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authorHarald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>2018-06-27 09:50:43 +0200
committerMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>2018-07-02 11:24:55 +0200
commit1fee96264a718fc5a2a94a09d5c7e2915a1c76b2 (patch)
tree7a489dfd2bb1be1eb443b239410eb901689eca58 /drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h
parentad82a928eb58471adb2dec2001f5fbe57e5ee4b5 (diff)
downloadlinux-1fee96264a718fc5a2a94a09d5c7e2915a1c76b2.tar.bz2
s390/zcrypt: add copy_from_user length plausibility checks
There have been identified some places in the zcrypt device driver where copy_from_user() is called but the length value is not explicitly checked. So now some plausibility checks and comments have been introduced there. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h')
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h20
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h
index 011d61d8a4ae..1752622b95f7 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec {
* @mex: pointer to user input data
* @p: pointer to memory area for the key
*
- * Returns the size of the key area or -EFAULT
+ * Returns the size of the key area or negative errno value.
*/
static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_en(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, void *p)
{
@@ -118,6 +118,15 @@ static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_en(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, void *p)
unsigned char *temp;
int i;
+ /*
+ * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching
+ * function zcrypt_rsa_modexpo(). However, do a plausibility check
+ * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized
+ * to compromise the system.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mex->inputdatalength > 512))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
key->pubHdr = static_pub_hdr;
@@ -178,6 +187,15 @@ static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, void *p)
struct cca_public_sec *pub;
int short_len, long_len, pad_len, key_len, size;
+ /*
+ * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching
+ * function zcrypt_rsa_crt(). However, do a plausibility check
+ * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized
+ * to compromise the system.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crt->inputdatalength > 512))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
short_len = (crt->inputdatalength + 1) / 2;