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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-11-01 11:46:27 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-11-01 11:46:27 -0700
commit2d6bb6adb714b133db92ccd4bfc9c20f75f71f3f (patch)
treeaef040a1ee4b8b6edc5a4fa2b3c6a2c48219f27a /Documentation
parent7c6c54b505b8aea1782ce6a6e8f3b8297d179937 (diff)
parent6fcde90466738b84a073e4f4d18c50015ee29fb2 (diff)
downloadlinux-2d6bb6adb714b133db92ccd4bfc9c20f75f71f3f.tar.bz2
Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook: "Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense against at least two classes of flaws: - Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too). - Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but provides the coverage for stacks. The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon). With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin" * tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca() stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/self-protection.rst10
-rw-r--r--Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt18
-rw-r--r--Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt3
3 files changed, 26 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
index e1ca698e0006..f584fb74b4ff 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
@@ -302,11 +302,11 @@ sure structure holes are cleared.
Memory poisoning
----------------
-When releasing memory, it is best to poison the contents (clear stack on
-syscall return, wipe heap memory on a free), to avoid reuse attacks that
-rely on the old contents of memory. This frustrates many uninitialized
-variable attacks, stack content exposures, heap content exposures, and
-use-after-free attacks.
+When releasing memory, it is best to poison the contents, to avoid reuse
+attacks that rely on the old contents of memory. E.g., clear stack on a
+syscall return (``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``), wipe heap memory on a
+free. This frustrates many uninitialized variable attacks, stack content
+exposures, heap content exposures, and use-after-free attacks.
Destination tracking
--------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 37a679501ddc..1b8775298cf7 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- shmmni
- softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace
- soft_watchdog
+- stack_erasing
- stop-a [ SPARC only ]
- sysrq ==> Documentation/admin-guide/sysrq.rst
- sysctl_writes_strict
@@ -987,6 +988,23 @@ detect a hard lockup condition.
==============================================================
+stack_erasing
+
+This parameter can be used to control kernel stack erasing at the end
+of syscalls for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
+
+That erasing reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs
+can reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
+The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
+compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary.
+
+ 0: kernel stack erasing is disabled, STACKLEAK_METRICS are not updated.
+
+ 1: kernel stack erasing is enabled (default), it is performed before
+ returning to the userspace at the end of syscalls.
+
+==============================================================
+
tainted:
Non-zero if the kernel has been tainted. Numeric values, which can be
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
index 702898633b00..73aaaa3da436 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
@@ -146,3 +146,6 @@ Their order is preserved but their base will be offset early at boot time.
Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which is
correct as KASAN disables KASLR.
+
+For both 4- and 5-level layouts, the STACKLEAK_POISON value in the last 2MB
+hole: ffffffffffff4111