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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-11-13 10:41:25 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-11-13 10:41:25 -0800
commitb33e3cc5c90b8293599318b68e61b93a89c127bb (patch)
treef61f315118d2b3e60e409c36e09fe06f8b6b6908 /Documentation
parent55b3a0cb5aeef0961ee18eac058e488f149a0053 (diff)
parente5729f86a2987c9404f9b2fb494b9a6fc4412baf (diff)
downloadlinux-b33e3cc5c90b8293599318b68e61b93a89c127bb.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem integrity updates from James Morris: "There is a mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, preparatory code for new functionality and new functionality. Commit 26ddabfe96bb ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded") enabled EVM without loading a symmetric key, but was limited to defining the x509 certificate pathname at build. Included in this set of patches is the ability of enabling EVM, without loading the EVM symmetric key, from userspace. New is the ability to prevent the loading of an EVM symmetric key." * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: ima: Remove redundant conditional operator ima: Fix bool initialization/comparison ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG module: export module signature enforcement status ima: fix hash algorithm initialization EVM: Only complain about a missing HMAC key once EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded EVM: Include security.apparmor in EVM measurements ima: call ima_file_free() prior to calling fasync integrity: use kernel_read_file_from_path() to read x509 certs ima: always measure and audit files in policy ima: don't remove the securityfs policy file vfs: fix mounting a filesystem with i_version
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/ABI/testing/evm48
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
index ca622c9aa24c..9578247e1792 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
@@ -7,17 +7,37 @@ Description:
HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
- EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it
- with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation.
- The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until
- EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully
- loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM
- can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but
- returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM
- should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done
- in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part
- of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and
- loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
- Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. (A sample
- dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables
- EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)
+ EVM supports two classes of security.evm. The first is
+ an HMAC-sha1 generated locally with a
+ trusted/encrypted key stored in the Kernel Key
+ Retention System. The second is a digital signature
+ generated either locally or remotely using an
+ asymmetric key. These keys are loaded onto root's
+ keyring using keyctl, and EVM is then enabled by
+ echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm:
+
+ 1: enable HMAC validation and creation
+ 2: enable digital signature validation
+ 3: enable HMAC and digital signature validation and HMAC
+ creation
+
+ Further writes will be blocked if HMAC support is enabled or
+ if bit 32 is set:
+
+ echo 0x80000002 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+ will enable digital signature validation and block
+ further writes to <securityfs>/evm.
+
+ Until this is done, EVM can not create or validate the
+ 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
+ Loading keys and signaling EVM should be done as early
+ as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs,
+ which has already been measured as part of the trusted
+ boot. For more information on creating and loading
+ existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
+
+ Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both dracut
+ (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
+ core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot
+ time.