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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-08-06 11:22:22 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-08-06 11:22:22 -0700 |
commit | 4368c4bc9d36821690d6bb2e743d5a075b6ddb55 (patch) | |
tree | 830266f667f9315e072704282f640464dd80996b /Documentation/arm/vfp | |
parent | 0eb0ce0a78e1f57082bca6cbdea6fd04feedb876 (diff) | |
parent | 4c92057661a3412f547ede95715641d7ee16ddac (diff) | |
download | linux-4368c4bc9d36821690d6bb2e743d5a075b6ddb55.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'x86/grand-schemozzle' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The performance deterioration departement is not proud at all to
present yet another set of speculation fences to mitigate the next
chapter in the 'what could possibly go wrong' story.
The new vulnerability belongs to the Spectre class and affects GS
based data accesses and has therefore been dubbed 'Grand Schemozzle'
for secret communication purposes. It's officially listed as
CVE-2019-1125.
Conditional branches in the entry paths which contain a SWAPGS
instruction (interrupts and exceptions) can be mis-speculated which
results in speculative accesses with a wrong GS base.
This can happen on entry from user mode through a mis-speculated
branch which takes the entry from kernel mode path and therefore does
not execute the SWAPGS instruction. The following speculative accesses
are done with user GS base.
On entry from kernel mode the mis-speculated branch executes the
SWAPGS instruction in the entry from user mode path which has the same
effect that the following GS based accesses are done with user GS
base.
If there is a disclosure gadget available in these code paths the
mis-speculated data access can be leaked through the usual side
channels.
The entry from user mode issue affects all CPUs which have speculative
execution. The entry from kernel mode issue affects only Intel CPUs
which can speculate through SWAPGS. On CPUs from other vendors SWAPGS
has semantics which prevent that.
SMAP migitates both problems but only when the CPU is not affected by
the Meltdown vulnerability.
The mitigation is to issue LFENCE instructions in the entry from
kernel mode path for all affected CPUs and on the affected Intel CPUs
also in the entry from user mode path unless PTI is enabled because
the CR3 write is serializing.
The fences are as usual enabled conditionally and can be completely
disabled on the kernel command line. The Spectre V1 documentation is
updated accordingly.
A big "Thank You!" goes to Josh for doing the heavy lifting for this
round of hardware misfeature 'repair'. Of course also "Thank You!" to
everybody else who contributed in one way or the other"
* 'x86/grand-schemozzle' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentation
x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude ATOMs from speculation through SWAPGS
x86/entry/64: Use JMP instead of JMPQ
x86/speculation: Enable Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations
x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/arm/vfp')
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