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| author | Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> | 2020-01-06 14:35:39 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-01-06 10:10:07 -0800 |
| commit | 24cecc37746393432d994c0dbc251fb9ac7c5d72 (patch) | |
| tree | 31d0263e96ab98623c738299c27293fb7597dd97 /arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | |
| parent | c79f46a282390e0f5b306007bf7b11a46d529538 (diff) | |
| download | linux-24cecc37746393432d994c0dbc251fb9ac7c5d72.tar.bz2 | |
arm64: Revert support for execute-only user mappings
The ARMv8 64-bit architecture supports execute-only user permissions by
clearing the PTE_USER and PTE_UXN bits, practically making it a mostly
privileged mapping but from which user running at EL0 can still execute.
The downside, however, is that the kernel at EL1 inadvertently reading
such mapping would not trip over the PAN (privileged access never)
protection.
Revert the relevant bits from commit cab15ce604e5 ("arm64: Introduce
execute-only page access permissions") so that PROT_EXEC implies
PROT_READ (and therefore PTE_USER) until the architecture gains proper
support for execute-only user mappings.
Fixes: cab15ce604e5 ("arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9.x-
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h index 5d15b4735a0e..cd5de0e40bfa 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -96,12 +96,8 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]; #define pte_dirty(pte) (pte_sw_dirty(pte) || pte_hw_dirty(pte)) #define pte_valid(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_VALID)) -/* - * Execute-only user mappings do not have the PTE_USER bit set. All valid - * kernel mappings have the PTE_UXN bit set. - */ #define pte_valid_not_user(pte) \ - ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER | PTE_UXN)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_UXN)) + ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == PTE_VALID) #define pte_valid_young(pte) \ ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_AF)) #define pte_valid_user(pte) \ @@ -117,8 +113,8 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]; /* * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (subject to the - * write permission check) other than user execute-only which do not have the - * PTE_USER bit set. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the PTE_VALID bit set. + * write permission check). PROT_NONE mappings do not have the PTE_VALID bit + * set. */ #define pte_access_permitted(pte, write) \ (pte_valid_user(pte) && (!(write) || pte_write(pte))) |