diff options
author | Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> | 2020-11-10 14:13:06 +0000 |
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committer | Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> | 2020-11-12 21:22:22 +0000 |
commit | 23711a5e662c1a66e14cb9288e7dfd2b840efcd5 (patch) | |
tree | eebbef5dcbc9d2d098e1112c8c5149d1232daf5e /arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | |
parent | 4f6b838c378a52ea3ae0b15f12ca8a20849072fa (diff) | |
download | linux-23711a5e662c1a66e14cb9288e7dfd2b840efcd5.tar.bz2 |
KVM: arm64: Allow setting of ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2 from userspace
We now expose ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2=1 to guests running on hosts
that are immune to Spectre-v2, but that don't have this field set,
most likely because they predate the specification.
However, this prevents the migration of guests that have started on
a host the doesn't fake this CSV2 setting to one that does, as KVM
rejects the write to ID_AA64PFR0_EL2 on the grounds that it isn't
what is already there.
In order to fix this, allow userspace to set this field as long as
this doesn't result in a promising more than what is already there
(setting CSV2 to 0 is acceptable, but setting it to 1 when it is
already set to 0 isn't).
Fixes: e1026237f9067 ("KVM: arm64: Set CSV2 for guests on hardware unaffected by Spectre-v2")
Reported-by: Peng Liang <liangpeng10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110141308.451654-2-maz@kernel.org
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 42 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c index 6d287eefd9f1..0aa86250e354 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c @@ -1128,9 +1128,8 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT); val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_SHIFT); - if (!(val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) && - arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) - val |= (1UL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); + val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); + val |= ((u64)vcpu->kvm->arch.pfr0_csv2 << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1) { val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT); } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 && !vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) { @@ -1213,6 +1212,40 @@ static unsigned int sve_visibility(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return REG_HIDDEN; } +static int set_id_aa64pfr0_el1(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + const struct sys_reg_desc *rd, + const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr) +{ + const u64 id = sys_reg_to_index(rd); + int err; + u64 val; + u8 csv2; + + err = reg_from_user(&val, uaddr, id); + if (err) + return err; + + /* + * Allow AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2 to be set from userspace as long as + * it doesn't promise more than what is actually provided (the + * guest could otherwise be covered in ectoplasmic residue). + */ + csv2 = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(val, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); + if (csv2 > 1 || + (csv2 && arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() != SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* We can only differ with CSV2, and anything else is an error */ + val ^= read_id_reg(vcpu, rd, false); + val &= ~(0xFUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); + if (val) + return -EINVAL; + + vcpu->kvm->arch.pfr0_csv2 = csv2; + + return 0; +} + /* * cpufeature ID register user accessors * @@ -1472,7 +1505,8 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = { /* AArch64 ID registers */ /* CRm=4 */ - ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1), + { SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1), .access = access_id_reg, + .get_user = get_id_reg, .set_user = set_id_aa64pfr0_el1, }, ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1), ID_UNALLOCATED(4,2), ID_UNALLOCATED(4,3), |