summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>2018-09-28 09:02:31 -0700
committerPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>2018-10-09 16:51:16 +0200
commit367e3f1d3fc9bbf1e626da7aea527f40babf8079 (patch)
tree0b74e1ef39d680af6299292baeadb7525983d8bf /arch/x86/mm/fault.c
parent3ae0ad92f53e0f05cf6ab781230b7902b88f73cd (diff)
downloadlinux-367e3f1d3fc9bbf1e626da7aea527f40babf8079.tar.bz2
x86/mm: Remove spurious fault pkey check
Spurious faults only ever occur in the kernel's address space. They are also constrained specifically to faults with one of these error codes: X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_PROT X86_PF_INSTR | X86_PF_PROT So, it's never even possible to reach spurious_kernel_fault_check() with X86_PF_PK set. In addition, the kernel's address space never has pages with user-mode protections. Protection Keys are only enforced on pages with user-mode protection. This gives us lots of reasons to not check for protection keys in our sprurious kernel fault handling. But, let's also add some warnings to ensure that these assumptions about protection keys hold true. Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180928160231.243A0D6A@viggo.jf.intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm/fault.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/fault.c13
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 7e0fa7e24168..a16652982f98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1037,12 +1037,6 @@ static int spurious_kernel_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)
if ((error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) && !pte_exec(*pte))
return 0;
- /*
- * Note: We do not do lazy flushing on protection key
- * changes, so no spurious fault will ever set X86_PF_PK.
- */
- if ((error_code & X86_PF_PK))
- return 1;
return 1;
}
@@ -1218,6 +1212,13 @@ do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code,
unsigned long address)
{
/*
+ * Protection keys exceptions only happen on user pages. We
+ * have no user pages in the kernel portion of the address
+ * space, so do not expect them here.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK);
+
+ /*
* We can fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The
* 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd.
*