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author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2019-01-06 18:47:42 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2019-01-18 18:40:24 +0800 |
commit | ba7d7433a0e998c902132bd47330e355a1eaa894 (patch) | |
tree | 173b444702f5d2114d687711b3376477dbbde26b /crypto/shash.c | |
parent | 6b476662b09c393936e0f62c97ad9988d410fd36 (diff) | |
download | linux-ba7d7433a0e998c902132bd47330e355a1eaa894.tar.bz2 |
crypto: hash - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a
key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.
Note: we can't set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY for OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, so
->setkey() for those must nevertheless be atomic. That's fine for now
since only the crc32 and crc32c algorithms set OPTIONAL_KEY, and it's
not intended that OPTIONAL_KEY be used much.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed"
states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
Fixes: 9fa68f620041 ("crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/shash.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/shash.c | 18 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/shash.c b/crypto/shash.c index 44d297b82a8f..40311ccad3fa 100644 --- a/crypto/shash.c +++ b/crypto/shash.c @@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ static int shash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, return err; } +static void shash_set_needkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, struct shash_alg *alg) +{ + if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(alg) && + !(alg->base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY)) + crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY); +} + int crypto_shash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) { @@ -65,8 +72,10 @@ int crypto_shash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, else err = shash->setkey(tfm, key, keylen); - if (err) + if (unlikely(err)) { + shash_set_needkey(tfm, shash); return err; + } crypto_shash_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY); return 0; @@ -373,7 +382,8 @@ int crypto_init_shash_ops_async(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) crt->final = shash_async_final; crt->finup = shash_async_finup; crt->digest = shash_async_digest; - crt->setkey = shash_async_setkey; + if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(alg)) + crt->setkey = shash_async_setkey; crypto_ahash_set_flags(crt, crypto_shash_get_flags(shash) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY); @@ -395,9 +405,7 @@ static int crypto_shash_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) hash->descsize = alg->descsize; - if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(alg) && - !(alg->base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY)) - crypto_shash_set_flags(hash, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY); + shash_set_needkey(hash, alg); return 0; } |