kvm: nVMX: Disallow userspace-injected exceptions in guest mode

The userspace exception injection API and code path are entirely
unprepared for exceptions that might cause a VM-exit from L2 to L1, so
the best course of action may be to simply disallow this for now.

1. The API provides no mechanism for userspace to specify the new DR6
bits for a #DB exception or the new CR2 value for a #PF
exception. Presumably, userspace is expected to modify these registers
directly with KVM_SET_SREGS before the next KVM_RUN ioctl. However, in
the event that L1 intercepts the exception, these registers should not
be changed. Instead, the new values should be provided in the
exit_qualification field of vmcs12 (Intel SDM vol 3, section 27.1).

2. In the case of a userspace-injected #DB, inject_pending_event()
clears DR7.GD before calling vmx_queue_exception(). However, in the
event that L1 intercepts the exception, this is too early, because
DR7.GD should not be modified by a #DB that causes a VM-exit directly
(Intel SDM vol 3, section 27.1).

3. If the injected exception is a #PF, nested_vmx_check_exception()
doesn't properly check whether or not L1 is interested in the
associated error code (using the #PF error code mask and match fields
from vmcs12). It may either return 0 when it should call
nested_vmx_vmexit() or vice versa.

4. nested_vmx_check_exception() assumes that it is dealing with a
hardware-generated exception intercept from L2, with some of the
relevant details (the VM-exit interruption-information and the exit
qualification) live in vmcs02. For userspace-injected exceptions, this
is not the case.

5. prepare_vmcs12() assumes that when its exit_intr_info argument
specifies valid information with a valid error code that it can VMREAD
the VM-exit interruption error code from vmcs02. For
userspace-injected exceptions, this is not the case.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

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