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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-01-12 16:31:19 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-01-12 16:31:19 -0800 |
commit | 64ad9461521b1a357846ef6cedc4bccd48a046e0 (patch) | |
tree | f134404b6c6df89198a4a2f2be6fef21af133c73 /arch/x86/mm | |
parent | 8e5b0adeea19309c8ce0e3c9119061554973efa9 (diff) | |
parent | 9cdbeec4096804083944d05da96bbaf59a1eb4f9 (diff) | |
download | linux-64ad9461521b1a357846ef6cedc4bccd48a046e0.tar.bz2 |
Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Get rid of all the .fixup sections because this generates
misleading/wrong stacktraces and confuse RELIABLE_STACKTRACE and
LIVEPATCH as the backtrace misses the function which is being fixed
up.
- Add Straight Line Speculation mitigation support which uses a new
compiler switch -mharden-sls= which sticks an INT3 after a RET or an
indirect branch in order to block speculation after them. Reportedly,
CPUs do speculate behind such insns.
- The usual set of cleanups and improvements
* tag 'x86_core_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (32 commits)
x86/entry_32: Fix segment exceptions
objtool: Remove .fixup handling
x86: Remove .fixup section
x86/word-at-a-time: Remove .fixup usage
x86/usercopy: Remove .fixup usage
x86/usercopy_32: Simplify __copy_user_intel_nocache()
x86/sgx: Remove .fixup usage
x86/checksum_32: Remove .fixup usage
x86/vmx: Remove .fixup usage
x86/kvm: Remove .fixup usage
x86/segment: Remove .fixup usage
x86/fpu: Remove .fixup usage
x86/xen: Remove .fixup usage
x86/uaccess: Remove .fixup usage
x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage
x86/msr: Remove .fixup usage
x86/extable: Extend extable functionality
x86/entry_32: Remove .fixup usage
x86/entry_64: Remove .fixup usage
x86/copy_mc_64: Remove .fixup usage
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 113 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 4 |
2 files changed, 88 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c index 5cd2a88930a9..dba2197c05c3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c @@ -2,12 +2,26 @@ #include <linux/extable.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/sched/debug.h> +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <xen/xen.h> #include <asm/fpu/api.h> #include <asm/sev.h> #include <asm/traps.h> #include <asm/kdebug.h> +#include <asm/insn-eval.h> +#include <asm/sgx.h> + +static inline unsigned long *pt_regs_nr(struct pt_regs *regs, int nr) +{ + int reg_offset = pt_regs_offset(regs, nr); + static unsigned long __dummy; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg_offset < 0)) + return &__dummy; + + return (unsigned long *)((unsigned long)regs + reg_offset); +} static inline unsigned long ex_fixup_addr(const struct exception_table_entry *x) @@ -15,10 +29,15 @@ ex_fixup_addr(const struct exception_table_entry *x) return (unsigned long)&x->fixup + x->fixup; } -static bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, +static bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *e, struct pt_regs *regs) { - regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); + if (e->data & EX_FLAG_CLEAR_AX) + regs->ax = 0; + if (e->data & EX_FLAG_CLEAR_DX) + regs->dx = 0; + + regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(e); return true; } @@ -29,6 +48,13 @@ static bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); } +static bool ex_handler_sgx(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr) +{ + regs->ax = trapnr | SGX_ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG; + return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); +} + /* * Handler for when we fail to restore a task's FPU state. We should never get * here because the FPU state of a task using the FPU (task->thread.fpu.state) @@ -65,28 +91,29 @@ static bool ex_handler_copy(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, return ex_handler_fault(fixup, regs, trapnr); } -static bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs) +static bool ex_handler_msr(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs, bool wrmsr, bool safe, int reg) { - if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", + if (!safe && wrmsr && + pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", + (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, + (unsigned int)regs->ax, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip)) + show_stack_regs(regs); + + if (!safe && !wrmsr && + pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip)) show_stack_regs(regs); - /* Pretend that the read succeeded and returned 0. */ - regs->ax = 0; - regs->dx = 0; - return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); -} + if (!wrmsr) { + /* Pretend that the read succeeded and returned 0. */ + regs->ax = 0; + regs->dx = 0; + } -static bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", - (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, - (unsigned int)regs->ax, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip)) - show_stack_regs(regs); + if (safe) + *pt_regs_nr(regs, reg) = -EIO; - /* Pretend that the write succeeded. */ return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); } @@ -99,17 +126,32 @@ static bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); } +static bool ex_handler_imm_reg(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs, int reg, int imm) +{ + *pt_regs_nr(regs, reg) = (long)imm; + return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); +} + +static bool ex_handler_ucopy_len(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, int reg, int imm) +{ + regs->cx = imm * regs->cx + *pt_regs_nr(regs, reg); + return ex_handler_uaccess(fixup, regs, trapnr); +} + int ex_get_fixup_type(unsigned long ip) { const struct exception_table_entry *e = search_exception_tables(ip); - return e ? e->type : EX_TYPE_NONE; + return e ? FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_TYPE_MASK, e->data) : EX_TYPE_NONE; } int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr) { const struct exception_table_entry *e; + int type, reg, imm; #ifdef CONFIG_PNPBIOS if (unlikely(SEGMENT_IS_PNP_CODE(regs->cs))) { @@ -129,7 +171,11 @@ int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code, if (!e) return 0; - switch (e->type) { + type = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_TYPE_MASK, e->data); + reg = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_REG_MASK, e->data); + imm = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_IMM_MASK, e->data); + + switch (type) { case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT: case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE: return ex_handler_default(e, regs); @@ -144,18 +190,31 @@ int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code, return ex_handler_clear_fs(e, regs); case EX_TYPE_FPU_RESTORE: return ex_handler_fprestore(e, regs); - case EX_TYPE_RDMSR: - return ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(e, regs); - case EX_TYPE_WRMSR: - return ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(e, regs); case EX_TYPE_BPF: return ex_handler_bpf(e, regs); - case EX_TYPE_RDMSR_IN_MCE: - ex_handler_msr_mce(regs, false); - break; + case EX_TYPE_WRMSR: + return ex_handler_msr(e, regs, true, false, reg); + case EX_TYPE_RDMSR: + return ex_handler_msr(e, regs, false, false, reg); + case EX_TYPE_WRMSR_SAFE: + return ex_handler_msr(e, regs, true, true, reg); + case EX_TYPE_RDMSR_SAFE: + return ex_handler_msr(e, regs, false, true, reg); case EX_TYPE_WRMSR_IN_MCE: ex_handler_msr_mce(regs, true); break; + case EX_TYPE_RDMSR_IN_MCE: + ex_handler_msr_mce(regs, false); + break; + case EX_TYPE_POP_REG: + regs->sp += sizeof(long); + fallthrough; + case EX_TYPE_IMM_REG: + return ex_handler_imm_reg(e, regs, reg, imm); + case EX_TYPE_FAULT_SGX: + return ex_handler_sgx(e, regs, trapnr); + case EX_TYPE_UCOPY_LEN: + return ex_handler_ucopy_len(e, regs, trapnr, reg, imm); } BUG(); } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S index 17d292b7072f..3d1dba05fce4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute) movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */ pop %rbp - ret + RET SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute) SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) @@ -151,6 +151,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy) pop %r12 pop %r15 - ret + RET .L__enc_copy_end: SYM_FUNC_END(__enc_copy) |