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authorMickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>2015-12-29 21:35:47 +0100
committerRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>2016-01-10 21:49:49 +0100
commitc50b4659e444b020657e01bdf769c965e5597cb0 (patch)
tree700ad5bdbc1726819971e0f258d49dd778606c5f /arch/um
parentd8f8b8445648c267a24f30a72533e77cb6543f21 (diff)
downloadlinux-c50b4659e444b020657e01bdf769c965e5597cb0.tar.bz2
um: Add seccomp support
This brings SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT and SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER support through prctl(2) and seccomp(2) to User-mode Linux for i386 and x86_64 subarchitectures. secure_computing() is called first in handle_syscall() so that the syscall emulation will be aborted quickly if matching a seccomp rule. This is inspired from Meredydd Luff's patch (https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21425). Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/um')
-rw-r--r--arch/um/Kconfig.common1
-rw-r--r--arch/um/Kconfig.um16
-rw-r--r--arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c5
4 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig.common b/arch/um/Kconfig.common
index d195a87ca542..cc0013475444 100644
--- a/arch/um/Kconfig.common
+++ b/arch/um/Kconfig.common
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ config UML
bool
default y
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
select HAVE_UID16
select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW
diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig.um b/arch/um/Kconfig.um
index 28a9885e3a37..4b2ed5858b2e 100644
--- a/arch/um/Kconfig.um
+++ b/arch/um/Kconfig.um
@@ -104,3 +104,19 @@ config PGTABLE_LEVELS
int
default 3 if 3_LEVEL_PGTABLES
default 2
+
+config SECCOMP
+ def_bool y
+ prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
+ ---help---
+ This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
+ that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
+ execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
+ the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
+ syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
+ their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
+ enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
+ and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
+ defined by each seccomp mode.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 53968aaf76f9..053baff03674 100644
--- a/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -62,11 +62,13 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void)
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 6
#define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK 7
#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 8
+#define TIF_SECCOMP 9 /* secure computing */
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
#define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
#define _TIF_MEMDIE (1 << TIF_MEMDIE)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
+#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
#endif
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
index 6cadce761bcf..48b0dcbd87be 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <kern_util.h>
#include <sysdep/ptrace.h>
#include <sysdep/ptrace_user.h>
@@ -19,6 +20,10 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r)
UPT_SYSCALL_NR(r) = PT_SYSCALL_NR(r->gp);
PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(regs, -ENOSYS);
+ /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
+ if (secure_computing() == -1)
+ return;
+
if (syscall_trace_enter(regs))
goto out;