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authorTadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>2016-02-02 10:08:53 -0800
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-02-10 10:13:27 +0000
commitdb6c43bd2132dc2dd63d73a6d1ed601cffd0ae06 (patch)
tree419c6b0bf5716e79a7047d2ba9eced1a1b0e5cd8 /crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
parent50d35015ff0c00a464e35b109231145d2beec1bd (diff)
downloadlinux-db6c43bd2132dc2dd63d73a6d1ed601cffd0ae06.tar.bz2
crypto: KEYS: convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher api
This patch converts the module verification code to the new akcipher API. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c212
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 133 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
index 508b57b77474..51502bca65e7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSA: "fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include "public_key.h"
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("RSA Public Key Algorithm");
@@ -84,72 +84,10 @@ static const struct {
#undef _
};
-/*
- * RSAVP1() function [RFC3447 sec 5.2.2]
- */
-static int RSAVP1(const struct public_key *key, MPI s, MPI *_m)
-{
- MPI m;
- int ret;
-
- /* (1) Validate 0 <= s < n */
- if (mpi_cmp_ui(s, 0) < 0) {
- kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s < 0]");
- return -EBADMSG;
- }
- if (mpi_cmp(s, key->rsa.n) >= 0) {
- kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s >= n]");
- return -EBADMSG;
- }
-
- m = mpi_alloc(0);
- if (!m)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- /* (2) m = s^e mod n */
- ret = mpi_powm(m, s, key->rsa.e, key->rsa.n);
- if (ret < 0) {
- mpi_free(m);
- return ret;
- }
-
- *_m = m;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Integer to Octet String conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.1]
- */
-static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **pX)
-{
- unsigned X_size, x_size;
- int X_sign;
- u8 *X;
-
- /* Make sure the string is the right length. The number should begin
- * with { 0x00, 0x01, ... } so we have to account for 15 leading zero
- * bits not being reported by MPI.
- */
- x_size = mpi_get_nbits(x);
- pr_devel("size(x)=%u xLen*8=%zu\n", x_size, xLen * 8);
- if (x_size != xLen * 8 - 15)
- return -ERANGE;
-
- X = mpi_get_buffer(x, &X_size, &X_sign);
- if (!X)
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (X_sign < 0) {
- kfree(X);
- return -EBADMSG;
- }
- if (X_size != xLen - 1) {
- kfree(X);
- return -EBADMSG;
- }
-
- *pX = X;
- return 0;
-}
+struct rsa_completion {
+ struct completion completion;
+ int err;
+};
/*
* Perform the RSA signature verification.
@@ -160,7 +98,7 @@ static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **pX)
* @asn1_template: The DigestInfo ASN.1 template
* @asn1_size: Size of asm1_template[]
*/
-static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
+static int rsa_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
const u8 *asn1_template, size_t asn1_size)
{
unsigned PS_end, T_offset, i;
@@ -170,9 +108,11 @@ static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
if (k < 2 + 1 + asn1_size + hash_size)
return -EBADMSG;
- /* Decode the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 */
- if (EM[1] != 0x01) {
- kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[1] == %02u]", EM[1]);
+ /* Decode the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
+ * note: leading zeros are stripped by the RSA implementation
+ */
+ if (EM[0] != 0x01) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[0] == %02u]", EM[0]);
return -EBADMSG;
}
@@ -183,7 +123,7 @@ static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
return -EBADMSG;
}
- for (i = 2; i < PS_end; i++) {
+ for (i = 1; i < PS_end; i++) {
if (EM[i] != 0xff) {
kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[PS%x] == %02u]", i - 2, EM[i]);
return -EBADMSG;
@@ -204,75 +144,81 @@ static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
return 0;
}
-/*
- * Perform the verification step [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2].
- */
-static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key,
- const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+static void public_key_verify_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
{
- size_t tsize;
- int ret;
+ struct rsa_completion *compl = req->data;
- /* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */
- const u8 *H = sig->digest;
- u8 *EM = NULL;
- MPI m = NULL;
- size_t k;
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
- kenter("");
-
- if (!RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data)
- return -ENOTSUPP;
-
- /* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */
- k = mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n);
- tsize = mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s);
+ compl->err = err;
+ complete(&compl->completion);
+}
- /* According to RFC 4880 sec 3.2, length of MPI is computed starting
- * from most significant bit. So the RFC 3447 sec 8.2.2 size check
- * must be relaxed to conform with shorter signatures - so we fail here
- * only if signature length is longer than modulus size.
- */
- pr_devel("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu\n", k, tsize);
- if (k < tsize) {
- ret = -EBADMSG;
- goto error;
+int rsa_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+ struct akcipher_request *req;
+ struct rsa_completion compl;
+ struct scatterlist sig_sg, sg_out;
+ void *outbuf = NULL;
+ unsigned int outlen = 0;
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher("rsa", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ goto error_out;
+
+ req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ goto error_free_tfm;
+
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error_free_req;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ outlen = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
+ if (!outlen)
+ goto error_free_req;
+
+ /* Initialize the output buffer */
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ outbuf = kmalloc(outlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!outbuf)
+ goto error_free_req;
+
+ sg_init_one(&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size);
+ sg_init_one(&sg_out, outbuf, outlen);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sig_sg, &sg_out, sig->s_size, outlen);
+ init_completion(&compl.completion);
+ akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ public_key_verify_done, &compl);
+
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_verify(req);
+ if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
+ wait_for_completion(&compl.completion);
+ ret = compl.err;
}
- /* Round up and convert to octets */
- k = (k + 7) / 8;
+ if (ret)
+ goto error_free_req;
- /* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */
- ret = RSAVP1(key, sig->rsa.s, &m);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- /* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message
- * (EM) of length k octets.
- *
- * NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a
- * pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()!
+ /* Output from the operation is an encoded message (EM) of
+ * length k octets.
*/
- ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size,
+ outlen = req->dst_len;
+ ret = rsa_verify(sig->digest, outbuf, outlen, sig->digest_size,
RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data,
RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size);
-
-error:
- kfree(EM);
- mpi_free(m);
- kleave(" = %d", ret);
+error_free_req:
+ akcipher_request_free(req);
+error_free_tfm:
+ crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+error_out:
+ kfree(outbuf);
return ret;
}
-
-const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm = {
- .name = "RSA",
- .n_pub_mpi = 2,
- .n_sec_mpi = 3,
- .n_sig_mpi = 1,
- .verify_signature = RSA_verify_signature,
-};
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(RSA_public_key_algorithm);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rsa_verify_signature);