summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/drivers/input
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDavid Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>2013-09-07 12:23:05 -0700
committerDmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>2013-09-07 12:53:20 -0700
commitc7dc65737c9a607d3e6f8478659876074ad129b8 (patch)
treeab5a3f751d28ae4d9c1be61b0877c95aa0e56338 /drivers/input
parent07176b988ebb20f46a317a60ee1d983fe1630203 (diff)
downloadlinux-c7dc65737c9a607d3e6f8478659876074ad129b8.tar.bz2
Input: evdev - add EVIOCREVOKE ioctl
If we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed: http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.html We currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices. With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active /dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency). This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active. Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd. Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer. There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used: http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.html Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/input')
-rw-r--r--drivers/input/evdev.c37
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/input/evdev.c b/drivers/input/evdev.c
index d2b34fbbc42e..b6ded17b3be3 100644
--- a/drivers/input/evdev.c
+++ b/drivers/input/evdev.c
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {
struct evdev *evdev;
struct list_head node;
int clkid;
+ bool revoked;
unsigned int bufsize;
struct input_event buffer[];
};
@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client,
struct input_event event;
bool wakeup = false;
+ if (client->revoked)
+ return;
+
event.time = ktime_to_timeval(client->clkid == CLOCK_MONOTONIC ?
mono : real);
@@ -240,7 +244,7 @@ static int evdev_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id)
if (retval)
return retval;
- if (!evdev->exist)
+ if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked)
retval = -ENODEV;
else
retval = input_flush_device(&evdev->handle, file);
@@ -429,7 +433,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
if (retval)
return retval;
- if (!evdev->exist) {
+ if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) {
retval = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
@@ -482,7 +486,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
return -EINVAL;
for (;;) {
- if (!evdev->exist)
+ if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked)
return -ENODEV;
if (client->packet_head == client->tail &&
@@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
if (!(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
error = wait_event_interruptible(evdev->wait,
client->packet_head != client->tail ||
- !evdev->exist);
+ !evdev->exist || client->revoked);
if (error)
return error;
}
@@ -529,7 +533,11 @@ static unsigned int evdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
poll_wait(file, &evdev->wait, wait);
- mask = evdev->exist ? POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM : POLLHUP | POLLERR;
+ if (evdev->exist && !client->revoked)
+ mask = POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
+ else
+ mask = POLLHUP | POLLERR;
+
if (client->packet_head != client->tail)
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
@@ -795,6 +803,17 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(struct input_dev *dev,
return 0;
}
+static int evdev_revoke(struct evdev *evdev, struct evdev_client *client,
+ struct file *file)
+{
+ client->revoked = true;
+ evdev_ungrab(evdev, client);
+ input_flush_device(&evdev->handle, file);
+ wake_up_interruptible(&evdev->wait);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
void __user *p, int compat_mode)
{
@@ -857,6 +876,12 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
else
return evdev_ungrab(evdev, client);
+ case EVIOCREVOKE:
+ if (p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else
+ return evdev_revoke(evdev, client, file);
+
case EVIOCSCLOCKID:
if (copy_from_user(&i, p, sizeof(unsigned int)))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1002,7 +1027,7 @@ static long evdev_ioctl_handler(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
if (retval)
return retval;
- if (!evdev->exist) {
+ if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) {
retval = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}