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author | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2020-04-22 18:11:30 +0200 |
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committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2020-05-15 11:48:01 +0200 |
commit | a9a3ed1eff3601b63aea4fb462d8b3b92c7c1e7e (patch) | |
tree | b9709e8468b304106f42e7ccf42273877400bd92 /arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | |
parent | 2ef96a5bb12be62ef75b5828c0aab838ebb29cb8 (diff) | |
download | linux-a9a3ed1eff3601b63aea4fb462d8b3b92c7c1e7e.tar.bz2 |
x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try
... or the odyssey of trying to disable the stack protector for the
function which generates the stack canary value.
The whole story started with Sergei reporting a boot crash with a kernel
built with gcc-10:
Kernel panic — not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5—00235—gfffb08b37df9 #139
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./H77M—D3H, BIOS F12 11/14/2013
Call Trace:
dump_stack
panic
? start_secondary
__stack_chk_fail
start_secondary
secondary_startup_64
-—-[ end Kernel panic — not syncing: stack—protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
This happens because gcc-10 tail-call optimizes the last function call
in start_secondary() - cpu_startup_entry() - and thus emits a stack
canary check which fails because the canary value changes after the
boot_init_stack_canary() call.
To fix that, the initial attempt was to mark the one function which
generates the stack canary with:
__attribute__((optimize("-fno-stack-protector"))) ... start_secondary(void *unused)
however, using the optimize attribute doesn't work cumulatively
as the attribute does not add to but rather replaces previously
supplied optimization options - roughly all -fxxx options.
The key one among them being -fno-omit-frame-pointer and thus leading to
not present frame pointer - frame pointer which the kernel needs.
The next attempt to prevent compilers from tail-call optimizing
the last function call cpu_startup_entry(), shy of carving out
start_secondary() into a separate compilation unit and building it with
-fno-stack-protector, was to add an empty asm("").
This current solution was short and sweet, and reportedly, is supported
by both compilers but we didn't get very far this time: future (LTO?)
optimization passes could potentially eliminate this, which leads us
to the third attempt: having an actual memory barrier there which the
compiler cannot ignore or move around etc.
That should hold for a long time, but hey we said that about the other
two solutions too so...
Reported-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200314164451.346497-1-slyfox@gentoo.org
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c index 8c89e4d9ad28..2f24c334a938 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c @@ -266,6 +266,14 @@ static void notrace start_secondary(void *unused) wmb(); cpu_startup_entry(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE); + + /* + * Prevent tail call to cpu_startup_entry() because the stack protector + * guard has been changed a couple of function calls up, in + * boot_init_stack_canary() and must not be checked before tail calling + * another function. + */ + prevent_tail_call_optimization(); } /** |