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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-09-07 14:35:32 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-09-07 14:35:32 -0700
commitc7c4591db64dbd1e504bc4e2806d7ef290a3c81b (patch)
treea2fb124f9760eec668d20541383e762822d7cc7b /fs/namespace.c
parent11c7b03d42a847db90862d0f9d8be6ce9b2f0553 (diff)
parentc7b96acf1456ef127fef461fcfedb54b81fecfbb (diff)
downloadlinux-c7c4591db64dbd1e504bc4e2806d7ef290a3c81b.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman: "This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug fixes. The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace infrastructure. Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace. namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on. pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code. proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/namespace.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/namespace.c121
1 files changed, 95 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ad8ea9bc2518..ef69fa5d2e5b 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -831,6 +831,10 @@ static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY))
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
+ /* Don't allow unprivileged users to reveal what is under a mount */
+ if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
+
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb;
mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(root);
@@ -1327,6 +1331,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(umount, char __user *, name, int, flags)
goto dput_and_out;
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
goto dput_and_out;
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto dput_and_out;
retval = do_umount(mnt, flags);
dput_and_out:
@@ -1349,14 +1355,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(oldumount, char __user *, name)
#endif
-static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct path *path)
+static bool is_mnt_ns_file(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- /* Could bind mounting the mount namespace inode cause a
- * mount namespace loop?
- */
- struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+ /* Is this a proxy for a mount namespace? */
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct proc_ns *ei;
- struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
if (!proc_ns_inode(inode))
return false;
@@ -1365,7 +1368,19 @@ static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct path *path)
if (ei->ns_ops != &mntns_operations)
return false;
- mnt_ns = ei->ns;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ /* Could bind mounting the mount namespace inode cause a
+ * mount namespace loop?
+ */
+ struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
+ if (!is_mnt_ns_file(dentry))
+ return false;
+
+ mnt_ns = get_proc_ns(dentry->d_inode)->ns;
return current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->seq >= mnt_ns->seq;
}
@@ -1374,13 +1389,17 @@ struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
{
struct mount *res, *p, *q, *r, *parent;
- if (!(flag & CL_COPY_ALL) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(mnt))
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(mnt))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE) && is_mnt_ns_file(dentry))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
res = q = clone_mnt(mnt, dentry, flag);
if (IS_ERR(q))
return q;
+ q->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
q->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
p = mnt;
@@ -1390,7 +1409,13 @@ struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
continue;
for (s = r; s; s = next_mnt(s, r)) {
- if (!(flag & CL_COPY_ALL) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(s)) {
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) &&
+ IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(s)) {
+ s = skip_mnt_tree(s);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE) &&
+ is_mnt_ns_file(s->mnt.mnt_root)) {
s = skip_mnt_tree(s);
continue;
}
@@ -1696,6 +1721,19 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int flag)
return err;
}
+static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct mount *child;
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
+ if (!is_subdir(child->mnt_mountpoint, dentry))
+ continue;
+
+ if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* do loopback mount.
*/
@@ -1713,7 +1751,7 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
return err;
err = -EINVAL;
- if (mnt_ns_loop(&old_path))
+ if (mnt_ns_loop(old_path.dentry))
goto out;
mp = lock_mount(path);
@@ -1731,8 +1769,11 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
if (!check_mnt(parent) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out2;
+ if (!recurse && has_locked_children(old, old_path.dentry))
+ goto out2;
+
if (recurse)
- mnt = copy_tree(old, old_path.dentry, 0);
+ mnt = copy_tree(old, old_path.dentry, CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE);
else
mnt = clone_mnt(old, old_path.dentry, 0);
@@ -1741,6 +1782,8 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
goto out2;
}
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
+
err = graft_tree(mnt, parent, mp);
if (err) {
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
@@ -1853,6 +1896,9 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
if (!check_mnt(p) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out1;
+ if (old->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto out1;
+
err = -EINVAL;
if (old_path.dentry != old_path.mnt->mnt_root)
goto out1;
@@ -2389,7 +2435,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *dup_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns,
namespace_lock();
/* First pass: copy the tree topology */
- copy_flags = CL_COPY_ALL | CL_EXPIRE;
+ copy_flags = CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE | CL_EXPIRE;
if (user_ns != mnt_ns->user_ns)
copy_flags |= CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE | CL_UNPRIVILEGED;
new = copy_tree(old, old->mnt.mnt_root, copy_flags);
@@ -2424,6 +2470,10 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *dup_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns,
}
p = next_mnt(p, old);
q = next_mnt(q, new);
+ if (!q)
+ break;
+ while (p->mnt.mnt_root != q->mnt.mnt_root)
+ p = next_mnt(p, old);
}
namespace_unlock();
@@ -2630,6 +2680,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
goto out4;
if (!check_mnt(root_mnt) || !check_mnt(new_mnt))
goto out4;
+ if (new_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto out4;
error = -ENOENT;
if (d_unlinked(new.dentry))
goto out4;
@@ -2653,6 +2705,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
detach_mnt(new_mnt, &parent_path);
detach_mnt(root_mnt, &root_parent);
+ if (root_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) {
+ new_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
+ root_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
+ }
/* mount old root on put_old */
attach_mnt(root_mnt, old_mnt, old_mp);
/* mount new_root on / */
@@ -2811,25 +2867,38 @@ bool current_chrooted(void)
return chrooted;
}
-void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns)
+bool fs_fully_visible(struct file_system_type *type)
{
struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
struct mount *mnt;
+ bool visible = false;
- down_read(&namespace_sem);
+ if (unlikely(!ns))
+ return false;
+
+ namespace_lock();
list_for_each_entry(mnt, &ns->list, mnt_list) {
- switch (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_magic) {
- case SYSFS_MAGIC:
- userns->may_mount_sysfs = true;
- break;
- case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
- userns->may_mount_proc = true;
- break;
+ struct mount *child;
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type != type)
+ continue;
+
+ /* This mount is not fully visible if there are any child mounts
+ * that cover anything except for empty directories.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
+ struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode;
+ if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ goto next;
+ if (inode->i_nlink != 2)
+ goto next;
}
- if (userns->may_mount_sysfs && userns->may_mount_proc)
- break;
+ visible = true;
+ goto found;
+ next: ;
}
- up_read(&namespace_sem);
+found:
+ namespace_unlock();
+ return visible;
}
static void *mntns_get(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2860,8 +2929,8 @@ static int mntns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
struct path root;
if (!ns_capable(mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT) ||
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (fs->users != 1)