diff options
author | Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> | 2019-04-15 16:21:26 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> | 2019-04-26 16:31:36 +0100 |
commit | d2532e27b5638bb2e2dd52b80b7ea2ec65135377 (patch) | |
tree | 31f1be21c8df7abee8f3235afcad6fa411fb133c /arch/arm64/kernel | |
parent | 8c1e3d2bb44cbb998cb28ff9a18f105fee7f1eb3 (diff) | |
download | linux-d2532e27b5638bb2e2dd52b80b7ea2ec65135377.tar.bz2 |
arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2
Track whether all the cores in the machine are vulnerable to Spectre-v2,
and whether all the vulnerable cores have been mitigated. We then expose
this information to userspace via sysfs.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 27 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index a9c3ad4f7948..d2bbafa04b3c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -512,6 +512,10 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \ CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list) +/* Track overall mitigation state. We are only mitigated if all cores are ok */ +static bool __hardenbp_enab = true; +static bool __spectrev2_safe = true; + /* * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all. */ @@ -522,6 +526,10 @@ static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = { { /* sentinel */ } }; +/* + * Track overall bp hardening for all heterogeneous cores in the machine. + * We are only considered "safe" if all booted cores are known safe. + */ static bool __maybe_unused check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) { @@ -543,6 +551,8 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) if (!need_wa) return false; + __spectrev2_safe = false; + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) { pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n"); __hardenbp_enab = false; @@ -552,11 +562,14 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) /* forced off */ if (__nospectre_v2) { pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); + __hardenbp_enab = false; return false; } - if (need_wa < 0) + if (need_wa < 0) { pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n"); + __hardenbp_enab = false; + } return (need_wa > 0); } @@ -779,3 +792,15 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, { return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + if (__spectrev2_safe) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + + if (__hardenbp_enab) + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} |