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authorJulius Hemanth Pitti <jpitti@cisco.com>2022-05-13 16:58:15 -0700
committerAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>2022-05-13 16:58:15 -0700
commitc7031c144043c5b9a9b8827aaf44a67937559418 (patch)
tree3fd6171000d852799cbeb1a1637882d4185e79bd /crypto
parent25d9767831d3dcae8f9f278555ba9ed57b30bbce (diff)
downloadlinux-c7031c144043c5b9a9b8827aaf44a67937559418.tar.bz2
proc/sysctl: make protected_* world readable
protected_* files have 600 permissions which prevents non-superuser from reading them. Container like "AWS greengrass" refuse to launch unless protected_hardlinks and protected_symlinks are set. When containers like these run with "userns-remap" or "--user" mapping container's root to non-superuser on host, they fail to run due to denied read access to these files. As these protections are hardly a secret, and do not possess any security risk, making them world readable. Though above greengrass usecase needs read access to only protected_hardlinks and protected_symlinks files, setting all other protected_* files to 644 to keep consistency. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200709235115.56954-1-jpitti@cisco.com Fixes: 800179c9b8a1 ("fs: add link restrictions") Signed-off-by: Julius Hemanth Pitti <jpitti@cisco.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
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