summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/crypto
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2018-01-03 11:16:30 -0800
committerHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2018-01-12 23:03:39 +1100
commitdc26c17f743aa8e4720a5fda577dde855f2e36f8 (patch)
treefcd23cb048b79d5d3a83a0901aae8289da8e46cc /crypto
parentf8d33fac84806eebd2ba31a3136066eeca19255f (diff)
downloadlinux-dc26c17f743aa8e4720a5fda577dde855f2e36f8.tar.bz2
crypto: aead - prevent using AEADs without setting key
Similar to what was done for the hash API, update the AEAD API to track whether each transform has been keyed, and reject encryption/decryption if a key is needed but one hasn't been set. This isn't quite as important as the equivalent fix for the hash API because AEADs always require a key, so are unlikely to be used without one. Still, tracking the key will prevent accidental unkeyed use. algif_aead also had to track the key anyway, so the new flag replaces that and slightly simplifies the algif_aead implementation. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/aead.c13
-rw-r--r--crypto/algif_aead.c11
2 files changed, 14 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/aead.c b/crypto/aead.c
index fe00cbd7243d..60b3bbe973e7 100644
--- a/crypto/aead.c
+++ b/crypto/aead.c
@@ -54,11 +54,18 @@ int crypto_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
+ int err;
if ((unsigned long)key & alignmask)
- return setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
+ err = setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
+ else
+ err = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
- return crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
+ crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_setkey);
@@ -93,6 +100,8 @@ static int crypto_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
struct crypto_aead *aead = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
+
aead->authsize = alg->maxauthsize;
if (alg->exit)
diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c
index d963c8cf8a55..4b07edd5a9ff 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
struct aead_tfm {
struct crypto_aead *aead;
- bool has_key;
struct crypto_skcipher *null_tfm;
};
@@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int aead_check_key(struct socket *sock)
err = -ENOKEY;
lock_sock_nested(psk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
- if (!tfm->has_key)
+ if (crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm->aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
goto unlock;
if (!pask->refcnt++)
@@ -523,12 +522,8 @@ static int aead_setauthsize(void *private, unsigned int authsize)
static int aead_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct aead_tfm *tfm = private;
- int err;
-
- err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm->aead, key, keylen);
- tfm->has_key = !err;
- return err;
+ return crypto_aead_setkey(tfm->aead, key, keylen);
}
static void aead_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
@@ -589,7 +584,7 @@ static int aead_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
struct aead_tfm *tfm = private;
- if (!tfm->has_key)
+ if (crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm->aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
return -ENOKEY;
return aead_accept_parent_nokey(private, sk);