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| author | Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> | 2015-12-31 10:28:52 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> | 2015-12-31 11:42:46 -0800 |
| commit | 1f6fa26199bb164157fbf81f850df1991d10c959 (patch) | |
| tree | 2d0933668d4f02fc2fc70cfae2f57ffedab2de9f /fs/f2fs | |
| parent | 732d56489f21c04f7bf60c675f7d152c9239a09c (diff) | |
| download | linux-1f6fa26199bb164157fbf81f850df1991d10c959.tar.bz2 | |
f2fs: remove f2fs_bug_on in terms of max_depth
There is no report on this bug_on case, but if malicious attacker changed this
field intentionally, we can just reset it as a MAX value.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/f2fs')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/f2fs/dir.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/dir.c b/fs/f2fs/dir.c index 3da58265c0d4..29bb8dd76a46 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c @@ -172,8 +172,6 @@ static struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_in_level(struct inode *dir, namehash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&name); - f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(dir), level > MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH); - nbucket = dir_buckets(level, F2FS_I(dir)->i_dir_level); nblock = bucket_blocks(level); @@ -238,6 +236,14 @@ struct f2fs_dir_entry *f2fs_find_entry(struct inode *dir, goto out; max_depth = F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth; + if (unlikely(max_depth > MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH)) { + f2fs_msg(F2FS_I_SB(dir)->sb, KERN_WARNING, + "Corrupted max_depth of %lu: %u", + dir->i_ino, max_depth); + max_depth = MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH; + F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth = max_depth; + mark_inode_dirty(dir); + } for (level = 0; level < max_depth; level++) { de = find_in_level(dir, level, &fname, res_page); |