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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-05-21 11:23:26 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-05-21 11:23:26 -0700
commit3b78ce4a34b761c7fe13520de822984019ff1a8f (patch)
tree63b93664a184c2d561a70c7f8d16a388750739f7 /fs/proc
parent6741c4bb389da103c0d79ad1961884628900bfe6 (diff)
parentaf86ca4e3088fe5eacf2f7e58c01fa68ca067672 (diff)
downloadlinux-3b78ce4a34b761c7fe13520de822984019ff1a8f.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'speck-v20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Merge speculative store buffer bypass fixes from Thomas Gleixner: - rework of the SPEC_CTRL MSR management to accomodate the new fancy SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable) bit handling. - the CPU bug and sysfs infrastructure for the exciting new Speculative Store Bypass 'feature'. - support for disabling SSB via LS_CFG MSR on AMD CPUs including Hyperthread synchronization on ZEN. - PRCTL support for dynamic runtime control of SSB - SECCOMP integration to automatically disable SSB for sandboxed processes with a filter flag for opt-out. - KVM integration to allow guests fiddling with SSBD including the new software MSR VIRT_SPEC_CTRL to handle the LS_CFG based oddities on AMD. - BPF protection against SSB .. this is just the core and x86 side, other architecture support will come separately. * 'speck-v20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (49 commits) bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static ...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/array.c25
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index ae2c807fd719..72391b3f6927 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
#include <linux/delayacct.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
@@ -335,6 +336,30 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nSeccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
#endif
+ seq_printf(m, "\nSpeculation_Store_Bypass:\t");
+ switch (arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(p, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS)) {
+ case -EINVAL:
+ seq_printf(m, "unknown");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED:
+ seq_printf(m, "not vulnerable");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ seq_printf(m, "thread force mitigated");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ seq_printf(m, "thread mitigated");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ seq_printf(m, "thread vulnerable");
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ seq_printf(m, "globally mitigated");
+ break;
+ default:
+ seq_printf(m, "vulnerable");
+ break;
+ }
seq_putc(m, '\n');
}