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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2016-11-14 18:48:07 -0600
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2016-11-22 11:49:49 -0600
commit64b875f7ac8a5d60a4e191479299e931ee949b67 (patch)
tree0c913f705ae947f5903ca0ff91ed633d1c2adc4a /fs/exec.c
parentbfedb589252c01fa505ac9f6f2a3d5d68d707ef4 (diff)
downloadlinux-64b875f7ac8a5d60a4e191479299e931ee949b67.tar.bz2
ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP
When the flag PT_PTRACE_CAP was added the PTRACE_TRACEME path was overlooked. This can result in incorrect behavior when an application like strace traces an exec of a setuid executable. Further PT_PTRACE_CAP does not have enough information for making good security decisions as it does not report which user namespace the capability is in. This has already allowed one mistake through insufficient granulariy. I found this issue when I was testing another corner case of exec and discovered that I could not get strace to set PT_PTRACE_CAP even when running strace as root with a full set of caps. This change fixes the above issue with strace allowing stracing as root a setuid executable without disabling setuid. More fundamentaly this change allows what is allowable at all times, by using the correct information in it's decision. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4214e42f96d4 ("v2.4.9.11 -> v2.4.9.12") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/exec.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 4e497b9ee71e..3cf2cfced97a 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1406,7 +1406,7 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
unsigned n_fs;
if (p->ptrace) {
- if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP)
+ if (ptracer_capable(p, current_user_ns()))
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP;
else
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE;