Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "This contains:

   - a PTI bugfix to avoid setting reserved CR3 bits when PCID is
     disabled. This seems to cause issues on a virtual machine at least
     and is incorrect according to the AMD manual.

   - a PTI bugfix which disables the perf BTS facility if PTI is
     enabled. The BTS AUX buffer is not globally visible and causes the
     CPU to fault when the mapping disappears on switching CR3 to user
     space. A full fix which restores BTS on PTI is non trivial and will
     be worked on.

   - PTI bugfixes for EFI and trusted boot which make sure that the user
     space visible page table entries have the NX bit cleared

   - removal of dead code in the PTI pagetable setup functions

   - add PTI documentation

   - add a selftest for vsyscall to verify that the kernel actually
     implements what it advertises.

   - a sysfs interface to expose vulnerability and mitigation
     information so there is a coherent way for users to retrieve the
     status.

   - the initial spectre_v2 mitigations, aka retpoline:

      + The necessary ASM thunk and compiler support

      + The ASM variants of retpoline and the conversion of affected ASM
        code

      + Make LFENCE serializing on AMD so it can be used as speculation
        trap

      + The RSB fill after vmexit

   - initial objtool support for retpoline

  As I said in the status mail this is the most of the set of patches
  which should go into 4.15 except two straight forward patches still on
  hold:

   - the retpoline add on of LFENCE which waits for ACKs

   - the RSB fill after context switch

  Both should be ready to go early next week and with that we'll have
  covered the major holes of spectre_v2 and go back to normality"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (28 commits)
  x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI
  security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI
  x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines
  selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall
  x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
  x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
  x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
  x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
  x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
  objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored
  objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks
  x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real
  x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking
  sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation
  x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC
  ...

1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 58a9b608d821..d99038487a0d 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -511,10 +511,58 @@ static void __init cpu_dev_register_generic(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
+	&dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr,
+	&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group cpu_root_vulnerabilities_group = {
+	.name  = "vulnerabilities",
+	.attrs = cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs,
+};
+
+static void __init cpu_register_vulnerabilities(void)
+{
+	if (sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
+			       &cpu_root_vulnerabilities_group))
+		pr_err("Unable to register CPU vulnerabilities\n");
+}
+
+#else
+static inline void cpu_register_vulnerabilities(void) { }
+#endif
+
 void __init cpu_dev_init(void)
 {
 	if (subsys_system_register(&cpu_subsys, cpu_root_attr_groups))
 		panic("Failed to register CPU subsystem");
 
 	cpu_dev_register_generic();
+	cpu_register_vulnerabilities();
 }