diff options
author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2020-07-21 15:59:20 -0700 |
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committer | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2020-07-21 16:02:41 -0700 |
commit | f3db0bed458314a835ccef5ccb130270c5b2cf04 (patch) | |
tree | 0a9b6eacb0dea29a4a18bf24ae56e29a67d3de08 /fs/verity | |
parent | ba47d845d715a010f7b51f6f89bae32845e6acb7 (diff) | |
download | linux-f3db0bed458314a835ccef5ccb130270c5b2cf04.tar.bz2 |
fs-verity: use smp_load_acquire() for ->i_verity_info
Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with
smp_load_acquire(). Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with
the more lightweight READ_ONCE(). However, for this to be safe, all the
published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the
pointer itself. This may not be the case if allocating the object also
involves initializing a static or global variable, for example.
fsverity_info::tree_params.hash_alg->tfm is a crypto_ahash object that's
internal to and is allocated by the crypto subsystem. So by using
READ_ONCE() for ->i_verity_info, we're relying on internal
implementation details of the crypto subsystem.
Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead.
Also fix the cmpxchg logic to correctly execute an ACQUIRE barrier when
losing the cmpxchg race, since cmpxchg doesn't guarantee a memory
barrier on failure.
(Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here. This change is just
fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.)
Fixes: fd2d1acfcadf ("fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721225920.114347-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/verity')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/open.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/fs/verity/open.c b/fs/verity/open.c index d007db0c9304..bfe0280c14e4 100644 --- a/fs/verity/open.c +++ b/fs/verity/open.c @@ -221,11 +221,20 @@ out: void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi) { /* - * Multiple processes may race to set ->i_verity_info, so use cmpxchg. - * This pairs with the READ_ONCE() in fsverity_get_info(). + * Multiple tasks may race to set ->i_verity_info, so use + * cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in + * fsverity_get_info(). I.e., here we publish ->i_verity_info with a + * RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it. */ - if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL) + if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL) { + /* Lost the race, so free the fsverity_info we allocated. */ fsverity_free_info(vi); + /* + * Afterwards, the caller may access ->i_verity_info directly, + * so make sure to ACQUIRE the winning fsverity_info. + */ + (void)fsverity_get_info(inode); + } } void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi) |