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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2015-06-22 21:04:48 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2015-06-22 21:04:48 -0700
commit44d21c3f3a2ef2f58b18bda64c52c99e723f3f4a (patch)
tree5146cf96cb0dbd7121176d484417ab942c92dcd4 /drivers/char
parentefdfce2b7ff3205ba0fba10270b92b80bbc6187d (diff)
parentfe55dfdcdfabf160ab0c14617725c57c7a1facfc (diff)
downloadlinux-44d21c3f3a2ef2f58b18bda64c52c99e723f3f4a.tar.bz2
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu: "Here is the crypto update for 4.2: API: - Convert RNG interface to new style. - New AEAD interface with one SG list for AD and plain/cipher text. All external AEAD users have been converted. - New asymmetric key interface (akcipher). Algorithms: - Chacha20, Poly1305 and RFC7539 support. - New RSA implementation. - Jitter RNG. - DRBG is now seeded with both /dev/random and Jitter RNG. If kernel pool isn't ready then DRBG will be reseeded when it is. - DRBG is now the default crypto API RNG, replacing krng. - 842 compression (previously part of powerpc nx driver). Drivers: - Accelerated SHA-512 for arm64. - New Marvell CESA driver that supports DMA and more algorithms. - Updated powerpc nx 842 support. - Added support for SEC1 hardware to talitos" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (292 commits) crypto: marvell/cesa - remove COMPILE_TEST dependency crypto: algif_aead - Temporarily disable all AEAD algorithms crypto: af_alg - Forbid the use internal algorithms crypto: echainiv - Only hold RNG during initialisation crypto: seqiv - Add compatibility support without RNG crypto: eseqiv - Offer normal cipher functionality without RNG crypto: chainiv - Offer normal cipher functionality without RNG crypto: user - Add CRYPTO_MSG_DELRNG crypto: user - Move cryptouser.h to uapi crypto: rng - Do not free default RNG when it becomes unused crypto: skcipher - Allow givencrypt to be NULL crypto: sahara - propagate the error on clk_disable_unprepare() failure crypto: rsa - fix invalid select for AKCIPHER crypto: picoxcell - Update to the current clk API crypto: nx - Check for bogus firmware properties crypto: marvell/cesa - add DT bindings documentation crypto: marvell/cesa - add support for Kirkwood and Dove SoCs crypto: marvell/cesa - add support for Orion SoCs crypto: marvell/cesa - add allhwsupport module parameter crypto: marvell/cesa - add support for all armada SoCs ...
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/random.c80
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 9cd6968e2f92..d0da5d852d41 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -409,6 +409,9 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(urandom_init_wait);
static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
+static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
+
/**********************************************************************
*
* OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
@@ -589,6 +592,22 @@ static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f)
f->count++;
}
+static void process_random_ready_list(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) {
+ struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
+
+ list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+ rdy->func(rdy);
+ module_put(owner);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+}
+
/*
* Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
* Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
@@ -660,7 +679,8 @@ retry:
r->entropy_total = 0;
if (r == &nonblocking_pool) {
prandom_reseed_late();
- wake_up_interruptible(&urandom_init_wait);
+ process_random_ready_list();
+ wake_up_all(&urandom_init_wait);
pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n", r->name);
}
}
@@ -1245,6 +1265,64 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
/*
+ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
+ * pool is initialised.
+ *
+ * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
+ * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
+ * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
+ */
+int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+{
+ struct module *owner;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int err = -EALREADY;
+
+ if (likely(nonblocking_pool.initialized))
+ return err;
+
+ owner = rdy->owner;
+ if (!try_module_get(owner))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ if (nonblocking_pool.initialized)
+ goto out;
+
+ owner = NULL;
+
+ list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
+ err = 0;
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+
+ module_put(owner);
+
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
+
+/*
+ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+ */
+void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct module *owner = NULL;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
+ list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+ owner = rdy->owner;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+
+ module_put(owner);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
+
+/*
* This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
* number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will
* almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it