Merge branch 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current

* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
  [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
  [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
  [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
  [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
  [PATCH] Fix audit operators
  [PATCH] promiscuous mode
  [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
  [PATCH] add/remove rule update
  [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
  [PATCH] SE Linux audit events
  [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
  [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
  [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
  [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
  [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
  [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
  [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
  [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
  [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
  [PATCH] Filter rule comparators
  ...

Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c

22 files changed, 1580 insertions, 546 deletions

diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
index f51c894a7da5..aee14fafd13d 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -252,6 +253,7 @@ out:
 static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct tss_struct *tss;
+	long eax;
 /*
  * make sure the vm86() system call doesn't try to do anything silly
  */
@@ -305,13 +307,19 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk
 	tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
 	if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
 		mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
+	__asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t");
+	__asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax));
+
+	/*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
+	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+		audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
-		"xorl %%eax,%%eax; movl %%eax,%%fs; movl %%eax,%%gs\n\t"
 		"movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
 		"movl %1,%%ebp\n\t"
 		"jmp resume_userspace"
 		: /* no outputs */
-		:"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)) : "ax");
+		:"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)));
 	/* we never return here */
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
index eaed14aac6aa..9887c8787e7a 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1656,8 +1656,14 @@ syscall_trace_leave (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3,
 		     long arg4, long arg5, long arg6, long arg7,
 		     struct pt_regs regs)
 {
-	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
-		audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs.r10), regs.r8);
+	if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
+		int success = AUDITSC_RESULT(regs.r10);
+		long result = regs.r8;
+
+		if (success != AUDITSC_SUCCESS)
+			result = -result;
+		audit_syscall_exit(current, success, result);
+	}
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
 	    && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 712dfc77793b..98dc2e134362 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1353,6 +1353,7 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir,struct dentry *victim,int isdir)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
+	audit_inode_child(victim->d_name.name, victim->d_inode, dir->i_ino);
 
 	error = permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, NULL);
 	if (error)
@@ -1472,7 +1473,7 @@ int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	DQUOT_INIT(dir);
 	error = dir->i_op->create(dir, dentry, mode, nd);
 	if (!error)
-		fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+		fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -1799,7 +1800,7 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
 	DQUOT_INIT(dir);
 	error = dir->i_op->mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 	if (!error)
-		fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+		fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -1876,7 +1877,7 @@ int vfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 	DQUOT_INIT(dir);
 	error = dir->i_op->mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
 	if (!error)
-		fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+		fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -2139,7 +2140,7 @@ int vfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *oldname, i
 	DQUOT_INIT(dir);
 	error = dir->i_op->symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
 	if (!error)
-		fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+		fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -2216,7 +2217,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_de
 	error = dir->i_op->link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
 	mutex_unlock(&old_dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
 	if (!error)
-		fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry->d_name.name);
+		fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry);
 	return error;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 7d02d19bd0a2..c32c89d6d8db 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
@@ -626,6 +627,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int fd, mode_t mode)
 	dentry = file->f_dentry;
 	inode = dentry->d_inode;
 
+	audit_inode(NULL, inode, 0);
+
 	err = -EROFS;
 	if (IS_RDONLY(inode))
 		goto out_putf;
@@ -775,7 +778,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int fd, uid_t user, gid_t group)
 
 	file = fget(fd);
 	if (file) {
-		error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
+		struct dentry * dentry;
+		dentry = file->f_dentry;
+		audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+		error = chown_common(dentry, user, group);
 		fput(file);
 	}
 	return error;
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 80eca7d3d69f..e416190f5e9c 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 
@@ -234,12 +235,15 @@ sys_fsetxattr(int fd, char __user *name, void __user *value,
 	      size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct file *f;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
 	int error = -EBADF;
 
 	f = fget(fd);
 	if (!f)
 		return error;
-	error = setxattr(f->f_dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	dentry = f->f_dentry;
+	audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+	error = setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 	fput(f);
 	return error;
 }
@@ -458,12 +462,15 @@ asmlinkage long
 sys_fremovexattr(int fd, char __user *name)
 {
 	struct file *f;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
 	int error = -EBADF;
 
 	f = fget(fd);
 	if (!f)
 		return error;
-	error = removexattr(f->f_dentry, name);
+	dentry = f->f_dentry;
+	audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+	error = removexattr(dentry, name);
 	fput(f);
 	return error;
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index da3c01955f3d..1c47c59058c1 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -33,27 +33,42 @@
  * 1200 - 1299 messages internal to the audit daemon
  * 1300 - 1399 audit event messages
  * 1400 - 1499 SE Linux use
- * 1500 - 1999 future use
- * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages
+ * 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events
+ * 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events
+ * 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records
+ * 1800 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events)
+ * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages (legacy)
+ * 2001 - 2099 unused (kernel)
+ * 2100 - 2199 user space anomaly records
+ * 2200 - 2299 user space actions taken in response to anomalies
+ * 2300 - 2399 user space generated LSPP events
+ * 2400 - 2499 user space crypto events
+ * 2500 - 2999 future user space (maybe integrity labels and related events)
  *
- * Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 are exclusively user
- * space. Anything over that is kernel --> user space communication.
+ * Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 & 2100 - 2999 are
+ * exclusively user space. 1300-2099 is kernel --> user space 
+ * communication.
  */
 #define AUDIT_GET		1000	/* Get status */
 #define AUDIT_SET		1001	/* Set status (enable/disable/auditd) */
-#define AUDIT_LIST		1002	/* List syscall filtering rules */
-#define AUDIT_ADD		1003	/* Add syscall filtering rule */
-#define AUDIT_DEL		1004	/* Delete syscall filtering rule */
+#define AUDIT_LIST		1002	/* List syscall rules -- deprecated */
+#define AUDIT_ADD		1003	/* Add syscall rule -- deprecated */
+#define AUDIT_DEL		1004	/* Delete syscall rule -- deprecated */
 #define AUDIT_USER		1005	/* Message from userspace -- deprecated */
 #define AUDIT_LOGIN		1006	/* Define the login id and information */
 #define AUDIT_WATCH_INS		1007	/* Insert file/dir watch entry */
 #define AUDIT_WATCH_REM		1008	/* Remove file/dir watch entry */
 #define AUDIT_WATCH_LIST	1009	/* List all file/dir watches */
 #define AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO	1010	/* Get info about sender of signal to auditd */
+#define AUDIT_ADD_RULE		1011	/* Add syscall filtering rule */
+#define AUDIT_DEL_RULE		1012	/* Delete syscall filtering rule */
+#define AUDIT_LIST_RULES	1013	/* List syscall filtering rules */
 
 #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG	1100	/* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */
 #define AUDIT_USER_AVC		1107	/* We filter this differently */
 #define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG	1199
+#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2	2100	/* More user space messages */
+#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2	2999
  
 #define AUDIT_DAEMON_START      1200    /* Daemon startup record */
 #define AUDIT_DAEMON_END        1201    /* Daemon normal stop record */
@@ -72,6 +87,13 @@
 #define AUDIT_AVC		1400	/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
 #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR	1401	/* Internal SE Linux Errors */
 #define AUDIT_AVC_PATH		1402	/* dentry, vfsmount pair from avc */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD	1403	/* Policy file load */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_STATUS	1404	/* Changed enforcing,permissive,off */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE	1405	/* Changes to booleans */
+
+#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG   1700
+#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG    1799
+#define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS      1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */
 
 #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
 
@@ -81,8 +103,9 @@
 #define AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY	0x02	/* Apply rule at syscall entry */
 #define AUDIT_FILTER_WATCH	0x03	/* Apply rule to file system watches */
 #define AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT	0x04	/* Apply rule at syscall exit */
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE	0x05	/* Apply rule at audit_log_start */
 
-#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS	5
+#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS	6
 
 #define AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND	0x10	/* Prepend to front of list */
 
@@ -98,6 +121,13 @@
 #define AUDIT_WORD(nr) ((__u32)((nr)/32))
 #define AUDIT_BIT(nr)  (1 << ((nr) - AUDIT_WORD(nr)*32))
 
+/* This bitmask is used to validate user input.  It represents all bits that
+ * are currently used in an audit field constant understood by the kernel.
+ * If you are adding a new #define AUDIT_<whatever>, please ensure that
+ * AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS is updated if need be. */
+#define AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS	0x0FFFFC00
+
+
 /* Rule fields */
 				/* These are useful when checking the
 				 * task structure at task creation time
@@ -114,6 +144,7 @@
 #define AUDIT_LOGINUID	9
 #define AUDIT_PERS	10
 #define AUDIT_ARCH	11
+#define AUDIT_MSGTYPE	12
 
 				/* These are ONLY useful when checking
 				 * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
@@ -128,8 +159,28 @@
 #define AUDIT_ARG2      (AUDIT_ARG0+2)
 #define AUDIT_ARG3      (AUDIT_ARG0+3)
 
-#define AUDIT_NEGATE    0x80000000
+#define AUDIT_NEGATE			0x80000000
 
+/* These are the supported operators.
+ *	4  2  1
+ *	=  >  <
+ *	-------
+ *	0  0  0		0	nonsense
+ *	0  0  1		1	<
+ *	0  1  0		2	>
+ *	0  1  1		3	!=
+ *	1  0  0		4	=
+ *	1  0  1		5	<=
+ *	1  1  0		6	>=
+ *	1  1  1		7	all operators
+ */
+#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN			0x10000000
+#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN		0x20000000
+#define AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL			0x30000000
+#define AUDIT_EQUAL			0x40000000
+#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL	(AUDIT_LESS_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL)
+#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL	(AUDIT_GREATER_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL)
+#define AUDIT_OPERATORS			(AUDIT_EQUAL|AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
 
 /* Status symbols */
 				/* Mask values */
@@ -186,6 +237,26 @@ struct audit_status {
 	__u32		backlog;	/* messages waiting in queue */
 };
 
+/* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string
+ * fields.  It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
+ * AUDIT_LIST_RULES requests.
+ */
+struct audit_rule_data {
+	__u32		flags;	/* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */
+	__u32		action;	/* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */
+	__u32		field_count;
+	__u32		mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; /* syscall(s) affected */
+	__u32		fields[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
+	__u32		values[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
+	__u32		fieldflags[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
+	__u32		buflen;	/* total length of string fields */
+	char		buf[0];	/* string fields buffer */
+};
+
+/* audit_rule is supported to maintain backward compatibility with
+ * userspace.  It supports integer fields only and corresponds to
+ * AUDIT_ADD, AUDIT_DEL and AUDIT_LIST requests.
+ */
 struct audit_rule {		/* for AUDIT_LIST, AUDIT_ADD, and AUDIT_DEL */
 	__u32		flags;	/* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */
 	__u32		action;	/* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */
@@ -222,22 +293,33 @@ extern void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *task, int arch,
 extern void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *task, int failed, long return_code);
 extern void audit_getname(const char *name);
 extern void audit_putname(const char *name);
-extern void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags);
+extern void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags);
+extern void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+				unsigned long pino);
+static inline void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode,
+			       unsigned flags) {
+	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+		__audit_inode(name, inode, flags);
+}
+static inline void audit_inode_child(const char *dname, 
+				     const struct inode *inode, 
+				     unsigned long pino) {
+	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+		__audit_inode_child(dname, inode, pino);
+}
 
 				/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
-extern int  audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq,
-				 void *data, uid_t loginuid);
 extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
 extern void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 			      struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial);
 extern int  audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid);
 extern uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx);
-extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode);
+extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
 extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
 extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
 extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
 extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
-extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
+extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name);
 #else
 #define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0)
@@ -245,16 +327,18 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
 #define audit_syscall_exit(t,f,r) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_getname(n) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_putname(n) do { ; } while (0)
+#define __audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0)
+#define __audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_receive_filter(t,p,u,s,d,l) ({ -EOPNOTSUPP; })
+#define audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0)
 #define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) do { BUG(); } while (0)
 #define audit_get_loginuid(c) ({ -1; })
-#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m,i) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_socketcall(n,a) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_signal_info(s,t) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_filter_user(cb,t) ({ 1; })
+#define audit_set_macxattr(n) do { ; } while (0)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -278,12 +362,11 @@ extern void		    audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 					     const char *prefix,
 					     struct dentry *dentry,
 					     struct vfsmount *vfsmnt);
-				/* Private API (for auditsc.c only) */
-extern void		    audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
-					     int done, int multi,
-					     void *payload, int size);
-extern void		    audit_log_lost(const char *message);
-extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem;
+				/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
+extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
+extern int audit_filter_type(int type);
+extern int  audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq,
+				 void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid);
 #else
 #define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; })
@@ -293,6 +376,7 @@ extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem;
 #define audit_log_hex(a,b,l) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_log_untrustedstring(a,s) do { ; } while (0)
 #define audit_log_d_path(b,p,d,v) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_panic(m) do { ; } while (0)
 #endif
 #endif
 #endif
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
index f7e517c1f1bd..11438eff4d44 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/dnotify.h>
 #include <linux/inotify.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 
 /*
  * fsnotify_d_instantiate - instantiate a dentry for inode
@@ -64,6 +65,8 @@ static inline void fsnotify_move(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
 	if (source) {
 		inotify_inode_queue_event(source, IN_MOVE_SELF, 0, NULL);
 	}
+	audit_inode_child(old_name, source, old_dir->i_ino);
+	audit_inode_child(new_name, target, new_dir->i_ino);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -89,19 +92,22 @@ static inline void fsnotify_inoderemove(struct inode *inode)
 /*
  * fsnotify_create - 'name' was linked in
  */
-static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, const char *name)
+static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE);
-	inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, name);
+	inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, dentry->d_name.name);
+	audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino);
 }
 
 /*
  * fsnotify_mkdir - directory 'name' was created
  */
-static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, const char *name)
+static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE);
-	inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0, name);
+	inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0, 
+				  dentry->d_name.name);
+	audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3c19be35124b..aaa0a5cdbf75 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -869,6 +869,11 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
  *	@ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
  *	@flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecurity:
+ *      Copy the security label associated with the ipc object into
+ *      @buffer.  @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer 
+ *      required.  @size indicates the size of @buffer in bytes. Return 
+ *      number of bytes used/required on success.
  *
  * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
  * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1168,7 +1173,8 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
 	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
-  	int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
+	const char *(*inode_xattr_getsuffix) (void);
+  	int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
   	int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
   	int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
 
@@ -1217,6 +1223,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
 
 	int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
+	int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size);
 
 	int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
 	void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
@@ -1680,7 +1687,12 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name);
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+{
+	return security_ops->inode_xattr_getsuffix();
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
 {
 	if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
 		return 0;
@@ -1875,6 +1887,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
 	return security_ops->ipc_permission (ipcp, flag);
 }
 
+static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	return security_ops->ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, buffer, size);
+}
+
 static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
 {
 	return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security (msg);
@@ -2327,7 +2344,12 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix (void)
+{
+	return NULL ;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
@@ -2510,6 +2532,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c
index 60c1e5c23418..7eec5ed32379 100644
--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -428,8 +428,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
 			return -EFAULT;
 		if (copy_msqid_from_user (&setbuf, buf, version))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
-			return err;
 		break;
 	case IPC_RMID:
 		break;
@@ -460,6 +458,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case IPC_SET:
 	{
+		if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+			goto out_unlock_up;
+
 		err = -EPERM;
 		if (setbuf.qbytes > msg_ctlmnb && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
 			goto out_unlock_up;
diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
index 31fd4027d2b5..59696a840be1 100644
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -809,8 +809,6 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
 	if(cmd == IPC_SET) {
 		if(copy_semid_from_user (&setbuf, arg.buf, version))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
-			return err;
 	}
 	sma = sem_lock(semid);
 	if(sma==NULL)
@@ -821,7 +819,6 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}	
 	ipcp = &sma->sem_perm;
-	
 	if (current->euid != ipcp->cuid && 
 	    current->euid != ipcp->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 	    	err=-EPERM;
@@ -838,6 +835,8 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
 		err = 0;
 		break;
 	case IPC_SET:
+		if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+			goto out_unlock;
 		ipcp->uid = setbuf.uid;
 		ipcp->gid = setbuf.gid;
 		ipcp->mode = (ipcp->mode & ~S_IRWXUGO)
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 16fe2786087d..6f9615c09fb2 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -620,13 +620,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
 			err = -EFAULT;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
-			return err;
 		down(&shm_ids.sem);
 		shp = shm_lock(shmid);
 		err=-EINVAL;
 		if(shp==NULL)
 			goto out_up;
+		if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, &(shp->shm_perm))))
+			goto out_unlock_up;
 		err = shm_checkid(shp,shmid);
 		if(err)
 			goto out_unlock_up;
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index aebd7a78984e..ff1c11dc12cf 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPUSETS) += cpuset.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IKCONFIG) += configs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_STOP_MACHINE) += stop_machine.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o auditfilter.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSFS) += ksysfs.o
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0a813d2883e5..04fe2e301b61 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 
 #include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ static int	audit_failure = AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK;
  * contains the (non-zero) pid. */
 int		audit_pid;
 
-/* If audit_limit is non-zero, limit the rate of sending audit records
+/* If audit_rate_limit is non-zero, limit the rate of sending audit records
  * to that number per second.  This prevents DoS attacks, but results in
  * audit records being dropped. */
 static int	audit_rate_limit;
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ static struct sock *audit_sock;
  * than AUDIT_MAXFREE are in use, the audit buffer is freed instead of
  * being placed on the freelist). */
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(audit_freelist_lock);
-static int	   audit_freelist_count = 0;
+static int	   audit_freelist_count;
 static LIST_HEAD(audit_freelist);
 
 static struct sk_buff_head audit_skb_queue;
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(audit_backlog_wait);
 /* The netlink socket is only to be read by 1 CPU, which lets us assume
  * that list additions and deletions never happen simultaneously in
  * auditsc.c */
-DECLARE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_sem);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_mutex);
 
 /* AUDIT_BUFSIZ is the size of the temporary buffer used for formatting
  * audit records.  Since printk uses a 1024 byte buffer, this buffer
@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ static void audit_set_pid(struct audit_buffer *ab, pid_t pid)
 	nlh->nlmsg_pid = pid;
 }
 
-static void audit_panic(const char *message)
+void audit_panic(const char *message)
 {
 	switch (audit_failure)
 	{
@@ -186,8 +187,14 @@ static inline int audit_rate_check(void)
 	return retval;
 }
 
-/* Emit at least 1 message per second, even if audit_rate_check is
- * throttling. */
+/**
+ * audit_log_lost - conditionally log lost audit message event
+ * @message: the message stating reason for lost audit message
+ *
+ * Emit at least 1 message per second, even if audit_rate_check is
+ * throttling.
+ * Always increment the lost messages counter.
+*/
 void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
 {
 	static unsigned long	last_msg = 0;
@@ -218,7 +225,6 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
 		       audit_backlog_limit);
 		audit_panic(message);
 	}
-
 }
 
 static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
@@ -300,8 +306,22 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
 			remove_wait_queue(&kauditd_wait, &wait);
 		}
 	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_send_reply - send an audit reply message via netlink
+ * @pid: process id to send reply to
+ * @seq: sequence number
+ * @type: audit message type
+ * @done: done (last) flag
+ * @multi: multi-part message flag
+ * @payload: payload data
+ * @size: payload size
+ *
+ * Allocates an skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the pid.
+ * No failure notifications.
+ */
 void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi,
 		      void *payload, int size)
 {
@@ -342,15 +362,19 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type)
 	switch (msg_type) {
 	case AUDIT_GET:
 	case AUDIT_LIST:
+	case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
 	case AUDIT_SET:
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
+	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
+	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
 	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
 		if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
 			err = -EPERM;
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
+	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
 		if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
 			err = -EPERM;
 		break;
@@ -376,7 +400,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	/* As soon as there's any sign of userspace auditd, start kauditd to talk to it */
+	/* As soon as there's any sign of userspace auditd,
+	 * start kauditd to talk to it */
 	if (!kauditd_task)
 		kauditd_task = kthread_run(kauditd_thread, NULL, "kauditd");
 	if (IS_ERR(kauditd_task)) {
@@ -430,6 +455,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
+	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
 		if (!audit_enabled && msg_type != AUDIT_USER_AVC)
 			return 0;
 
@@ -448,12 +474,23 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
-		if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(struct audit_rule))
+		if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		/* fallthrough */
 	case AUDIT_LIST:
 		err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
-					   uid, seq, data, loginuid);
+					   uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
+					   loginuid);
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
+	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
+		if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule_data))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		/* fallthrough */
+	case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
+		err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
+					   uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
+					   loginuid);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
 		sig_data.uid = audit_sig_uid;
@@ -469,9 +506,11 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	return err < 0 ? err : 0;
 }
 
-/* Get message from skb (based on rtnetlink_rcv_skb).  Each message is
+/*
+ * Get message from skb (based on rtnetlink_rcv_skb).  Each message is
  * processed by audit_receive_msg.  Malformed skbs with wrong length are
- * discarded silently.  */
+ * discarded silently.
+ */
 static void audit_receive_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int		err;
@@ -499,14 +538,14 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sock *sk, int length)
 	struct sk_buff  *skb;
 	unsigned int qlen;
 
-	down(&audit_netlink_sem);
+	mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
 
 	for (qlen = skb_queue_len(&sk->sk_receive_queue); qlen; qlen--) {
 		skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
 		audit_receive_skb(skb);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 	}
-	up(&audit_netlink_sem);
+	mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
 }
 
 
@@ -519,8 +558,9 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
 					   THIS_MODULE);
 	if (!audit_sock)
 		audit_panic("cannot initialize netlink socket");
+	else
+		audit_sock->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
 
-	audit_sock->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
 	skb_queue_head_init(&audit_skb_queue);
 	audit_initialized = 1;
 	audit_enabled = audit_default;
@@ -600,7 +640,10 @@ err:
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-/* Compute a serial number for the audit record.  Audit records are
+/**
+ * audit_serial - compute a serial number for the audit record
+ *
+ * Compute a serial number for the audit record.  Audit records are
  * written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete
  * audit record may be written in several pieces.  The timestamp of the
  * record and this serial number are used by the user-space tools to
@@ -612,8 +655,8 @@ err:
  * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them
  * all at syscall exit.  However, this could delay the reporting of
  * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system
- * halts). */
-
+ * halts).
+ */
 unsigned int audit_serial(void)
 {
 	static spinlock_t serial_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
@@ -649,6 +692,21 @@ static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
  * will be written at syscall exit.  If there is no associated task, tsk
  * should be NULL. */
 
+/**
+ * audit_log_start - obtain an audit buffer
+ * @ctx: audit_context (may be NULL)
+ * @gfp_mask: type of allocation
+ * @type: audit message type
+ *
+ * Returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on error.
+ *
+ * Obtain an audit buffer.  This routine does locking to obtain the
+ * audit buffer, but then no locking is required for calls to
+ * audit_log_*format.  If the task (ctx) is a task that is currently in a
+ * syscall, then the syscall is marked as auditable and an audit record
+ * will be written at syscall exit.  If there is no associated task, then
+ * task context (ctx) should be NULL.
+ */
 struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
 				     int type)
 {
@@ -661,6 +719,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
 	if (!audit_initialized)
 		return NULL;
 
+	if (unlikely(audit_filter_type(type)))
+		return NULL;
+
 	if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT)
 		reserve = 0;
 	else
@@ -713,6 +774,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
 /**
  * audit_expand - expand skb in the audit buffer
  * @ab: audit_buffer
+ * @extra: space to add at tail of the skb
  *
  * Returns 0 (no space) on failed expansion, or available space if
  * successful.
@@ -729,10 +791,12 @@ static inline int audit_expand(struct audit_buffer *ab, int extra)
 	return skb_tailroom(skb);
 }
 
-/* Format an audit message into the audit buffer.  If there isn't enough
+/*
+ * Format an audit message into the audit buffer.  If there isn't enough
  * room in the audit buffer, more room will be allocated and vsnprint
  * will be called a second time.  Currently, we assume that a printk
- * can't format message larger than 1024 bytes, so we don't either. */
+ * can't format message larger than 1024 bytes, so we don't either.
+ */
 static void audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt,
 			      va_list args)
 {
@@ -757,7 +821,8 @@ static void audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt,
 		/* The printk buffer is 1024 bytes long, so if we get
 		 * here and AUDIT_BUFSIZ is at least 1024, then we can
 		 * log everything that printk could have logged. */
-		avail = audit_expand(ab, max_t(unsigned, AUDIT_BUFSIZ, 1+len-avail));
+		avail = audit_expand(ab,
+			max_t(unsigned, AUDIT_BUFSIZ, 1+len-avail));
 		if (!avail)
 			goto out;
 		len = vsnprintf(skb->tail, avail, fmt, args2);
@@ -768,8 +833,14 @@ out:
 	return;
 }
 
-/* Format a message into the audit buffer.  All the work is done in
- * audit_log_vformat. */
+/**
+ * audit_log_format - format a message into the audit buffer.
+ * @ab: audit_buffer
+ * @fmt: format string
+ * @...: optional parameters matching @fmt string
+ *
+ * All the work is done in audit_log_vformat.
+ */
 void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	va_list args;
@@ -781,9 +852,18 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
 	va_end(args);
 }
 
-/* This function will take the passed buf and convert it into a string of
- * ascii hex digits. The new string is placed onto the skb. */
-void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, 
+/**
+ * audit_log_hex - convert a buffer to hex and append it to the audit skb
+ * @ab: the audit_buffer
+ * @buf: buffer to convert to hex
+ * @len: length of @buf to be converted
+ *
+ * No return value; failure to expand is silently ignored.
+ *
+ * This function will take the passed buf and convert it into a string of
+ * ascii hex digits. The new string is placed onto the skb.
+ */
+void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
 		size_t len)
 {
 	int i, avail, new_len;
@@ -812,10 +892,16 @@ void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
 	skb_put(skb, len << 1); /* new string is twice the old string */
 }
 
-/* This code will escape a string that is passed to it if the string
- * contains a control character, unprintable character, double quote mark, 
+/**
+ * audit_log_unstrustedstring - log a string that may contain random characters
+ * @ab: audit_buffer
+ * @string: string to be logged
+ *
+ * This code will escape a string that is passed to it if the string
+ * contains a control character, unprintable character, double quote mark,
  * or a space. Unescaped strings will start and end with a double quote mark.
- * Strings that are escaped are printed in hex (2 digits per char). */
+ * Strings that are escaped are printed in hex (2 digits per char).
+ */
 void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string)
 {
 	const unsigned char *p = string;
@@ -854,10 +940,15 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix,
 	kfree(path);
 }
 
-/* The netlink_* functions cannot be called inside an irq context, so
- * the audit buffer is places on a queue and a tasklet is scheduled to
+/**
+ * audit_log_end - end one audit record
+ * @ab: the audit_buffer
+ *
+ * The netlink_* functions cannot be called inside an irq context, so
+ * the audit buffer is placed on a queue and a tasklet is scheduled to
  * remove them from the queue outside the irq context.  May be called in
- * any context. */
+ * any context.
+ */
 void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
 	if (!ab)
@@ -878,9 +969,18 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	audit_buffer_free(ab);
 }
 
-/* Log an audit record.  This is a convenience function that calls
- * audit_log_start, audit_log_vformat, and audit_log_end.  It may be
- * called in any context. */
+/**
+ * audit_log - Log an audit record
+ * @ctx: audit context
+ * @gfp_mask: type of allocation
+ * @type: audit message type
+ * @fmt: format string to use
+ * @...: variable parameters matching the format string
+ *
+ * This is a convenience function that calls audit_log_start,
+ * audit_log_vformat, and audit_log_end.  It may be called
+ * in any context.
+ */
 void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type, 
 	       const char *fmt, ...)
 {
@@ -895,3 +995,8 @@ void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type,
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
 }
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_start);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_end);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_format);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bc5392076e2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* audit -- definition of audit_context structure and supporting types 
+ *
+ * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+/* 0 = no checking
+   1 = put_count checking
+   2 = verbose put_count checking
+*/
+#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+
+/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
+   a per-task filter.  At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
+   the syscall filter. */
+enum audit_state {
+	AUDIT_DISABLED,		/* Do not create per-task audit_context.
+				 * No syscall-specific audit records can
+				 * be generated. */
+	AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
+				 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
+				 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
+				 * instead). */
+	AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
+				 * and always fill it in at syscall
+				 * entry time.  This makes a full
+				 * syscall record available if some
+				 * other part of the kernel decides it
+				 * should be recorded. */
+	AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
+				 * always fill it in at syscall entry
+				 * time, and always write out the audit
+				 * record at syscall exit time.  */
+};
+
+/* Rule lists */
+struct audit_field {
+	u32			type;
+	u32			val;
+	u32			op;
+};
+
+struct audit_krule {
+	int			vers_ops;
+	u32			flags;
+	u32			listnr;
+	u32			action;
+	u32			mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
+	u32			buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
+	u32			field_count;
+	struct audit_field	*fields;
+};
+
+struct audit_entry {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct rcu_head		rcu;
+	struct audit_krule	rule;
+};
+
+
+extern int audit_pid;
+extern int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right);
+
+extern void		    audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
+					     int done, int multi,
+					     void *payload, int size);
+extern void		    audit_log_lost(const char *message);
+extern void		    audit_panic(const char *message);
+extern struct mutex audit_netlink_mutex;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d3a8539f3a83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,630 @@
+/* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events
+ *
+ * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include "audit.h"
+
+/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
+ * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
+ * syscall exit time. */
+struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
+	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
+#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6
+#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
+#endif
+};
+
+static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
+{
+	kfree(e->rule.fields);
+	kfree(e);
+}
+
+static inline void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
+	audit_free_rule(e);
+}
+
+/* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
+ * buffer. */
+static __attribute__((unused)) char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
+{
+	char *str;
+
+	if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX
+	 * defines the longest valid length.
+	 */
+	if (len > PATH_MAX)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
+
+	str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!str))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	memcpy(str, *bufp, len);
+	str[len] = 0;
+	*bufp += len;
+	*remain -= len;
+
+	return str;
+}
+
+/* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
+static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
+{
+	unsigned listnr;
+	struct audit_entry *entry;
+	struct audit_field *fields;
+	int i, err;
+
+	err = -EINVAL;
+	listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+	switch(listnr) {
+	default:
+		goto exit_err;
+	case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
+	case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+	case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY:
+	case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT:
+	case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:
+#endif
+		;
+	}
+	if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE &&
+	    rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
+		goto exit_err;
+	if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
+		goto exit_err;
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!entry))
+		goto exit_err;
+	fields = kmalloc(sizeof(*fields) * rule->field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!fields)) {
+		kfree(entry);
+		goto exit_err;
+	}
+
+	memset(&entry->rule, 0, sizeof(struct audit_krule));
+	memset(fields, 0, sizeof(struct audit_field));
+
+	entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+	entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
+	entry->rule.action = rule->action;
+	entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
+	entry->rule.fields = fields;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+		entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
+
+	return entry;
+
+exit_err:
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/* Translate struct audit_rule to kernel's rule respresentation.
+ * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
+static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *entry;
+	int err = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	entry = audit_to_entry_common(rule);
+	if (IS_ERR(entry))
+		goto exit_nofree;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
+
+		if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto exit_free;
+		}
+
+		f->op = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
+		f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
+		f->val = rule->values[i];
+
+		entry->rule.vers_ops = (f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
+
+		/* Support for legacy operators where
+		 * AUDIT_NEGATE bit signifies != and otherwise assumes == */
+		if (f->op & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+			f->op = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL;
+		else if (!f->op)
+			f->op = AUDIT_EQUAL;
+		else if (f->op == AUDIT_OPERATORS) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto exit_free;
+		}
+	}
+
+exit_nofree:
+	return entry;
+
+exit_free:
+	audit_free_rule(entry);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule respresentation. */
+static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
+					       size_t datasz)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	struct audit_entry *entry;
+	void *bufp;
+	/* size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); */
+	int i;
+
+	entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data);
+	if (IS_ERR(entry))
+		goto exit_nofree;
+
+	bufp = data->buf;
+	entry->rule.vers_ops = 2;
+	for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
+		struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
+
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		if (!(data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ||
+		    data->fieldflags[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS)
+			goto exit_free;
+
+		f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
+		f->type = data->fields[i];
+		switch(f->type) {
+		/* call type-specific conversion routines here */
+		default:
+			f->val = data->values[i];
+		}
+	}
+
+exit_nofree:
+	return entry;
+
+exit_free:
+	audit_free_rule(entry);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
+static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, char *str)
+{
+	size_t len = strlen(str);
+
+	memcpy(*bufp, str, len);
+	*bufp += len;
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule.
+ * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
+static struct audit_rule *audit_krule_to_rule(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+	struct audit_rule *rule;
+	int i;
+
+	rule = kmalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!rule))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	memset(rule, 0, sizeof(*rule));
+
+	rule->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
+	rule->action = krule->action;
+	rule->field_count = krule->field_count;
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		rule->values[i] = krule->fields[i].val;
+		rule->fields[i] = krule->fields[i].type;
+
+		if (krule->vers_ops == 1) {
+			if (krule->fields[i].op & AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+				rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NEGATE;
+		} else {
+			rule->fields[i] |= krule->fields[i].op;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) rule->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
+
+	return rule;
+}
+
+/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule_data. */
+static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+	struct audit_rule_data *data;
+	void *bufp;
+	int i;
+
+	data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!data))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
+
+	data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
+	data->action = krule->action;
+	data->field_count = krule->field_count;
+	bufp = data->buf;
+	for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
+		struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i];
+
+		data->fields[i] = f->type;
+		data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
+		switch(f->type) {
+		/* call type-specific conversion routines here */
+		default:
+			data->values[i] = f->val;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
+
+	return data;
+}
+
+/* Compare two rules in kernel format.  Considered success if rules
+ * don't match. */
+static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (a->flags != b->flags ||
+	    a->listnr != b->listnr ||
+	    a->action != b->action ||
+	    a->field_count != b->field_count)
+		return 1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
+		if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type ||
+		    a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op)
+			return 1;
+
+		switch(a->fields[i].type) {
+		/* call type-specific comparison routines here */
+		default:
+			if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
+				return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+		if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
+			return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate.  Protected by
+ * audit_netlink_mutex. */
+static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
+				  struct list_head *list)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+
+	/* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+	 * addition routine. */
+	list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
+		if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule))
+			return -EEXIST;
+	}
+
+	if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
+		list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+	} else {
+		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Remove an existing rule from filterlist.  Protected by
+ * audit_netlink_mutex. */
+static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
+				 struct list_head *list)
+{
+	struct audit_entry  *e;
+
+	/* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+	 * deletion routine. */
+	list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
+		if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
+			list_del_rcu(&e->list);
+			call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return -ENOENT;		/* No matching rule */
+}
+
+/* List rules using struct audit_rule.  Exists for backward
+ * compatibility with userspace. */
+static int audit_list(void *_dest)
+{
+	int pid, seq;
+	int *dest = _dest;
+	struct audit_entry *entry;
+	int i;
+
+	pid = dest[0];
+	seq = dest[1];
+	kfree(dest);
+
+	mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+	/* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
+	   always called with audit_netlink_mutex held. */
+	for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+		list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
+			struct audit_rule *rule;
+
+			rule = audit_krule_to_rule(&entry->rule);
+			if (unlikely(!rule))
+				break;
+			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+					 rule, sizeof(*rule));
+			kfree(rule);
+		}
+	}
+	audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+	
+	mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
+static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
+{
+	int pid, seq;
+	int *dest = _dest;
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+	int i;
+
+	pid = dest[0];
+	seq = dest[1];
+	kfree(dest);
+
+	mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+	/* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
+	   always called with audit_netlink_mutex held. */
+	for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+		list_for_each_entry(e, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
+			struct audit_rule_data *data;
+
+			data = audit_krule_to_data(&e->rule);
+			if (unlikely(!data))
+				break;
+			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1,
+					 data, sizeof(*data));
+			kfree(data);
+		}
+	}
+	audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type
+ * @type: audit message type
+ * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages
+ * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages
+ * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
+ * @data: payload data
+ * @datasz: size of payload data
+ * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
+ */
+int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
+			 size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+	int *dest;
+	int err = 0;
+	struct audit_entry *entry;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case AUDIT_LIST:
+	case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
+		/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
+		 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
+		 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
+		 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
+		 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
+		 
+		dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!dest)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		dest[0] = pid;
+		dest[1] = seq;
+
+		if (type == AUDIT_LIST)
+			tsk = kthread_run(audit_list, dest, "audit_list");
+		else
+			tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest,
+					  "audit_list_rules");
+		if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
+			kfree(dest);
+			err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_ADD:
+	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
+		if (type == AUDIT_ADD)
+			entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
+		else
+			entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+		if (IS_ERR(entry))
+			return PTR_ERR(entry);
+
+		err = audit_add_rule(entry,
+				     &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
+		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+			"auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d\n",
+			loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+
+		if (err)
+			audit_free_rule(entry);
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_DEL:
+	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
+		if (type == AUDIT_DEL)
+			entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
+		else
+			entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+		if (IS_ERR(entry))
+			return PTR_ERR(entry);
+
+		err = audit_del_rule(entry,
+				     &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
+		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+			"auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d\n",
+			loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+
+		audit_free_rule(entry);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right)
+{
+	switch (op) {
+	case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+		return (left == right);
+	case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+		return (left != right);
+	case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
+		return (left < right);
+	case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+		return (left <= right);
+	case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
+		return (left > right);
+	case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+		return (left >= right);
+	}
+	BUG();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
+				   struct audit_krule *rule,
+				   enum audit_state *state)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+		int result = 0;
+
+		switch (f->type) {
+		case AUDIT_PID:
+			result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, f->op, f->val);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_UID:
+			result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, f->op, f->val);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_GID:
+			result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, f->op, f->val);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
+			result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!result)
+			return 0;
+	}
+	switch (rule->action) {
+	case AUDIT_NEVER:    *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;	    break;
+	case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;  break;
+	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:   *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+	enum audit_state   state;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
+		if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
+			if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
+				ret = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return ret; /* Audit by default */
+}
+
+int audit_filter_type(int type)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+	int result = 0;
+	
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE]))
+		goto unlock_and_return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE],
+				list) {
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+			if (f->type == AUDIT_MSGTYPE) {
+				result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val);
+				if (!result)
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (result)
+			goto unlock_and_return;
+	}
+unlock_and_return:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return result;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c4394abcd5e6..7f160df21a23 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
  *
  * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
  * All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -27,11 +29,22 @@
  * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
  * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
  *
+ * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
+ * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
+ *
+ * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
+ * filesystem information.
+ *
+ * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
+ * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
  */
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <asm/types.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
@@ -39,16 +52,16 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
-#include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
 
-/* 0 = no checking
-   1 = put_count checking
-   2 = verbose put_count checking
-*/
-#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
 
 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
 extern int audit_enabled;
@@ -62,29 +75,6 @@ extern int audit_enabled;
  * path_lookup. */
 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
 
-/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
-   a per-task filter.  At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
-   the syscall filter. */
-enum audit_state {
-	AUDIT_DISABLED,		/* Do not create per-task audit_context.
-				 * No syscall-specific audit records can
-				 * be generated. */
-	AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
-				 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
-				 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
-				 * instead). */
-	AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
-				 * and always fill it in at syscall
-				 * entry time.  This makes a full
-				 * syscall record available if some
-				 * other part of the kernel decides it
-				 * should be recorded. */
-	AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
-				 * always fill it in at syscall entry
-				 * time, and always write out the audit
-				 * record at syscall exit time.  */
-};
-
 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
  * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
  * pointers at syscall exit time).
@@ -93,12 +83,13 @@ enum audit_state {
 struct audit_names {
 	const char	*name;
 	unsigned long	ino;
+	unsigned long	pino;
 	dev_t		dev;
 	umode_t		mode;
 	uid_t		uid;
 	gid_t		gid;
 	dev_t		rdev;
-	unsigned	flags;
+	char		*ctx;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data {
@@ -115,6 +106,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
 	uid_t			uid;
 	gid_t			gid;
 	mode_t			mode;
+	char 			*ctx;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -167,290 +159,72 @@ struct audit_context {
 #endif
 };
 
-				/* Public API */
-/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
- * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
- * syscall exit time. */
-static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
-	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
-	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
-	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
-	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
-	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
-#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
-#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
-#endif
-};
-
-struct audit_entry {
-	struct list_head  list;
-	struct rcu_head   rcu;
-	struct audit_rule rule;
-};
-
-extern int audit_pid;
-
-/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space.  Called from 
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
-static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
-	    && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
-	    && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
-		return -1;
-	if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
-		return -1;
-	if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
-		return -1;
-
-	d->flags	= s->flags;
-	d->action	= s->action;
-	d->field_count	= s->field_count;
-	for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
-		d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
-		d->values[i] = s->values[i];
-	}
-	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check to see if two rules are identical.  It is called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and 
- * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
-static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (a->flags != b->flags)
-		return 1;
-
-	if (a->action != b->action)
-		return 1;
-
-	if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
-		return 1;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
-		if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
-		    || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
-			return 1;
-	}
-
-	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
-		if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
-			return 1;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
-				  struct list_head *list)
-{
-	struct audit_entry  *entry;
-
-	/* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
-	 * addition routine. */
-	list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
-		if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
-			return -EEXIST;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
-		kfree(entry);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
-		entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
-		list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
-	} else {
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
-	struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
-	kfree(e);
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
-				 struct list_head *list)
-{
-	struct audit_entry  *e;
-
-	/* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
-	 * deletion routine. */
-	list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
-		if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
-			list_del_rcu(&e->list);
-			call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-	return -ENOENT;		/* No matching rule */
-}
-
-static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
-{
-	int pid, seq;
-	int *dest = _dest;
-	struct audit_entry *entry;
-	int i;
-
-	pid = dest[0];
-	seq = dest[1];
-	kfree(dest);
-
-	down(&audit_netlink_sem);
-
-	/* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
-	   always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
-	for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
-		list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
-			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
-					 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
-	}
-	audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
-	
-	up(&audit_netlink_sem);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
-							uid_t loginuid)
-{
-	struct task_struct *tsk;
-	int *dest;
-	int		   err = 0;
-	unsigned listnr;
-
-	switch (type) {
-	case AUDIT_LIST:
-		/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
-		 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
-		 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
-		 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
-		 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
-		 
-		dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!dest)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		dest[0] = pid;
-		dest[1] = seq;
-
-		tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
-		if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
-			kfree(dest);
-			err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
-		}
-		break;
-	case AUDIT_ADD:
-		listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
-		if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
-			return -EINVAL;
-
-		err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
-		if (!err)
-			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-				  "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
-		break;
-	case AUDIT_DEL:
-		listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
-		if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
-			return -EINVAL;
-
-		err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
-		if (!err)
-			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-				  "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
-		break;
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	return err;
-}
 
 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
  * otherwise. */
 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
-			      struct audit_rule *rule,
+			      struct audit_krule *rule,
 			      struct audit_context *ctx,
 			      enum audit_state *state)
 {
 	int i, j;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
-		u32 field  = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
-		u32 value  = rule->values[i];
+		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
 		int result = 0;
 
-		switch (field) {
+		switch (f->type) {
 		case AUDIT_PID:
-			result = (tsk->pid == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_UID:
-			result = (tsk->uid == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_EUID:
-			result = (tsk->euid == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUID:
-			result = (tsk->suid == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_FSUID:
-			result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_GID:
-			result = (tsk->gid == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_EGID:
-			result = (tsk->egid == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SGID:
-			result = (tsk->sgid == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_FSGID:
-			result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_PERS:
-			result = (tsk->personality == value);
+			result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_ARCH:
-			if (ctx) 
-				result = (ctx->arch == value);
+ 			if (ctx)
+				result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 
 		case AUDIT_EXIT:
 			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
-				result = (ctx->return_code == value);
+				result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
 			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
-				if (value)
-					result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+				if (f->val)
+					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
 				else
-					result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+					result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
 			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
 			if (ctx) {
 				for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-					if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+					if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev),	f->op, f->val)) {
 						++result;
 						break;
 					}
@@ -460,7 +234,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
 			if (ctx) {
 				for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-					if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+					if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
 						++result;
 						break;
 					}
@@ -470,7 +244,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		case AUDIT_INODE:
 			if (ctx) {
 				for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-					if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
+					if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
+					    audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
 						++result;
 						break;
 					}
@@ -480,19 +255,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
 			result = 0;
 			if (ctx)
-				result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
+				result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_ARG0:
 		case AUDIT_ARG1:
 		case AUDIT_ARG2:
 		case AUDIT_ARG3:
 			if (ctx)
-				result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
+				result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
 			break;
 		}
 
-		if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
-			result = !result;
 		if (!result)
 			return 0;
 	}
@@ -527,7 +300,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
  * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
  * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
- * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or  AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
+ * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
  */
 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					     struct audit_context *ctx,
@@ -541,77 +314,19 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (!list_empty(list)) {
-		    int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
-		    int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
-		    list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
-			    if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
-				&& audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
-				    rcu_read_unlock();
-				    return state;
-			    }
-		    }
-	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
-}
-
-static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
-			      struct audit_rule *rule,
-			      enum audit_state *state)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
-		u32 field  = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
-		u32 value  = rule->values[i];
-		int result = 0;
-
-		switch (field) {
-		case AUDIT_PID:
-			result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_UID:
-			result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_GID:
-			result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
-			result = (cb->loginuid == value);
-			break;
-		}
-
-		if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
-			result = !result;
-		if (!result)
-			return 0;
-	}
-	switch (rule->action) {
-	case AUDIT_NEVER:    *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;	    break;
-	case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;  break;
-	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:   *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
-	}
-	return 1;
-}
-
-int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
-{
-	struct audit_entry *e;
-	enum audit_state   state;
-	int ret = 1;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
-		if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
-			if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
-				ret = 0;
-			break;
+		int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+		int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+			if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
+					&& audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+				rcu_read_unlock();
+				return state;
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	return ret; /* Audit by default */
+	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }
 
 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
@@ -654,17 +369,18 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
 	if (context->auditable
 	    ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
 		       " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
 		       " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
-		       __LINE__,
+		       __FILE__, __LINE__,
 		       context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
 		       context->name_count, context->put_count,
 		       context->ino_count);
-		for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+		for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
 			       context->names[i].name,
-			       context->names[i].name);
+			       context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
+		}
 		dump_stack();
 		return;
 	}
@@ -674,9 +390,13 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 	context->ino_count  = 0;
 #endif
 
-	for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+		char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
+		context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
+		kfree(p);
 		if (context->names[i].name)
 			__putname(context->names[i].name);
+	}
 	context->name_count = 0;
 	if (context->pwd)
 		dput(context->pwd);
@@ -696,6 +416,12 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
 			dput(axi->dentry);
 			mntput(axi->mnt);
 		}
+		if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
+			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+			if (axi->ctx)
+				kfree(axi->ctx);
+		}
+
 		context->aux = aux->next;
 		kfree(aux);
 	}
@@ -721,10 +447,15 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
 	return context;
 }
 
-/* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
+/**
+ * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
+ * @tsk: task
+ *
+ * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
  * if necessary.  Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
  * specified task.  This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
- * needed. */
+ * needed.
+ */
 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context;
@@ -775,7 +506,37 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+	char *ctx = NULL;
+	ssize_t len = 0;
+
+	len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
+	if (len < 0) {
+		if (len != -EINVAL)
+			goto error_path;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
+	if (!ctx)
+		goto error_path;
+
+	len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
+	if (len < 0 )
+		goto error_path;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+	return;
+
+error_path:
+	if (ctx)
+		kfree(ctx);
+	audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+	return;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 {
 	char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
@@ -788,6 +549,10 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	if (!mm)
 		return;
 
+	/*
+	 * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
+	 * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
+	 */
 	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 	vma = mm->mmap;
 	while (vma) {
@@ -801,6 +566,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 		vma = vma->vm_next;
 	}
 	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
 }
 
 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
@@ -808,6 +574,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 	int i;
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+	const char *tty;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
 	if (!ab)
@@ -820,11 +587,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 
 				 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
 				 context->return_code);
+	if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
+		tty = current->signal->tty->name;
+	else
+		tty = "(none)";
 	audit_log_format(ab,
 		  " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
 		  " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
 		  " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
-		  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
+		  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
 		  context->argv[0],
 		  context->argv[1],
 		  context->argv[2],
@@ -835,8 +606,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 		  context->uid,
 		  context->gid,
 		  context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
-		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
-	audit_log_task_info(ab);
+		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+	audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 
 	for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
@@ -849,8 +620,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 		case AUDIT_IPC: {
 			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
 			audit_log_format(ab, 
-					 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
-					 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+					 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
+					 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
 			break; }
 
 		case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
@@ -885,42 +656,62 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 		}
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+		unsigned long ino  = context->names[i].ino;
+		unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
+
 		ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
 		if (!ab)
 			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
 		audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
-		if (context->names[i].name) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		if (context->names[i].name)
 			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
-		}
-		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
-			 
-		if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
-			audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
-					     " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
-					 context->names[i].ino,
-					 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
-					 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
-					 context->names[i].mode,
-					 context->names[i].uid,
-					 context->names[i].gid,
-					 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
+		else
+			audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
+
+		if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu",  pino);
+		if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu",  ino);
+		if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" 
+					 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", 
+					 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), 
+					 MINOR(context->names[i].dev), 
+					 context->names[i].mode, 
+					 context->names[i].uid, 
+					 context->names[i].gid, 
+					 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), 
 					 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
+		if (context->names[i].ctx) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
+					context->names[i].ctx);
+		}
+
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
 }
 
-/* Free a per-task audit context.  Called from copy_process and
- * __put_task_struct. */
+/**
+ * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
+ * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
+ *
+ * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ */
 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context;
 
-	task_lock(tsk);
+	/*
+	 * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free()
+	 * then the task has no external references anymore, and
+	 * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses
+	 * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq
+	 * contexts as well, via RCU.)
+	 */
 	context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
-	task_unlock(tsk);
-
 	if (likely(!context))
 		return;
 
@@ -934,13 +725,24 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
-/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
+/**
+ * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
+ * @tsk: task being audited
+ * @arch: architecture type
+ * @major: major syscall type (function)
+ * @a1: additional syscall register 1
+ * @a2: additional syscall register 2
+ * @a3: additional syscall register 3
+ * @a4: additional syscall register 4
+ *
+ * Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
  * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
  * filters demand the audit context be built.  If the state from the
  * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
  * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
  * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
- * be written). */
+ * be written).
+ */
 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
 			 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
 			 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
@@ -950,7 +752,8 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
 
 	BUG_ON(!context);
 
-	/* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
+	/*
+	 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
 	 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
 	 * with direct calls.  (If you are porting to a new
 	 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
@@ -966,11 +769,6 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
 	if (context->in_syscall) {
 		struct audit_context *newctx;
 
-#if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
-		/* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
-		if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
-			return;
-#endif
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
 		printk(KERN_ERR
 		       "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
@@ -1014,11 +812,18 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
 	context->auditable  = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
 }
 
-/* Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
+/**
+ * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
+ * @tsk: task being audited
+ * @valid: success/failure flag
+ * @return_code: syscall return value
+ *
+ * Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
  * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
  * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
  * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
- * free the names stored from getname(). */
+ * free the names stored from getname().
+ */
 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context;
@@ -1053,7 +858,13 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 	put_task_struct(tsk);
 }
 
-/* Add a name to the list.  Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
+/**
+ * audit_getname - add a name to the list
+ * @name: name to add
+ *
+ * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
+ */
 void audit_getname(const char *name)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1082,10 +893,13 @@ void audit_getname(const char *name)
 		
 }
 
-/* Intercept a putname request.  Called from
- * include/linux/fs.h:putname().  If we have stored the name from
- * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
- * exit. */
+/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
+ * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
+ *
+ * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
+ * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
+ * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
+ */
 void audit_putname(const char *name)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1100,7 +914,7 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
 			for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
 				printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
 				       context->names[i].name,
-				       context->names[i].name);
+				       context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
 		}
 #endif
 		__putname(name);
@@ -1122,9 +936,52 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
 #endif
 }
 
-/* Store the inode and device from a lookup.  Called from
- * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
-void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
+void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
+	char *ctx = NULL;
+	int len = 0;
+
+	if (!suffix)
+		goto ret;
+
+	len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
+	if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		goto ret;
+	if (len < 0) 
+		goto error_path;
+
+	ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx) 
+		goto error_path;
+
+	len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
+	if (len < 0)
+		goto error_path;
+
+	kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
+	context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
+	goto ret;
+
+error_path:
+	if (ctx)
+		kfree(ctx);
+	audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
+ret:
+	return;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
+ * @name: name being audited
+ * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
+ *
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
+ */
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
 {
 	int idx;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1150,15 +1007,105 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
 		++context->ino_count;
 #endif
 	}
-	context->names[idx].flags = flags;
-	context->names[idx].ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	context->names[idx].dev	  = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
 	context->names[idx].mode  = inode->i_mode;
 	context->names[idx].uid   = inode->i_uid;
 	context->names[idx].gid   = inode->i_gid;
 	context->names[idx].rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
+	audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+	if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) && 
+	    (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
+		context->names[idx].ino   = (unsigned long)-1;
+		context->names[idx].pino  = inode->i_ino;
+	} else {
+		context->names[idx].ino   = inode->i_ino;
+		context->names[idx].pino  = (unsigned long)-1;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
+ * @dname: inode's dentry name
+ * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
+ *
+ * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
+ * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
+ * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
+ * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
+ * the object is created.  Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
+ * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
+ * unsuccessful attempts.
+ */
+void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+			 unsigned long pino)
+{
+	int idx;
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+	if (!context->in_syscall)
+		return;
+
+	/* determine matching parent */
+	if (dname)
+		for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
+			if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
+				const char *n;
+				const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
+				int dlen = strlen(dname);
+				int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
+
+				if (nlen < dlen)
+					continue;
+				
+				/* disregard trailing slashes */
+				n = name + nlen - 1;
+				while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
+					n--;
+
+				/* find last path component */
+				n = n - dlen + 1;
+				if (n < name)
+					continue;
+				else if (n > name) {
+					if (*--n != '/')
+						continue;
+					else
+						n++;
+				}
+
+				if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
+					goto update_context;
+			}
+
+	/* catch-all in case match not found */
+	idx = context->name_count++;
+	context->names[idx].name  = NULL;
+	context->names[idx].pino  = pino;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+	context->ino_count++;
+#endif
+
+update_context:
+	if (inode) {
+		context->names[idx].ino   = inode->i_ino;
+		context->names[idx].dev	  = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+		context->names[idx].mode  = inode->i_mode;
+		context->names[idx].uid   = inode->i_uid;
+		context->names[idx].gid   = inode->i_gid;
+		context->names[idx].rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
+		audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+	}
 }
 
+/**
+ * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
+ * @ctx: audit_context for the task
+ * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
+ * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
+ *
+ * Also sets the context as auditable.
+ */
 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 		       struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
 {
@@ -1170,6 +1117,15 @@ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 	ctx->auditable = 1;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
+ * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
+ * @loginuid: loginuid value
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ *
+ * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
+ */
 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
 {
 	if (task->audit_context) {
@@ -1188,12 +1144,59 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
+ * @ctx: the audit_context
+ *
+ * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
+ */
 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
 	return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
 }
 
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	char *ctx = NULL;
+	int len = 0;
+
+	if (likely(!context))
+		return NULL;
+
+	len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
+	if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		goto ret;
+	if (len < 0)
+		goto error_path;
+
+	ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!ctx)
+		goto error_path;
+
+	len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
+	if (len < 0)
+		goto error_path;
+
+	return ctx;
+
+error_path:
+	kfree(ctx);
+	audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
+ret:
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * @qbytes: msgq bytes
+ * @uid: msgq user id
+ * @gid: msgq group id
+ * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
 	struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1201,7 +1204,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
 	if (likely(!context))
 		return 0;
 
-	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!ax)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1209,6 +1212,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
 	ax->uid = uid;
 	ax->gid = gid;
 	ax->mode = mode;
+	ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
 
 	ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
 	ax->d.next = context->aux;
@@ -1216,6 +1220,13 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
+ * @nargs: number of args
+ * @args: args array
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
 {
 	struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
@@ -1237,6 +1248,13 @@ int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
+ * @len: data length in user space
+ * @a: data address in kernel space
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 {
 	struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
@@ -1258,6 +1276,15 @@ int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
+ * @dentry: dentry to record
+ * @mnt: mnt to record
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ *
+ * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
+ */
 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
 {
 	struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
@@ -1279,6 +1306,14 @@ int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
+ * @sig: signal value
+ * @t: task being signaled
+ *
+ * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
+ * and uid that is doing that.
+ */
 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 {
 	extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
@@ -1295,4 +1330,3 @@ void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 		}
 	}
 }
-
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index e0489ca731c5..8e1dc3051222 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
 #include <linux/wireless.h>
 #include <net/iw_handler.h>
 #include <asm/current.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 
 /*
  *	The list of packet types we will receive (as opposed to discard)
@@ -2147,6 +2148,12 @@ void dev_set_promiscuity(struct net_device *dev, int inc)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "device %s %s promiscuous mode\n",
 		       dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) ? "entered" :
 		       					       "left");
+		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
+			AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS,
+			"dev=%s prom=%d old_prom=%d auid=%u",
+			dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC),
+			(old_flags & IFF_PROMISC),
+			audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); 
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index a678f094b72d..fd99429278e9 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
@@ -393,6 +393,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static const char *dummy_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -558,6 +563,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int dummy_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -931,6 +941,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_xattr_getsuffix);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
@@ -965,6 +976,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
  	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecurity);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ccaf988f3729..b61b9554bc27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -119,6 +119,32 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 
 static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
 
+/* Return security context for a given sid or just the context 
+   length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
+static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	char *context;
+	unsigned len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!buffer || !size)
+		goto getsecurity_exit;
+
+	if (size < len) {
+		len = -ERANGE;
+		goto getsecurity_exit;
+	}
+	memcpy(buffer, context, len);
+
+getsecurity_exit:
+	kfree(context);
+	return len;
+}
+
 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 
 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2210,6 +2236,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
+static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+{
+      return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+}
+
 /*
  * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user.  If the
  * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
@@ -2217,47 +2248,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
  *
  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
  */
-static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
-	char *context;
-	unsigned len;
-	int rc;
-
-	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) {
-		rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
-	if (rc)
-		goto out;
-
-	/* Probe for required buffer size */
-	if (!buffer || !size) {
-		rc = len;
-		goto out_free;
-	}
 
-	if (size < len) {
-		rc = -ERANGE;
-		goto out_free;
-	}
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	if (err > 0) {
-		if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) {
-			/* Don't need to canonicalize value */
-			rc = err;
-			goto out_free;
-		}
-		memset(buffer, 0, size);
-	}
-	memcpy(buffer, context, len);
-	rc = len;
-out_free:
-	kfree(context);
-out:
-	return rc;
+	return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
@@ -4054,6 +4052,13 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
 }
 
+static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+
+	return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
+}
+
 /* module stacking operations */
 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 {
@@ -4095,8 +4100,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			       char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	u32 sid, len;
-	char *context;
+	u32 sid;
 	int error;
 
 	if (current != p) {
@@ -4105,9 +4109,6 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			return error;
 	}
 
-	if (!size)
-		return -ERANGE;
-
 	tsec = p->security;
 
 	if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
@@ -4124,16 +4125,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 	if (!sid)
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-	if (len > size) {
-		kfree(context);
-		return -ERANGE;
-	}
-	memcpy(value, context, len);
-	kfree(context);
-	return len;
+	return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
 }
 
 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -4291,6 +4283,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_getxattr =		selinux_inode_getxattr,
 	.inode_listxattr =		selinux_inode_listxattr,
 	.inode_removexattr =		selinux_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_xattr_getsuffix =        selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
 	.inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
 	.inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -4328,6 +4321,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
 
 	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
+	.ipc_getsecurity =		selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
 
 	.msg_msg_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
 	.msg_msg_free_security =	selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 85e399259832..b8f4d25cf335 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
 	{ AUDIT_LIST,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
 	{ AUDIT_ADD,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
 	{ AUDIT_DEL,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_LIST_RULES,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+	{ AUDIT_ADD_RULE,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
+	{ AUDIT_DEL_RULE,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
 	{ AUDIT_USER,		NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY    },
 	{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,	NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
 };
@@ -152,8 +155,10 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
 		break;
 
 	case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET:
-		if (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
-		    nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) {
+		if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
+		     nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) ||
+		    (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 &&
+                     nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) {
 			*perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY;
 		} else {
 			err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms,
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index f5d78365488f..a4efc966f065 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/major.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
 
@@ -127,6 +128,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
 		if (length)
 			goto out;
+		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u", new_value, 
+			selinux_enforcing,
+			audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
 		selinux_enforcing = new_value;
 		if (selinux_enforcing)
 			avc_ss_reset(0);
@@ -177,6 +182,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		length = selinux_disable();
 		if (length < 0)
 			goto out;
+		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+			"selinux=0 auid=%u",
+			audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
 	}
 
 	length = count;
@@ -262,6 +270,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		length = ret;
 	else
 		length = count;
+	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+		"policy loaded auid=%u",
+		audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
 	vfree(data);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 63e0b7f29cb5..61492485de84 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1759,19 +1759,22 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
+				AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u",
+				policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+				!!values[i],
+				policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+				audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
+		}
 		if (values[i]) {
 			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
 		} else {
 			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
 		}
-		if (i != 0)
-			printk(", ");
-		printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
-		       policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state);
 	}
-	printk(" }\n");
 
 	for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
 		rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);