diff options
| author | Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2009-03-13 13:51:59 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2009-03-14 11:57:22 -0700 |
| commit | 84814d642a4f1f294bd675ab11aae1ca54c6cedb (patch) | |
| tree | 4ae91cce54c8d9578dc3217b6454a921b91833a3 /fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | |
| parent | 15e7b8767605dc0cb9bd4594caabfec392385210 (diff) | |
| download | linux-84814d642a4f1f294bd675ab11aae1ca54c6cedb.tar.bz2 | |
eCryptfs: don't encrypt file key with filename key
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.
This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c index f6caeb1d1106..bdca1f4b3a3e 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c @@ -946,6 +946,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs( list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok, &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, mount_crypt_stat_list) { + if (global_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK) + continue; rc = ecryptfs_add_keysig(crypt_stat, global_auth_tok->sig); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding keysig; rc = [%d]\n", rc); |