diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-07-27 09:57:16 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-07-27 09:57:16 -0700 |
commit | 9dae0a3fc4b0b9aed302a0fad61846c49cc313b1 (patch) | |
tree | 7ef2c3a50f8c340762fe45102d90cf41bdf27170 /arch/x86/kernel | |
parent | 43a255c210cebdf09235567bf46d3ceea3438b4f (diff) | |
parent | d81b4253b0f0f1e7b7e03b0cd0f80cab18bc4d7b (diff) | |
download | linux-9dae0a3fc4b0b9aed302a0fad61846c49cc313b1.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"A bunch of fixes for perf and kprobes:
- revert a commit that caused a perf group regression
- silence dmesg spam
- fix kprobe probing errors on ia64 and ppc64
- filter kprobe faults from userspace
- lockdep fix for perf exit path
- prevent perf #GP in KVM guest
- correct perf event and filters"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
kprobes: Fix "Failed to find blacklist" probing errors on ia64 and ppc64
kprobes/x86: Don't try to resolve kprobe faults from userspace
perf/x86/intel: Avoid spamming kernel log for BTS buffer failure
perf/x86/intel: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying
perf: Fix lockdep warning on process exit
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix SNB-EP/IVT Cbox filter mappings
perf/x86/intel: Use proper dTLB-load-misses event on IvyBridge
perf: Revert ("perf: Always destroy groups on exit")
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 69 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_uncore.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 3 |
6 files changed, 91 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c index 2bdfbff8a4f6..2879ecdaac43 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c @@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static int x86_pmu_extra_regs(u64 config, struct perf_event *event) continue; if (event->attr.config1 & ~er->valid_mask) return -EINVAL; + /* Check if the extra msrs can be safely accessed*/ + if (!er->extra_msr_access) + return -ENXIO; reg->idx = er->idx; reg->config = event->attr.config1; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h index 3b2f9bdd974b..8ade93111e03 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h @@ -295,14 +295,16 @@ struct extra_reg { u64 config_mask; u64 valid_mask; int idx; /* per_xxx->regs[] reg index */ + bool extra_msr_access; }; #define EVENT_EXTRA_REG(e, ms, m, vm, i) { \ - .event = (e), \ - .msr = (ms), \ - .config_mask = (m), \ - .valid_mask = (vm), \ - .idx = EXTRA_REG_##i, \ + .event = (e), \ + .msr = (ms), \ + .config_mask = (m), \ + .valid_mask = (vm), \ + .idx = EXTRA_REG_##i, \ + .extra_msr_access = true, \ } #define INTEL_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, vm, idx) \ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c index 07846d738bdb..2502d0d9d246 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c @@ -2182,6 +2182,41 @@ static void intel_snb_check_microcode(void) } } +/* + * Under certain circumstances, access certain MSR may cause #GP. + * The function tests if the input MSR can be safely accessed. + */ +static bool check_msr(unsigned long msr, u64 mask) +{ + u64 val_old, val_new, val_tmp; + + /* + * Read the current value, change it and read it back to see if it + * matches, this is needed to detect certain hardware emulators + * (qemu/kvm) that don't trap on the MSR access and always return 0s. + */ + if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_old)) + return false; + + /* + * Only change the bits which can be updated by wrmsrl. + */ + val_tmp = val_old ^ mask; + if (wrmsrl_safe(msr, val_tmp) || + rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_new)) + return false; + + if (val_new != val_tmp) + return false; + + /* Here it's sure that the MSR can be safely accessed. + * Restore the old value and return. + */ + wrmsrl(msr, val_old); + + return true; +} + static __init void intel_sandybridge_quirk(void) { x86_pmu.check_microcode = intel_snb_check_microcode; @@ -2271,7 +2306,8 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) union cpuid10_ebx ebx; struct event_constraint *c; unsigned int unused; - int version; + struct extra_reg *er; + int version, i; if (!cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) { switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) { @@ -2474,6 +2510,9 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) case 62: /* IvyBridge EP */ memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, snb_hw_cache_event_ids, sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids)); + /* dTLB-load-misses on IVB is different than SNB */ + hw_cache_event_ids[C(DTLB)][C(OP_READ)][C(RESULT_MISS)] = 0x8108; /* DTLB_LOAD_MISSES.DEMAND_LD_MISS_CAUSES_A_WALK */ + memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, snb_hw_cache_extra_regs, sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs)); @@ -2574,6 +2613,34 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) } } + /* + * Access LBR MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances. + * E.g. KVM doesn't support LBR MSR + * Check all LBT MSR here. + * Disable LBR access if any LBR MSRs can not be accessed. + */ + if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr && !check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_tos, 0x3UL)) + x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0; + for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.lbr_nr; i++) { + if (!(check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_from + i, 0xffffUL) && + check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_to + i, 0xffffUL))) + x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0; + } + + /* + * Access extra MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances. + * E.g. KVM doesn't support offcore event + * Check all extra_regs here. + */ + if (x86_pmu.extra_regs) { + for (er = x86_pmu.extra_regs; er->msr; er++) { + er->extra_msr_access = check_msr(er->msr, 0x1ffUL); + /* Disable LBR select mapping */ + if ((er->idx == EXTRA_REG_LBR) && !er->extra_msr_access) + x86_pmu.lbr_sel_map = NULL; + } + } + /* Support full width counters using alternative MSR range */ if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.full_width_write) { x86_pmu.max_period = x86_pmu.cntval_mask; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c index 980970cb744d..696ade311ded 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_ds.c @@ -311,9 +311,11 @@ static int alloc_bts_buffer(int cpu) if (!x86_pmu.bts) return 0; - buffer = kzalloc_node(BTS_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL, node); - if (unlikely(!buffer)) + buffer = kzalloc_node(BTS_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN, node); + if (unlikely(!buffer)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "%s: BTS buffer allocation failure\n", __func__); return -ENOMEM; + } max = BTS_BUFFER_SIZE / BTS_RECORD_SIZE; thresh = max / 16; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_uncore.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_uncore.c index 65bbbea38b9c..ae6552a0701f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_uncore.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_uncore.c @@ -550,16 +550,16 @@ static struct extra_reg snbep_uncore_cbox_extra_regs[] = { SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4134, 0xffff, 0x6), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0135, 0xffff, 0x8), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0335, 0xffff, 0x8), - SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4135, 0xffff, 0xc), - SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4335, 0xffff, 0xc), + SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4135, 0xffff, 0xa), + SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4335, 0xffff, 0xa), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4435, 0xffff, 0x2), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4835, 0xffff, 0x2), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4a35, 0xffff, 0x2), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x5035, 0xffff, 0x2), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0136, 0xffff, 0x8), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0336, 0xffff, 0x8), - SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4136, 0xffff, 0xc), - SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4336, 0xffff, 0xc), + SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4136, 0xffff, 0xa), + SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4336, 0xffff, 0xa), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4436, 0xffff, 0x2), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4836, 0xffff, 0x2), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4a36, 0xffff, 0x2), @@ -1222,6 +1222,7 @@ static struct extra_reg ivt_uncore_cbox_extra_regs[] = { SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(SNBEP_CBO_PMON_CTL_TID_EN, SNBEP_CBO_PMON_CTL_TID_EN, 0x1), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x1031, 0x10ff, 0x2), + SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x1134, 0xffff, 0x4), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4134, 0xffff, 0xc), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x5134, 0xffff, 0xc), @@ -1245,7 +1246,7 @@ static struct extra_reg ivt_uncore_cbox_extra_regs[] = { SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x8335, 0xffff, 0x10), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0136, 0xffff, 0x10), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0336, 0xffff, 0x10), - SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x2336, 0xffff, 0x10), + SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x2136, 0xffff, 0x10), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x2336, 0xffff, 0x10), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4136, 0xffff, 0x18), SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4336, 0xffff, 0x18), diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c index 7596df664901..67e6d19ef1be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c @@ -574,6 +574,9 @@ int kprobe_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) struct kprobe *p; struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb; + if (user_mode_vm(regs)) + return 0; + addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *)(regs->ip - sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t)); /* * We don't want to be preempted for the entire |