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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-07-29 17:38:46 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-07-29 17:38:46 -0700
commit7a1e8b80fb1e8ead4cec15d1fc494ed290e4d2e9 (patch)
tree55a36d4256f1ae793b5c8e88c0f158737447193f /arch
parenta867d7349e94b6409b08629886a819f802377e91 (diff)
parent7616ac70d1bb4f2e9d25c1a82d283f3368a7b632 (diff)
downloadlinux-7a1e8b80fb1e8ead4cec15d1fc494ed290e4d2e9.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - TPM core and driver updates/fixes - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO) - Lots of Apparmor fixes - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change syscall #" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits) apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family) tpm: Factor out common startup code tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr() apparmor: do not expose kernel stack apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds ...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c46
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c21
-rw-r--r--arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/common.c106
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h6
11 files changed, 84 insertions, 156 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
index 4d9375814b53..ce131ed5939d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -932,18 +932,19 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
{
current_thread_info()->syscall = scno;
- /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
+ tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
+
+ /* Do seccomp after ptrace; syscall may have changed. */
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
- if (secure_computing() == -1)
+ if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
return -1;
#else
/* XXX: remove this once OABI gets fixed */
- secure_computing_strict(scno);
+ secure_computing_strict(current_thread_info()->syscall);
#endif
- if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
- tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
-
+ /* Tracer or seccomp may have changed syscall. */
scno = current_thread_info()->syscall;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 030c1d5aa46d..e0c81da60f76 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1347,13 +1347,13 @@ static void tracehook_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs,
asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
- if (secure_computing() == -1)
- return -1;
-
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
+ /* Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
+ if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->syscallno);
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
index 0dcf69194473..6103b24d1bfc 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -888,17 +888,16 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
*/
asmlinkage long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall)
{
- long ret = 0;
user_exit();
current_thread_info()->syscall = syscall;
- if (secure_computing() == -1)
- return -1;
-
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
- ret = -1;
+ return -1;
+
+ if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+ return -1;
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[2]);
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
index b5458b37fc5b..e02d7b4d2b69 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -311,10 +311,6 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- /* Do the secure computing check first. */
- if (secure_computing() == -1)
- return -1;
-
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
/*
@@ -325,6 +321,11 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
regs->gr[20] = -1UL;
goto out;
}
+
+ /* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */
+ if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gr[20]);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
index 060b140f03c6..134bee9ac664 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1783,12 +1783,12 @@ static int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs)
* have already loaded -ENOSYS into r3, or seccomp has put
* something else in r3 (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE).
*/
- if (__secure_computing())
+ if (__secure_computing(NULL))
return -1;
/*
* The syscall was allowed by seccomp, restore the register
- * state to what ptrace and audit expect.
+ * state to what audit expects.
* Note that we use orig_gpr3, which means a seccomp tracer can
* modify the first syscall parameter (in orig_gpr3) and also
* allow the syscall to proceed.
@@ -1822,22 +1822,25 @@ static inline int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs) { return 0; }
*/
long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- bool abort = false;
-
user_exit();
+ /*
+ * The tracer may decide to abort the syscall, if so tracehook
+ * will return !0. Note that the tracer may also just change
+ * regs->gpr[0] to an invalid syscall number, that is handled
+ * below on the exit path.
+ */
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+ tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+ goto skip;
+
+ /* Run seccomp after ptrace; allow it to set gpr[3]. */
if (do_seccomp(regs))
return -1;
- if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) {
- /*
- * The tracer may decide to abort the syscall, if so tracehook
- * will return !0. Note that the tracer may also just change
- * regs->gpr[0] to an invalid syscall number, that is handled
- * below on the exit path.
- */
- abort = tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs) != 0;
- }
+ /* Avoid trace and audit when syscall is invalid. */
+ if (regs->gpr[0] >= NR_syscalls)
+ goto skip;
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gpr[0]);
@@ -1854,17 +1857,16 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
regs->gpr[5] & 0xffffffff,
regs->gpr[6] & 0xffffffff);
- if (abort || regs->gpr[0] >= NR_syscalls) {
- /*
- * If we are aborting explicitly, or if the syscall number is
- * now invalid, set the return value to -ENOSYS.
- */
- regs->gpr[3] = -ENOSYS;
- return -1;
- }
-
/* Return the possibly modified but valid syscall number */
return regs->gpr[0];
+
+skip:
+ /*
+ * If we are aborting explicitly, or if the syscall number is
+ * now invalid, set the return value to -ENOSYS.
+ */
+ regs->gpr[3] = -ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
}
void do_syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
index 49b1c13bf6c9..cea17010448f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -821,15 +821,6 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- long ret = 0;
-
- /* Do the secure computing check first. */
- if (secure_computing()) {
- /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
- ret = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
/*
* The sysc_tracesys code in entry.S stored the system
* call number to gprs[2].
@@ -843,7 +834,13 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
* the system call and the system call restart handling.
*/
clear_pt_regs_flag(regs, PIF_SYSCALL);
- ret = -1;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */
+ if (secure_computing(NULL)) {
+ /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
+ return -1;
}
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
@@ -852,8 +849,8 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
audit_syscall_entry(regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2,
regs->gprs[3], regs->gprs[4],
regs->gprs[5]);
-out:
- return ret ?: regs->gprs[2];
+
+ return regs->gprs[2];
}
asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
diff --git a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
index 54e7b723db99..d89b7011667c 100644
--- a/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -255,14 +255,15 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
- if (secure_computing() == -1)
+ if ((work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
+ tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+ regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
return -1;
-
- if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) {
- if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
- regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR] = -1;
}
+ if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
if (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[TREG_SYSCALL_NR]);
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
index 48b0dcbd87be..ef4b8f949b51 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
@@ -20,12 +20,12 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r)
UPT_SYSCALL_NR(r) = PT_SYSCALL_NR(r->gp);
PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(regs, -ENOSYS);
- /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
- if (secure_computing() == -1)
+ if (syscall_trace_enter(regs))
return;
- if (syscall_trace_enter(regs))
- goto out;
+ /* Do the seccomp check after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
+ if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+ return;
/* Update the syscall number after orig_ax has potentially been updated
* with ptrace.
@@ -37,6 +37,5 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r)
PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(regs,
EXECUTE_SYSCALL(syscall, regs));
-out:
syscall_trace_leave(regs);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index 9e1e27d31c6d..a1e71d431fed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -64,22 +64,16 @@ static void do_audit_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
}
/*
- * We can return 0 to resume the syscall or anything else to go to phase
- * 2. If we resume the syscall, we need to put something appropriate in
- * regs->orig_ax.
- *
- * NB: We don't have full pt_regs here, but regs->orig_ax and regs->ax
- * are fully functional.
- *
- * For phase 2's benefit, our return value is:
- * 0: resume the syscall
- * 1: go to phase 2; no seccomp phase 2 needed
- * anything else: go to phase 2; pass return value to seccomp
+ * Returns the syscall nr to run (which should match regs->orig_ax) or -1
+ * to skip the syscall.
*/
-unsigned long syscall_trace_enter_phase1(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
+static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ u32 arch = in_ia32_syscall() ? AUDIT_ARCH_I386 : AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64;
+
struct thread_info *ti = pt_regs_to_thread_info(regs);
unsigned long ret = 0;
+ bool emulated = false;
u32 work;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY))
@@ -87,11 +81,19 @@ unsigned long syscall_trace_enter_phase1(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
work = ACCESS_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY;
+ if (unlikely(work & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
+ emulated = true;
+
+ if ((emulated || (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
+ tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+ return -1L;
+
+ if (emulated)
+ return -1L;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
/*
- * Do seccomp first -- it should minimize exposure of other
- * code, and keeping seccomp fast is probably more valuable
- * than the rest of this.
+ * Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes.
*/
if (work & _TIF_SECCOMP) {
struct seccomp_data sd;
@@ -118,69 +120,12 @@ unsigned long syscall_trace_enter_phase1(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
sd.args[5] = regs->bp;
}
- BUILD_BUG_ON(SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK != 0);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP != 1);
-
- ret = seccomp_phase1(&sd);
- if (ret == SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP) {
- regs->orig_ax = -1;
- ret = 0;
- } else if (ret != SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK) {
- return ret; /* Go directly to phase 2 */
- }
-
- work &= ~_TIF_SECCOMP;
- }
-#endif
-
- /* Do our best to finish without phase 2. */
- if (work == 0)
- return ret; /* seccomp and/or nohz only (ret == 0 here) */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
- if (work == _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) {
- /*
- * If there is no more work to be done except auditing,
- * then audit in phase 1. Phase 2 always audits, so, if
- * we audit here, then we can't go on to phase 2.
- */
- do_audit_syscall_entry(regs, arch);
- return 0;
+ ret = __secure_computing(&sd);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ return ret;
}
#endif
- return 1; /* Something is enabled that we can't handle in phase 1 */
-}
-
-/* Returns the syscall nr to run (which should match regs->orig_ax). */
-long syscall_trace_enter_phase2(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch,
- unsigned long phase1_result)
-{
- struct thread_info *ti = pt_regs_to_thread_info(regs);
- long ret = 0;
- u32 work = ACCESS_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY;
-
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY))
- BUG_ON(regs != task_pt_regs(current));
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
- /*
- * Call seccomp_phase2 before running the other hooks so that
- * they can see any changes made by a seccomp tracer.
- */
- if (phase1_result > 1 && seccomp_phase2(phase1_result)) {
- /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (unlikely(work & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
- ret = -1L;
-
- if ((ret || test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
- tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
- ret = -1L;
-
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->orig_ax);
@@ -189,17 +134,6 @@ long syscall_trace_enter_phase2(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch,
return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
}
-long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- u32 arch = in_ia32_syscall() ? AUDIT_ARCH_I386 : AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64;
- unsigned long phase1_result = syscall_trace_enter_phase1(regs, arch);
-
- if (phase1_result == 0)
- return regs->orig_ax;
- else
- return syscall_trace_enter_phase2(regs, arch, phase1_result);
-}
-
#define EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS \
(_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE | \
_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index 75fc719b7f31..636c4b341f36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
*/
regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
- tmp = secure_computing();
+ tmp = secure_computing(NULL);
if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
"seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
index 6271281f947d..2b5d686ea9f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
@@ -83,12 +83,6 @@ extern void send_sigtrap(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs,
int error_code, int si_code);
-extern unsigned long syscall_trace_enter_phase1(struct pt_regs *, u32 arch);
-extern long syscall_trace_enter_phase2(struct pt_regs *, u32 arch,
- unsigned long phase1_result);
-
-extern long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *);
-
static inline unsigned long regs_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->ax;