proc: maps protection

The /proc/pid/ "maps", "smaps", and "numa_maps" files contain sensitive
information about the memory location and usage of processes.  Issues:

- maps should not be world-readable, especially if programs expect any
  kind of ASLR protection from local attackers.
- maps cannot just be 0400 because "-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O2" makes glibc
  check the maps when %n is in a *printf call, and a setuid(getuid())
  process wouldn't be able to read its own maps file.  (For reference
  see http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/22/150)
- a system-wide toggle is needed to allow prior behavior in the case of
  non-root applications that depend on access to the maps contents.

This change implements a check using "ptrace_may_attach" before allowing
access to read the maps contents.  To control this protection, the new knob
/proc/sys/kernel/maps_protect has been added, with corresponding updates to
the procfs documentation.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: New sysctl numbers are old hat]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
index 7cddf6b8635a..d8b8c7183c24 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -143,6 +144,12 @@ out:
 static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *_vml)
 {
 	struct vm_list_struct *vml = _vml;
+	struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
+	struct task_struct *task = priv->task;
+
+	if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	return nommu_vma_show(m, vml->vma);
 }