diff options
| author | Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | 2015-12-29 21:35:47 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> | 2016-01-10 21:49:49 +0100 |
| commit | c50b4659e444b020657e01bdf769c965e5597cb0 (patch) | |
| tree | 700ad5bdbc1726819971e0f258d49dd778606c5f /arch/um/Kconfig.um | |
| parent | d8f8b8445648c267a24f30a72533e77cb6543f21 (diff) | |
| download | linux-c50b4659e444b020657e01bdf769c965e5597cb0.tar.bz2 | |
um: Add seccomp support
This brings SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT and SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER support through
prctl(2) and seccomp(2) to User-mode Linux for i386 and x86_64
subarchitectures.
secure_computing() is called first in handle_syscall() so that the
syscall emulation will be aborted quickly if matching a seccomp rule.
This is inspired from Meredydd Luff's patch
(https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21425).
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/um/Kconfig.um')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/um/Kconfig.um | 16 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig.um b/arch/um/Kconfig.um index 28a9885e3a37..4b2ed5858b2e 100644 --- a/arch/um/Kconfig.um +++ b/arch/um/Kconfig.um @@ -104,3 +104,19 @@ config PGTABLE_LEVELS int default 3 if 3_LEVEL_PGTABLES default 2 + +config SECCOMP + def_bool y + prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" + ---help--- + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications + that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to + the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in + their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is + enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled + and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls + defined by each seccomp mode. + + If unsure, say Y. |