crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds

In preparation for adding XChaCha12 support, rename/refactor
chacha20-generic to support different numbers of rounds.  The
justification for needing XChaCha12 support is explained in more detail
in the patch "crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support".

The only difference between ChaCha{8,12,20} are the number of rounds
itself; all other parts of the algorithm are the same.  Therefore,
remove the "20" from all definitions, structures, functions, files, etc.
that will be shared by all ChaCha versions.

Also make ->setkey() store the round count in the chacha_ctx (previously
chacha20_ctx).  The generic code then passes the round count through to
chacha_block().  There will be a ->setkey() function for each explicitly
allowed round count; the encrypt/decrypt functions will be the same.  I
decided not to do it the opposite way (same ->setkey() function for all
round counts, with different encrypt/decrypt functions) because that
would have required more boilerplate code in architecture-specific
implementations of ChaCha and XChaCha.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

4 files changed, 31 insertions, 32 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 2eb70e76ed35..38c6d1af6d1c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/completion.h>
 #include <linux/uuid.h>
-#include <crypto/chacha20.h>
+#include <crypto/chacha.h>
 
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -431,11 +431,10 @@ static int crng_init = 0;
 #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
 static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
 static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
-			  __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
+static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
+				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
 static void process_random_ready_list(void);
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
@@ -863,7 +862,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
 	}
 	p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
 	while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
-		p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
+		p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
 		cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--;
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
@@ -895,7 +894,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
 	unsigned long		flags;
 	static unsigned char	lfsr = 1;
 	unsigned char		tmp;
-	unsigned		i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
+	unsigned		i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE;
 	const char *		src_buf = cp;
 	char *			dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
 
@@ -913,8 +912,8 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
 		lfsr >>= 1;
 		if (tmp & 1)
 			lfsr ^= 0xE1;
-		tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
-		dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
+		tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+		dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
 		lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
@@ -926,7 +925,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
 	unsigned long	flags;
 	int		i, num;
 	union {
-		__u8	block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		__u8	block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
 		__u32	key[8];
 	} buf;
 
@@ -937,7 +936,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
 	} else {
 		_extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
 		_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
-					CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+					CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
 	}
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
@@ -973,7 +972,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
 }
 
 static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
-			  __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
+			  __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
 	unsigned long v, flags;
 
@@ -990,7 +989,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
 	struct crng_state *crng = NULL;
 
@@ -1008,14 +1007,14 @@ static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
  * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
  */
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 {
 	unsigned long	flags;
 	__u32		*s, *d;
 	int		i;
 
 	used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32));
-	if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+	if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 		extract_crng(tmp);
 		used = 0;
 	}
@@ -1027,7 +1026,7 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 {
 	struct crng_state *crng = NULL;
 
@@ -1042,8 +1041,8 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 
 static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+	ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
 	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
 
 	while (nbytes) {
@@ -1057,7 +1056,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 		}
 
 		extract_crng(tmp);
-		i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
 		if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			break;
@@ -1622,14 +1621,14 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
  */
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
 
 	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 
-	while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+	while (nbytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 		extract_crng(buf);
-		buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
-		nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	}
 
 	if (nbytes > 0) {
@@ -1637,7 +1636,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 		memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
 		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes);
 	} else
-		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 }
 
@@ -2208,8 +2207,8 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 
 struct batched_entropy {
 	union {
-		u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
-		u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+		u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
+		u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
 	};
 	unsigned int position;
 };
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
index 523565ce0060..92e593e2069a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int chachapoly_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
 	unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
 	unsigned int saltlen = CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE - ivsize;
 
-	if (keylen != CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE + saltlen) {
+	if (keylen != CHACHA_KEY_SIZE + saltlen) {
 		crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c
index 2598640aa98b..425d5d974613 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ static int chachapoly_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
 	unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
 	unsigned int saltlen = CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE - ivsize;
 
-	if (keylen != CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE + saltlen) {
+	if (keylen != CHACHA_KEY_SIZE + saltlen) {
 		crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1577,9 +1577,9 @@ static struct caam_skcipher_alg driver_algs[] = {
 			.setkey = skcipher_setkey,
 			.encrypt = skcipher_encrypt,
 			.decrypt = skcipher_decrypt,
-			.min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE,
-			.max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE,
-			.ivsize = CHACHA20_IV_SIZE,
+			.min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE,
+			.ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE,
 		},
 		.caam.class1_alg_type = OP_ALG_ALGSEL_CHACHA20,
 	},
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/compat.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/compat.h
index 8bde903f9f4a..87d9efe4c7aa 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/compat.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/compat.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 #include <crypto/gcm.h>
 #include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/md5.h>
-#include <crypto/chacha20.h>
+#include <crypto/chacha.h>
 #include <crypto/poly1305.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
 #include <crypto/authenc.h>