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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-09-27 19:37:27 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-09-27 19:37:27 -0700 |
commit | f1f2f614d535564992f32e720739cb53cf03489f (patch) | |
tree | 7c363b95df8d63954e822c98462fd3a9a98794ae /crypto | |
parent | 298fb76a5583900a155d387efaf37a8b39e5dea2 (diff) | |
parent | 2a7f0e53daf29ca6dc9fbe2a27158f13474ec1b5 (diff) | |
download | linux-f1f2f614d535564992f32e720739cb53cf03489f.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and
appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug
fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size().
In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel
image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same
scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules.
Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature.
This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature
verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of
calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list
and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file
hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing
the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended
signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.)
The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other
signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single
system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and
the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig)
ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig()
MODSIGN: make new include file self contained
ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request
ima: always return negative code for error
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 33 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 11bee67fa9cc..ce49820caa97 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/asn1.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "pkcs7_parser.h" @@ -29,6 +30,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo); + /* The digest was calculated already. */ + if (sig->digest) + return 0; + if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo) return -ENOPKG; @@ -117,6 +122,34 @@ error_no_desc: return ret; } +int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len, + enum hash_algo *hash_algo) +{ + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; + int i, ret; + + /* + * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature. + */ + if (sinfo == NULL || sinfo->next != NULL) + return -EBADMSG; + + ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo); + if (ret) + return ret; + + *buf = sinfo->sig->digest; + *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size; + + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) + if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) { + *hash_algo = i; + break; + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7 * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for |