuf.Capabilities =
cpu_to_le32(tcon->ses->server->vals->req_capabilities);
memcpy(vneg_inbuf.Guid, tcon->ses->server->client_guid,
@@ -1175,6 +1183,8 @@ SMB2_sess_setup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
while (sess_data->func)
sess_data->func(sess_data);
+ if ((ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST) && (ses->sign))
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "signing requested but authenticated as guest\n");
rc = sess_data->result;
out:
kfree(sess_data);