Merge branch 'akpm'

* akpm:
  mm: madvise(MADV_DODUMP): allow hugetlbfs pages
  ocfs2: fix locking for res->tracking and dlm->tracking_list
  mm/vmscan.c: fix int overflow in callers of do_shrink_slab()
  mm/vmstat.c: skip NR_TLB_REMOTE_FLUSH* properly
  mm/vmstat.c: fix outdated vmstat_text
  proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root
  mm/hugetlb: add mmap() encodings for 32MB and 512MB page sizes
  mm/migrate.c: split only transparent huge pages when allocation fails
  ipc/shm.c: use ERR_CAST() for shm_lock() error return
  mm/gup_benchmark: fix unsigned comparison to zero in __gup_benchmark_ioctl
  mm, thp: fix mlocking THP page with migration enabled
  ocfs2: fix crash in ocfs2_duplicate_clusters_by_page()
  hugetlb: take PMD sharing into account when flushing tlb/caches
  mm: migration: fix migration of huge PMD shared pages

1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ccf86f16d9f0..7e9f07bf260d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -407,6 +407,20 @@ static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 	unsigned long *entries;
 	int err;
 
+	/*
+	 * The ability to racily run the kernel stack unwinder on a running task
+	 * and then observe the unwinder output is scary; while it is useful for
+	 * debugging kernel issues, it can also allow an attacker to leak kernel
+	 * stack contents.
+	 * Doing this in a manner that is at least safe from races would require
+	 * some work to ensure that the remote task can not be scheduled; and
+	 * even then, this would still expose the unwinder as local attack
+	 * surface.
+	 * Therefore, this interface is restricted to root.
+	 */
+	if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	entries = kmalloc_array(MAX_STACK_TRACE_DEPTH, sizeof(*entries),
 				GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!entries)