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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-03-10 10:17:23 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-03-10 10:17:23 -0700
commit3d8dfe75ef69f4dd4ba35c09b20a5aa58b4a5078 (patch)
treee5dd2ba86a027007610df67331304e083fe560ec /drivers
parentd6075262969321bcb5d795de25595fc2a141ac02 (diff)
parentb855b58ac1b7891b219e1d9ef60c45c774cadefe (diff)
downloadlinux-3d8dfe75ef69f4dd4ba35c09b20a5aa58b4a5078.tar.bz2
Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas: - Pseudo NMI support for arm64 using GICv3 interrupt priorities - uaccess macros clean-up (unsafe user accessors also merged but reverted, waiting for objtool support on arm64) - ptrace regsets for Pointer Authentication (ARMv8.3) key management - inX() ordering w.r.t. delay() on arm64 and riscv (acks in place by the riscv maintainers) - arm64/perf updates: PMU bindings converted to json-schema, unused variable and misleading comment removed - arm64/debug fixes to ensure checking of the triggering exception level and to avoid the propagation of the UNKNOWN FAR value into the si_code for debug signals - Workaround for Fujitsu A64FX erratum 010001 - lib/raid6 ARM NEON optimisations - NR_CPUS now defaults to 256 on arm64 - Minor clean-ups (documentation/comments, Kconfig warning, unused asm-offsets, clang warnings) - MAINTAINERS update for list information to the ARM64 ACPI entry * tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (54 commits) arm64: mmu: drop paging_init comments arm64: debug: Ensure debug handlers check triggering exception level arm64: debug: Don't propagate UNKNOWN FAR into si_code for debug signals Revert "arm64: uaccess: Implement unsafe accessors" arm64: avoid clang warning about self-assignment arm64: Kconfig.platforms: fix warning unmet direct dependencies lib/raid6: arm: optimize away a mask operation in NEON recovery routine lib/raid6: use vdupq_n_u8 to avoid endianness warnings arm64: io: Hook up __io_par() for inX() ordering riscv: io: Update __io_[p]ar() macros to take an argument asm-generic/io: Pass result of I/O accessor to __io_[p]ar() arm64: Add workaround for Fujitsu A64FX erratum 010001 arm64: Rename get_thread_info() arm64: Remove documentation about TIF_USEDFPU arm64: irqflags: Fix clang build warnings arm64: Enable the support of pseudo-NMIs arm64: Skip irqflags tracing for NMI in IRQs disabled context arm64: Skip preemption when exiting an NMI arm64: Handle serror in NMI context irqchip/gic-v3: Allow interrupts to be set as pseudo-NMI ...
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
-rw-r--r--drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c6
-rw-r--r--drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c17
-rw-r--r--drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c265
-rw-r--r--drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c2
4 files changed, 251 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c
index f99995666f86..0c1af675c338 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c
@@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ static struct ptdump_info efi_ptdump_info = {
static int __init ptdump_init(void)
{
- if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
- return 0;
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
+ ptdump_debugfs_register(&efi_ptdump_info, "efi_page_tables");
- return ptdump_debugfs_register(&efi_ptdump_info, "efi_page_tables");
+ return 0;
}
device_initcall(ptdump_init);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c
index 698745c249e8..6fa2df383f22 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c
@@ -89,11 +89,24 @@ exit: \
efi_rts_work.status; \
})
+#ifndef arch_efi_save_flags
+#define arch_efi_save_flags(state_flags) local_save_flags(state_flags)
+#define arch_efi_restore_flags(state_flags) local_irq_restore(state_flags)
+#endif
+
+unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ arch_efi_save_flags(flags);
+ return flags;
+}
+
void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call)
{
unsigned long cur_flags, mismatch;
- local_save_flags(cur_flags);
+ cur_flags = efi_call_virt_save_flags();
mismatch = flags ^ cur_flags;
if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(mismatch & ARCH_EFI_IRQ_FLAGS_MASK))
@@ -102,7 +115,7 @@ void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call)
add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
pr_err_ratelimited(FW_BUG "IRQ flags corrupted (0x%08lx=>0x%08lx) by EFI %s\n",
flags, cur_flags, call);
- local_irq_restore(flags);
+ arch_efi_restore_flags(flags);
}
/*
diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
index 0868a9d81c3c..15e55d327505 100644
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/of_address.h>
#include <linux/of_irq.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/irqchip.h>
@@ -41,6 +42,8 @@
#include "irq-gic-common.h"
+#define GICD_INT_NMI_PRI (GICD_INT_DEF_PRI & ~0x80)
+
#define FLAGS_WORKAROUND_GICR_WAKER_MSM8996 (1ULL << 0)
struct redist_region {
@@ -66,6 +69,34 @@ struct gic_chip_data {
static struct gic_chip_data gic_data __read_mostly;
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(supports_deactivate_key);
+/*
+ * The behaviours of RPR and PMR registers differ depending on the value of
+ * SCR_EL3.FIQ, and the behaviour of non-secure priority registers of the
+ * distributor and redistributors depends on whether security is enabled in the
+ * GIC.
+ *
+ * When security is enabled, non-secure priority values from the (re)distributor
+ * are presented to the GIC CPUIF as follow:
+ * (GIC_(R)DIST_PRI[irq] >> 1) | 0x80;
+ *
+ * If SCR_EL3.FIQ == 1, the values writen to/read from PMR and RPR at non-secure
+ * EL1 are subject to a similar operation thus matching the priorities presented
+ * from the (re)distributor when security is enabled.
+ *
+ * see GICv3/GICv4 Architecture Specification (IHI0069D):
+ * - section 4.8.1 Non-secure accesses to register fields for Secure interrupt
+ * priorities.
+ * - Figure 4-7 Secure read of the priority field for a Non-secure Group 1
+ * interrupt.
+ *
+ * For now, we only support pseudo-NMIs if we have non-secure view of
+ * priorities.
+ */
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(supports_pseudo_nmis);
+
+/* ppi_nmi_refs[n] == number of cpus having ppi[n + 16] set as NMI */
+static refcount_t ppi_nmi_refs[16];
+
static struct gic_kvm_info gic_v3_kvm_info;
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, has_rss);
@@ -232,6 +263,12 @@ static void gic_unmask_irq(struct irq_data *d)
gic_poke_irq(d, GICD_ISENABLER);
}
+static inline bool gic_supports_nmi(void)
+{
+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI) &&
+ static_branch_likely(&supports_pseudo_nmis);
+}
+
static int gic_irq_set_irqchip_state(struct irq_data *d,
enum irqchip_irq_state which, bool val)
{
@@ -287,6 +324,79 @@ static int gic_irq_get_irqchip_state(struct irq_data *d,
return 0;
}
+static void gic_irq_set_prio(struct irq_data *d, u8 prio)
+{
+ void __iomem *base = gic_dist_base(d);
+
+ writeb_relaxed(prio, base + GICD_IPRIORITYR + gic_irq(d));
+}
+
+static int gic_irq_nmi_setup(struct irq_data *d)
+{
+ struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(d->irq);
+
+ if (!gic_supports_nmi())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (gic_peek_irq(d, GICD_ISENABLER)) {
+ pr_err("Cannot set NMI property of enabled IRQ %u\n", d->irq);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A secondary irq_chip should be in charge of LPI request,
+ * it should not be possible to get there
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON(gic_irq(d) >= 8192))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* desc lock should already be held */
+ if (gic_irq(d) < 32) {
+ /* Setting up PPI as NMI, only switch handler for first NMI */
+ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ppi_nmi_refs[gic_irq(d) - 16])) {
+ refcount_set(&ppi_nmi_refs[gic_irq(d) - 16], 1);
+ desc->handle_irq = handle_percpu_devid_fasteoi_nmi;
+ }
+ } else {
+ desc->handle_irq = handle_fasteoi_nmi;
+ }
+
+ gic_irq_set_prio(d, GICD_INT_NMI_PRI);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void gic_irq_nmi_teardown(struct irq_data *d)
+{
+ struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(d->irq);
+
+ if (WARN_ON(!gic_supports_nmi()))
+ return;
+
+ if (gic_peek_irq(d, GICD_ISENABLER)) {
+ pr_err("Cannot set NMI property of enabled IRQ %u\n", d->irq);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A secondary irq_chip should be in charge of LPI request,
+ * it should not be possible to get there
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON(gic_irq(d) >= 8192))
+ return;
+
+ /* desc lock should already be held */
+ if (gic_irq(d) < 32) {
+ /* Tearing down NMI, only switch handler for last NMI */
+ if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ppi_nmi_refs[gic_irq(d) - 16]))
+ desc->handle_irq = handle_percpu_devid_irq;
+ } else {
+ desc->handle_irq = handle_fasteoi_irq;
+ }
+
+ gic_irq_set_prio(d, GICD_INT_DEF_PRI);
+}
+
static void gic_eoi_irq(struct irq_data *d)
{
gic_write_eoir(gic_irq(d));
@@ -350,12 +460,50 @@ static u64 gic_mpidr_to_affinity(unsigned long mpidr)
return aff;
}
+static void gic_deactivate_unhandled(u32 irqnr)
+{
+ if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key)) {
+ if (irqnr < 8192)
+ gic_write_dir(irqnr);
+ } else {
+ gic_write_eoir(irqnr);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void gic_handle_nmi(u32 irqnr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key))
+ gic_write_eoir(irqnr);
+ /*
+ * Leave the PSR.I bit set to prevent other NMIs to be
+ * received while handling this one.
+ * PSR.I will be restored when we ERET to the
+ * interrupted context.
+ */
+ err = handle_domain_nmi(gic_data.domain, irqnr, regs);
+ if (err)
+ gic_deactivate_unhandled(irqnr);
+}
+
static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_entry gic_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u32 irqnr;
irqnr = gic_read_iar();
+ if (gic_supports_nmi() &&
+ unlikely(gic_read_rpr() == GICD_INT_NMI_PRI)) {
+ gic_handle_nmi(irqnr, regs);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (gic_prio_masking_enabled()) {
+ gic_pmr_mask_irqs();
+ gic_arch_enable_irqs();
+ }
+
if (likely(irqnr > 15 && irqnr < 1020) || irqnr >= 8192) {
int err;
@@ -367,12 +515,7 @@ static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_entry gic_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs
err = handle_domain_irq(gic_data.domain, irqnr, regs);
if (err) {
WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected interrupt received!\n");
- if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key)) {
- if (irqnr < 8192)
- gic_write_dir(irqnr);
- } else {
- gic_write_eoir(irqnr);
- }
+ gic_deactivate_unhandled(irqnr);
}
return;
}
@@ -395,6 +538,44 @@ static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_entry gic_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs
}
}
+static u32 gic_get_pribits(void)
+{
+ u32 pribits;
+
+ pribits = gic_read_ctlr();
+ pribits &= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_MASK;
+ pribits >>= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_SHIFT;
+ pribits++;
+
+ return pribits;
+}
+
+static bool gic_has_group0(void)
+{
+ u32 val;
+ u32 old_pmr;
+
+ old_pmr = gic_read_pmr();
+
+ /*
+ * Let's find out if Group0 is under control of EL3 or not by
+ * setting the highest possible, non-zero priority in PMR.
+ *
+ * If SCR_EL3.FIQ is set, the priority gets shifted down in
+ * order for the CPU interface to set bit 7, and keep the
+ * actual priority in the non-secure range. In the process, it
+ * looses the least significant bit and the actual priority
+ * becomes 0x80. Reading it back returns 0, indicating that
+ * we're don't have access to Group0.
+ */
+ gic_write_pmr(BIT(8 - gic_get_pribits()));
+ val = gic_read_pmr();
+
+ gic_write_pmr(old_pmr);
+
+ return val != 0;
+}
+
static void __init gic_dist_init(void)
{
unsigned int i;
@@ -530,13 +711,19 @@ static void gic_update_vlpi_properties(void)
!gic_data.rdists.has_direct_lpi ? "no " : "");
}
+/* Check whether it's single security state view */
+static inline bool gic_dist_security_disabled(void)
+{
+ return readl_relaxed(gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR) & GICD_CTLR_DS;
+}
+
static void gic_cpu_sys_reg_init(void)
{
int i, cpu = smp_processor_id();
u64 mpidr = cpu_logical_map(cpu);
u64 need_rss = MPIDR_RS(mpidr);
bool group0;
- u32 val, pribits;
+ u32 pribits;
/*
* Need to check that the SRE bit has actually been set. If
@@ -548,28 +735,22 @@ static void gic_cpu_sys_reg_init(void)
if (!gic_enable_sre())
pr_err("GIC: unable to set SRE (disabled at EL2), panic ahead\n");
- pribits = gic_read_ctlr();
- pribits &= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_MASK;
- pribits >>= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_SHIFT;
- pribits++;
+ pribits = gic_get_pribits();
- /*
- * Let's find out if Group0 is under control of EL3 or not by
- * setting the highest possible, non-zero priority in PMR.
- *
- * If SCR_EL3.FIQ is set, the priority gets shifted down in
- * order for the CPU interface to set bit 7, and keep the
- * actual priority in the non-secure range. In the process, it
- * looses the least significant bit and the actual priority
- * becomes 0x80. Reading it back returns 0, indicating that
- * we're don't have access to Group0.
- */
- write_gicreg(BIT(8 - pribits), ICC_PMR_EL1);
- val = read_gicreg(ICC_PMR_EL1);
- group0 = val != 0;
+ group0 = gic_has_group0();
/* Set priority mask register */
- write_gicreg(DEFAULT_PMR_VALUE, ICC_PMR_EL1);
+ if (!gic_prio_masking_enabled()) {
+ write_gicreg(DEFAULT_PMR_VALUE, ICC_PMR_EL1);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Mismatch configuration with boot CPU, the system is likely
+ * to die as interrupt masking will not work properly on all
+ * CPUs
+ */
+ WARN_ON(gic_supports_nmi() && group0 &&
+ !gic_dist_security_disabled());
+ }
/*
* Some firmwares hand over to the kernel with the BPR changed from
@@ -824,12 +1005,6 @@ static int gic_set_affinity(struct irq_data *d, const struct cpumask *mask_val,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PM
-/* Check whether it's single security state view */
-static bool gic_dist_security_disabled(void)
-{
- return readl_relaxed(gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR) & GICD_CTLR_DS;
-}
-
static int gic_cpu_pm_notifier(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long cmd, void *v)
{
@@ -866,6 +1041,8 @@ static struct irq_chip gic_chip = {
.irq_set_affinity = gic_set_affinity,
.irq_get_irqchip_state = gic_irq_get_irqchip_state,
.irq_set_irqchip_state = gic_irq_set_irqchip_state,
+ .irq_nmi_setup = gic_irq_nmi_setup,
+ .irq_nmi_teardown = gic_irq_nmi_teardown,
.flags = IRQCHIP_SET_TYPE_MASKED |
IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE |
IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND,
@@ -881,6 +1058,8 @@ static struct irq_chip gic_eoimode1_chip = {
.irq_get_irqchip_state = gic_irq_get_irqchip_state,
.irq_set_irqchip_state = gic_irq_set_irqchip_state,
.irq_set_vcpu_affinity = gic_irq_set_vcpu_affinity,
+ .irq_nmi_setup = gic_irq_nmi_setup,
+ .irq_nmi_teardown = gic_irq_nmi_teardown,
.flags = IRQCHIP_SET_TYPE_MASKED |
IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE |
IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND,
@@ -1082,6 +1261,21 @@ static bool gic_enable_quirk_msm8996(void *data)
return true;
}
+static void gic_enable_nmi_support(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ refcount_set(&ppi_nmi_refs[i], 0);
+
+ static_branch_enable(&supports_pseudo_nmis);
+
+ if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key))
+ gic_eoimode1_chip.flags |= IRQCHIP_SUPPORTS_NMI;
+ else
+ gic_chip.flags |= IRQCHIP_SUPPORTS_NMI;
+}
+
static int __init gic_init_bases(void __iomem *dist_base,
struct redist_region *rdist_regs,
u32 nr_redist_regions,
@@ -1151,6 +1345,13 @@ static int __init gic_init_bases(void __iomem *dist_base,
its_cpu_init();
}
+ if (gic_prio_masking_enabled()) {
+ if (!gic_has_group0() || gic_dist_security_disabled())
+ gic_enable_nmi_support();
+ else
+ pr_warn("SCR_EL3.FIQ is cleared, cannot enable use of pseudo-NMIs\n");
+ }
+
return 0;
out_free:
diff --git a/drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c
index d4ec04868d59..27574e85f351 100644
--- a/drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c
+++ b/drivers/perf/xgene_pmu.c
@@ -1052,7 +1052,6 @@ static void xgene_perf_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
static void xgene_perf_stop(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hw = &event->hw;
- u64 config;
if (hw->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE)
return;
@@ -1064,7 +1063,6 @@ static void xgene_perf_stop(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
if (hw->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE)
return;
- config = hw->config;
xgene_perf_read(event);
hw->state |= PERF_HES_UPTODATE;
}