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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-03-10 10:17:23 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-03-10 10:17:23 -0700 |
commit | 3d8dfe75ef69f4dd4ba35c09b20a5aa58b4a5078 (patch) | |
tree | e5dd2ba86a027007610df67331304e083fe560ec /drivers | |
parent | d6075262969321bcb5d795de25595fc2a141ac02 (diff) | |
parent | b855b58ac1b7891b219e1d9ef60c45c774cadefe (diff) | |
download | linux-3d8dfe75ef69f4dd4ba35c09b20a5aa58b4a5078.tar.bz2 |
Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
- Pseudo NMI support for arm64 using GICv3 interrupt priorities
- uaccess macros clean-up (unsafe user accessors also merged but
reverted, waiting for objtool support on arm64)
- ptrace regsets for Pointer Authentication (ARMv8.3) key management
- inX() ordering w.r.t. delay() on arm64 and riscv (acks in place by
the riscv maintainers)
- arm64/perf updates: PMU bindings converted to json-schema, unused
variable and misleading comment removed
- arm64/debug fixes to ensure checking of the triggering exception
level and to avoid the propagation of the UNKNOWN FAR value into the
si_code for debug signals
- Workaround for Fujitsu A64FX erratum 010001
- lib/raid6 ARM NEON optimisations
- NR_CPUS now defaults to 256 on arm64
- Minor clean-ups (documentation/comments, Kconfig warning, unused
asm-offsets, clang warnings)
- MAINTAINERS update for list information to the ARM64 ACPI entry
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (54 commits)
arm64: mmu: drop paging_init comments
arm64: debug: Ensure debug handlers check triggering exception level
arm64: debug: Don't propagate UNKNOWN FAR into si_code for debug signals
Revert "arm64: uaccess: Implement unsafe accessors"
arm64: avoid clang warning about self-assignment
arm64: Kconfig.platforms: fix warning unmet direct dependencies
lib/raid6: arm: optimize away a mask operation in NEON recovery routine
lib/raid6: use vdupq_n_u8 to avoid endianness warnings
arm64: io: Hook up __io_par() for inX() ordering
riscv: io: Update __io_[p]ar() macros to take an argument
asm-generic/io: Pass result of I/O accessor to __io_[p]ar()
arm64: Add workaround for Fujitsu A64FX erratum 010001
arm64: Rename get_thread_info()
arm64: Remove documentation about TIF_USEDFPU
arm64: irqflags: Fix clang build warnings
arm64: Enable the support of pseudo-NMIs
arm64: Skip irqflags tracing for NMI in IRQs disabled context
arm64: Skip preemption when exiting an NMI
arm64: Handle serror in NMI context
irqchip/gic-v3: Allow interrupts to be set as pseudo-NMI
...
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 265 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c | 2 |
4 files changed, 251 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c index f99995666f86..0c1af675c338 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c @@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ static struct ptdump_info efi_ptdump_info = { static int __init ptdump_init(void) { - if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) - return 0; + if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) + ptdump_debugfs_register(&efi_ptdump_info, "efi_page_tables"); - return ptdump_debugfs_register(&efi_ptdump_info, "efi_page_tables"); + return 0; } device_initcall(ptdump_init); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c index 698745c249e8..6fa2df383f22 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c @@ -89,11 +89,24 @@ exit: \ efi_rts_work.status; \ }) +#ifndef arch_efi_save_flags +#define arch_efi_save_flags(state_flags) local_save_flags(state_flags) +#define arch_efi_restore_flags(state_flags) local_irq_restore(state_flags) +#endif + +unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + arch_efi_save_flags(flags); + return flags; +} + void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call) { unsigned long cur_flags, mismatch; - local_save_flags(cur_flags); + cur_flags = efi_call_virt_save_flags(); mismatch = flags ^ cur_flags; if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(mismatch & ARCH_EFI_IRQ_FLAGS_MASK)) @@ -102,7 +115,7 @@ void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call) add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); pr_err_ratelimited(FW_BUG "IRQ flags corrupted (0x%08lx=>0x%08lx) by EFI %s\n", flags, cur_flags, call); - local_irq_restore(flags); + arch_efi_restore_flags(flags); } /* diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c index 0868a9d81c3c..15e55d327505 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <linux/of_address.h> #include <linux/of_irq.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> +#include <linux/refcount.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/irqchip.h> @@ -41,6 +42,8 @@ #include "irq-gic-common.h" +#define GICD_INT_NMI_PRI (GICD_INT_DEF_PRI & ~0x80) + #define FLAGS_WORKAROUND_GICR_WAKER_MSM8996 (1ULL << 0) struct redist_region { @@ -66,6 +69,34 @@ struct gic_chip_data { static struct gic_chip_data gic_data __read_mostly; static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(supports_deactivate_key); +/* + * The behaviours of RPR and PMR registers differ depending on the value of + * SCR_EL3.FIQ, and the behaviour of non-secure priority registers of the + * distributor and redistributors depends on whether security is enabled in the + * GIC. + * + * When security is enabled, non-secure priority values from the (re)distributor + * are presented to the GIC CPUIF as follow: + * (GIC_(R)DIST_PRI[irq] >> 1) | 0x80; + * + * If SCR_EL3.FIQ == 1, the values writen to/read from PMR and RPR at non-secure + * EL1 are subject to a similar operation thus matching the priorities presented + * from the (re)distributor when security is enabled. + * + * see GICv3/GICv4 Architecture Specification (IHI0069D): + * - section 4.8.1 Non-secure accesses to register fields for Secure interrupt + * priorities. + * - Figure 4-7 Secure read of the priority field for a Non-secure Group 1 + * interrupt. + * + * For now, we only support pseudo-NMIs if we have non-secure view of + * priorities. + */ +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(supports_pseudo_nmis); + +/* ppi_nmi_refs[n] == number of cpus having ppi[n + 16] set as NMI */ +static refcount_t ppi_nmi_refs[16]; + static struct gic_kvm_info gic_v3_kvm_info; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, has_rss); @@ -232,6 +263,12 @@ static void gic_unmask_irq(struct irq_data *d) gic_poke_irq(d, GICD_ISENABLER); } +static inline bool gic_supports_nmi(void) +{ + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI) && + static_branch_likely(&supports_pseudo_nmis); +} + static int gic_irq_set_irqchip_state(struct irq_data *d, enum irqchip_irq_state which, bool val) { @@ -287,6 +324,79 @@ static int gic_irq_get_irqchip_state(struct irq_data *d, return 0; } +static void gic_irq_set_prio(struct irq_data *d, u8 prio) +{ + void __iomem *base = gic_dist_base(d); + + writeb_relaxed(prio, base + GICD_IPRIORITYR + gic_irq(d)); +} + +static int gic_irq_nmi_setup(struct irq_data *d) +{ + struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(d->irq); + + if (!gic_supports_nmi()) + return -EINVAL; + + if (gic_peek_irq(d, GICD_ISENABLER)) { + pr_err("Cannot set NMI property of enabled IRQ %u\n", d->irq); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * A secondary irq_chip should be in charge of LPI request, + * it should not be possible to get there + */ + if (WARN_ON(gic_irq(d) >= 8192)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* desc lock should already be held */ + if (gic_irq(d) < 32) { + /* Setting up PPI as NMI, only switch handler for first NMI */ + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ppi_nmi_refs[gic_irq(d) - 16])) { + refcount_set(&ppi_nmi_refs[gic_irq(d) - 16], 1); + desc->handle_irq = handle_percpu_devid_fasteoi_nmi; + } + } else { + desc->handle_irq = handle_fasteoi_nmi; + } + + gic_irq_set_prio(d, GICD_INT_NMI_PRI); + + return 0; +} + +static void gic_irq_nmi_teardown(struct irq_data *d) +{ + struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(d->irq); + + if (WARN_ON(!gic_supports_nmi())) + return; + + if (gic_peek_irq(d, GICD_ISENABLER)) { + pr_err("Cannot set NMI property of enabled IRQ %u\n", d->irq); + return; + } + + /* + * A secondary irq_chip should be in charge of LPI request, + * it should not be possible to get there + */ + if (WARN_ON(gic_irq(d) >= 8192)) + return; + + /* desc lock should already be held */ + if (gic_irq(d) < 32) { + /* Tearing down NMI, only switch handler for last NMI */ + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ppi_nmi_refs[gic_irq(d) - 16])) + desc->handle_irq = handle_percpu_devid_irq; + } else { + desc->handle_irq = handle_fasteoi_irq; + } + + gic_irq_set_prio(d, GICD_INT_DEF_PRI); +} + static void gic_eoi_irq(struct irq_data *d) { gic_write_eoir(gic_irq(d)); @@ -350,12 +460,50 @@ static u64 gic_mpidr_to_affinity(unsigned long mpidr) return aff; } +static void gic_deactivate_unhandled(u32 irqnr) +{ + if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key)) { + if (irqnr < 8192) + gic_write_dir(irqnr); + } else { + gic_write_eoir(irqnr); + } +} + +static inline void gic_handle_nmi(u32 irqnr, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int err; + + if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key)) + gic_write_eoir(irqnr); + /* + * Leave the PSR.I bit set to prevent other NMIs to be + * received while handling this one. + * PSR.I will be restored when we ERET to the + * interrupted context. + */ + err = handle_domain_nmi(gic_data.domain, irqnr, regs); + if (err) + gic_deactivate_unhandled(irqnr); +} + static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_entry gic_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs) { u32 irqnr; irqnr = gic_read_iar(); + if (gic_supports_nmi() && + unlikely(gic_read_rpr() == GICD_INT_NMI_PRI)) { + gic_handle_nmi(irqnr, regs); + return; + } + + if (gic_prio_masking_enabled()) { + gic_pmr_mask_irqs(); + gic_arch_enable_irqs(); + } + if (likely(irqnr > 15 && irqnr < 1020) || irqnr >= 8192) { int err; @@ -367,12 +515,7 @@ static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_entry gic_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs err = handle_domain_irq(gic_data.domain, irqnr, regs); if (err) { WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected interrupt received!\n"); - if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key)) { - if (irqnr < 8192) - gic_write_dir(irqnr); - } else { - gic_write_eoir(irqnr); - } + gic_deactivate_unhandled(irqnr); } return; } @@ -395,6 +538,44 @@ static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_entry gic_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs } } +static u32 gic_get_pribits(void) +{ + u32 pribits; + + pribits = gic_read_ctlr(); + pribits &= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_MASK; + pribits >>= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_SHIFT; + pribits++; + + return pribits; +} + +static bool gic_has_group0(void) +{ + u32 val; + u32 old_pmr; + + old_pmr = gic_read_pmr(); + + /* + * Let's find out if Group0 is under control of EL3 or not by + * setting the highest possible, non-zero priority in PMR. + * + * If SCR_EL3.FIQ is set, the priority gets shifted down in + * order for the CPU interface to set bit 7, and keep the + * actual priority in the non-secure range. In the process, it + * looses the least significant bit and the actual priority + * becomes 0x80. Reading it back returns 0, indicating that + * we're don't have access to Group0. + */ + gic_write_pmr(BIT(8 - gic_get_pribits())); + val = gic_read_pmr(); + + gic_write_pmr(old_pmr); + + return val != 0; +} + static void __init gic_dist_init(void) { unsigned int i; @@ -530,13 +711,19 @@ static void gic_update_vlpi_properties(void) !gic_data.rdists.has_direct_lpi ? "no " : ""); } +/* Check whether it's single security state view */ +static inline bool gic_dist_security_disabled(void) +{ + return readl_relaxed(gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR) & GICD_CTLR_DS; +} + static void gic_cpu_sys_reg_init(void) { int i, cpu = smp_processor_id(); u64 mpidr = cpu_logical_map(cpu); u64 need_rss = MPIDR_RS(mpidr); bool group0; - u32 val, pribits; + u32 pribits; /* * Need to check that the SRE bit has actually been set. If @@ -548,28 +735,22 @@ static void gic_cpu_sys_reg_init(void) if (!gic_enable_sre()) pr_err("GIC: unable to set SRE (disabled at EL2), panic ahead\n"); - pribits = gic_read_ctlr(); - pribits &= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_MASK; - pribits >>= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_SHIFT; - pribits++; + pribits = gic_get_pribits(); - /* - * Let's find out if Group0 is under control of EL3 or not by - * setting the highest possible, non-zero priority in PMR. - * - * If SCR_EL3.FIQ is set, the priority gets shifted down in - * order for the CPU interface to set bit 7, and keep the - * actual priority in the non-secure range. In the process, it - * looses the least significant bit and the actual priority - * becomes 0x80. Reading it back returns 0, indicating that - * we're don't have access to Group0. - */ - write_gicreg(BIT(8 - pribits), ICC_PMR_EL1); - val = read_gicreg(ICC_PMR_EL1); - group0 = val != 0; + group0 = gic_has_group0(); /* Set priority mask register */ - write_gicreg(DEFAULT_PMR_VALUE, ICC_PMR_EL1); + if (!gic_prio_masking_enabled()) { + write_gicreg(DEFAULT_PMR_VALUE, ICC_PMR_EL1); + } else { + /* + * Mismatch configuration with boot CPU, the system is likely + * to die as interrupt masking will not work properly on all + * CPUs + */ + WARN_ON(gic_supports_nmi() && group0 && + !gic_dist_security_disabled()); + } /* * Some firmwares hand over to the kernel with the BPR changed from @@ -824,12 +1005,6 @@ static int gic_set_affinity(struct irq_data *d, const struct cpumask *mask_val, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PM -/* Check whether it's single security state view */ -static bool gic_dist_security_disabled(void) -{ - return readl_relaxed(gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR) & GICD_CTLR_DS; -} - static int gic_cpu_pm_notifier(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long cmd, void *v) { @@ -866,6 +1041,8 @@ static struct irq_chip gic_chip = { .irq_set_affinity = gic_set_affinity, .irq_get_irqchip_state = gic_irq_get_irqchip_state, .irq_set_irqchip_state = gic_irq_set_irqchip_state, + .irq_nmi_setup = gic_irq_nmi_setup, + .irq_nmi_teardown = gic_irq_nmi_teardown, .flags = IRQCHIP_SET_TYPE_MASKED | IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE | IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND, @@ -881,6 +1058,8 @@ static struct irq_chip gic_eoimode1_chip = { .irq_get_irqchip_state = gic_irq_get_irqchip_state, .irq_set_irqchip_state = gic_irq_set_irqchip_state, .irq_set_vcpu_affinity = gic_irq_set_vcpu_affinity, + .irq_nmi_setup = gic_irq_nmi_setup, + .irq_nmi_teardown = gic_irq_nmi_teardown, .flags = IRQCHIP_SET_TYPE_MASKED | IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE | IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND, @@ -1082,6 +1261,21 @@ static bool gic_enable_quirk_msm8996(void *data) return true; } +static void gic_enable_nmi_support(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + refcount_set(&ppi_nmi_refs[i], 0); + + static_branch_enable(&supports_pseudo_nmis); + + if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key)) + gic_eoimode1_chip.flags |= IRQCHIP_SUPPORTS_NMI; + else + gic_chip.flags |= IRQCHIP_SUPPORTS_NMI; +} + static int __init gic_init_bases(void __iomem *dist_base, struct redist_region *rdist_regs, u32 nr_redist_regions, @@ -1151,6 +1345,13 @@ static int __init gic_init_bases(void __iomem *dist_base, its_cpu_init(); } + if (gic_prio_masking_enabled()) { + if (!gic_has_group0() || gic_dist_security_disabled()) + gic_enable_nmi_support(); + else + pr_warn("SCR_EL3.FIQ is cleared, cannot enable use of pseudo-NMIs\n"); + } + return 0; out_free: diff --git a/drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c index d4ec04868d59..27574e85f351 100644 --- a/drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c +++ b/drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c @@ -1052,7 +1052,6 @@ static void xgene_perf_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags) static void xgene_perf_stop(struct perf_event *event, int flags) { struct hw_perf_event *hw = &event->hw; - u64 config; if (hw->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE) return; @@ -1064,7 +1063,6 @@ static void xgene_perf_stop(struct perf_event *event, int flags) if (hw->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE) return; - config = hw->config; xgene_perf_read(event); hw->state |= PERF_HES_UPTODATE; } |