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authorAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>2019-01-18 16:50:16 -0800
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2019-03-06 21:52:11 +0100
commited5194c2732c8084af9fd159c146ea92bf137128 (patch)
tree452a9a72f3eafd895da92b95576be36d87838f5a /arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
parent36ad35131adacc29b328b9c8b6277a8bf0d6fd5d (diff)
downloadlinux-ed5194c2732c8084af9fd159c146ea92bf137128.tar.bz2
x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS), is a class of side channel attacks on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are: - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126) - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130) - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127) MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other. MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible. MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible. All variants have the same mitigation for single CPU thread case (SMT off), so the kernel can treat them as one MDS issue. Add the basic infrastructure to detect if the current CPU is affected by MDS. [ tglx: Rewrote changelog ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h5
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index e4074556c37b..e2d30636c03f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@
* attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
* control required.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO BIT(5) /*
+ * Not susceptible to
+ * Microarchitectural Data
+ * Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*