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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-10-02 21:38:48 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-10-02 21:38:48 -0700 |
commit | 88265322c14cce39f7afbc416726ef4fac413298 (patch) | |
tree | e4956f905ef617971f87788d8f8a09dbb66b70a3 /Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | |
parent | 65b99c74fdd325d1ffa2e5663295888704712604 (diff) | |
parent | bf5308344527d015ac9a6d2bda4ad4d40fd7d943 (diff) | |
download | linux-88265322c14cce39f7afbc416726ef4fac413298.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
attacks
- Integrity: add digital signature verification
- Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
- IBM vTPM support on ppc64
- Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
- Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"
Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
ima: change flags container data type
Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
ima: audit log hashes
ima: generic IMA action flag handling
ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
audit: export audit_log_task_info
tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
ima: digital signature verification support
ima: add support for different security.ima data types
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
ima: add inode_post_setattr call
ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
ima: allocating iint improvements
ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
ima: integrity appraisal extension
vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 25 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 6cd6daefaaed..986946613542 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -12,11 +12,14 @@ Description: then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after the file ima/policy is closed. + IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements + for local measurement appraisal. + rule format: action [condition ...] - action: measure | dont_measure + action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit condition:= base | lsm - base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]] + base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=] [fowner]] lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] @@ -24,36 +27,50 @@ Description: mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value uid:= decimal value + fowner:=decimal value lsm: are LSM specific default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0 # SYSFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572 # DEBUGFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720 # TMPFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994 + # RAMFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6 # SECURITYFS_MAGIC dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673 measure func=BPRM_CHECK measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 + appraise fowner=0 The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files - open for read by root in do_filp_open. + open for read by root in do_filp_open. The default appraisal + policy appraises all files owned by root. Examples of LSM specific definitions: SELinux: # SELINUX_MAGIC - dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C + dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c + dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t + dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t + dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ |