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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-09-07 14:35:32 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-09-07 14:35:32 -0700
commitc7c4591db64dbd1e504bc4e2806d7ef290a3c81b (patch)
treea2fb124f9760eec668d20541383e762822d7cc7b
parent11c7b03d42a847db90862d0f9d8be6ce9b2f0553 (diff)
parentc7b96acf1456ef127fef461fcfedb54b81fecfbb (diff)
downloadlinux-c7c4591db64dbd1e504bc4e2806d7ef290a3c81b.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman: "This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug fixes. The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace infrastructure. Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace. namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on. pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code. proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
-rw-r--r--fs/namespace.c121
-rw-r--r--fs/open.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/pnode.h5
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/root.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/sysfs/mount.c11
-rw-r--r--include/linux/capability.h1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fs.h1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kobject_ns.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/mount.h1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/user_namespace.h4
-rw-r--r--ipc/namespace.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c12
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c5
-rw-r--r--kernel/groups.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/nsproxy.c36
-rw-r--r--kernel/pid.c1
-rw-r--r--kernel/pid_namespace.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys.c20
-rw-r--r--kernel/uid16.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/user.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/user_namespace.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/utsname.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/kobject.c15
-rw-r--r--net/core/net-sysfs.c8
-rw-r--r--net/core/net_namespace.c2
-rw-r--r--net/core/scm.c4
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c10
27 files changed, 177 insertions, 104 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ad8ea9bc2518..ef69fa5d2e5b 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -831,6 +831,10 @@ static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY))
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
+ /* Don't allow unprivileged users to reveal what is under a mount */
+ if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
+
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb;
mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(root);
@@ -1327,6 +1331,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(umount, char __user *, name, int, flags)
goto dput_and_out;
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
goto dput_and_out;
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto dput_and_out;
retval = do_umount(mnt, flags);
dput_and_out:
@@ -1349,14 +1355,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(oldumount, char __user *, name)
#endif
-static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct path *path)
+static bool is_mnt_ns_file(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- /* Could bind mounting the mount namespace inode cause a
- * mount namespace loop?
- */
- struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+ /* Is this a proxy for a mount namespace? */
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct proc_ns *ei;
- struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
if (!proc_ns_inode(inode))
return false;
@@ -1365,7 +1368,19 @@ static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct path *path)
if (ei->ns_ops != &mntns_operations)
return false;
- mnt_ns = ei->ns;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ /* Could bind mounting the mount namespace inode cause a
+ * mount namespace loop?
+ */
+ struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
+ if (!is_mnt_ns_file(dentry))
+ return false;
+
+ mnt_ns = get_proc_ns(dentry->d_inode)->ns;
return current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->seq >= mnt_ns->seq;
}
@@ -1374,13 +1389,17 @@ struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
{
struct mount *res, *p, *q, *r, *parent;
- if (!(flag & CL_COPY_ALL) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(mnt))
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(mnt))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE) && is_mnt_ns_file(dentry))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
res = q = clone_mnt(mnt, dentry, flag);
if (IS_ERR(q))
return q;
+ q->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
q->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
p = mnt;
@@ -1390,7 +1409,13 @@ struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
continue;
for (s = r; s; s = next_mnt(s, r)) {
- if (!(flag & CL_COPY_ALL) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(s)) {
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) &&
+ IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(s)) {
+ s = skip_mnt_tree(s);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE) &&
+ is_mnt_ns_file(s->mnt.mnt_root)) {
s = skip_mnt_tree(s);
continue;
}
@@ -1696,6 +1721,19 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int flag)
return err;
}
+static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct mount *child;
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
+ if (!is_subdir(child->mnt_mountpoint, dentry))
+ continue;
+
+ if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* do loopback mount.
*/
@@ -1713,7 +1751,7 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
return err;
err = -EINVAL;
- if (mnt_ns_loop(&old_path))
+ if (mnt_ns_loop(old_path.dentry))
goto out;
mp = lock_mount(path);
@@ -1731,8 +1769,11 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
if (!check_mnt(parent) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out2;
+ if (!recurse && has_locked_children(old, old_path.dentry))
+ goto out2;
+
if (recurse)
- mnt = copy_tree(old, old_path.dentry, 0);
+ mnt = copy_tree(old, old_path.dentry, CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE);
else
mnt = clone_mnt(old, old_path.dentry, 0);
@@ -1741,6 +1782,8 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
goto out2;
}
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
+
err = graft_tree(mnt, parent, mp);
if (err) {
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
@@ -1853,6 +1896,9 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
if (!check_mnt(p) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out1;
+ if (old->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto out1;
+
err = -EINVAL;
if (old_path.dentry != old_path.mnt->mnt_root)
goto out1;
@@ -2389,7 +2435,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *dup_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns,
namespace_lock();
/* First pass: copy the tree topology */
- copy_flags = CL_COPY_ALL | CL_EXPIRE;
+ copy_flags = CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE | CL_EXPIRE;
if (user_ns != mnt_ns->user_ns)
copy_flags |= CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE | CL_UNPRIVILEGED;
new = copy_tree(old, old->mnt.mnt_root, copy_flags);
@@ -2424,6 +2470,10 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *dup_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns,
}
p = next_mnt(p, old);
q = next_mnt(q, new);
+ if (!q)
+ break;
+ while (p->mnt.mnt_root != q->mnt.mnt_root)
+ p = next_mnt(p, old);
}
namespace_unlock();
@@ -2630,6 +2680,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
goto out4;
if (!check_mnt(root_mnt) || !check_mnt(new_mnt))
goto out4;
+ if (new_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto out4;
error = -ENOENT;
if (d_unlinked(new.dentry))
goto out4;
@@ -2653,6 +2705,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
detach_mnt(new_mnt, &parent_path);
detach_mnt(root_mnt, &root_parent);
+ if (root_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) {
+ new_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
+ root_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
+ }
/* mount old root on put_old */
attach_mnt(root_mnt, old_mnt, old_mp);
/* mount new_root on / */
@@ -2811,25 +2867,38 @@ bool current_chrooted(void)
return chrooted;
}
-void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns)
+bool fs_fully_visible(struct file_system_type *type)
{
struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
struct mount *mnt;
+ bool visible = false;
- down_read(&namespace_sem);
+ if (unlikely(!ns))
+ return false;
+
+ namespace_lock();
list_for_each_entry(mnt, &ns->list, mnt_list) {
- switch (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_magic) {
- case SYSFS_MAGIC:
- userns->may_mount_sysfs = true;
- break;
- case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
- userns->may_mount_proc = true;
- break;
+ struct mount *child;
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type != type)
+ continue;
+
+ /* This mount is not fully visible if there are any child mounts
+ * that cover anything except for empty directories.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
+ struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode;
+ if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ goto next;
+ if (inode->i_nlink != 2)
+ goto next;
}
- if (userns->may_mount_sysfs && userns->may_mount_proc)
- break;
+ visible = true;
+ goto found;
+ next: ;
}
- up_read(&namespace_sem);
+found:
+ namespace_unlock();
+ return visible;
}
static void *mntns_get(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2860,8 +2929,8 @@ static int mntns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
struct path root;
if (!ns_capable(mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT) ||
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (fs->users != 1)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 8070825b285b..2a731b0d08bc 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ retry:
goto dput_and_out;
error = -EPERM;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
goto dput_and_out;
error = security_path_chroot(&path);
if (error)
diff --git a/fs/pnode.h b/fs/pnode.h
index b091445c1c4a..59e7eda1851e 100644
--- a/fs/pnode.h
+++ b/fs/pnode.h
@@ -19,11 +19,14 @@
#define CL_EXPIRE 0x01
#define CL_SLAVE 0x02
-#define CL_COPY_ALL 0x04
+#define CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE 0x04
#define CL_MAKE_SHARED 0x08
#define CL_PRIVATE 0x10
#define CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE 0x20
#define CL_UNPRIVILEGED 0x40
+#define CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE 0x80
+
+#define CL_COPY_ALL (CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE | CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE)
static inline void set_mnt_shared(struct mount *mnt)
{
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index e0a790da726d..87dbcbef7fe4 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -110,7 +110,11 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
options = data;
- if (!current_user_ns()->may_mount_proc)
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !fs_fully_visible(fs_type))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
+ /* Does the mounter have privilege over the pid namespace? */
+ if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
}
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/mount.c b/fs/sysfs/mount.c
index fd7ce7a39f91..834ec2cdb7a3 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/mount.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/mount.c
@@ -112,8 +112,15 @@ static struct dentry *sysfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
struct super_block *sb;
int error;
- if (!(flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) && !current_user_ns()->may_mount_sysfs)
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ if (!(flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !fs_fully_visible(fs_type))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
+ for (type = KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NONE; type < KOBJ_NS_TYPES; type++) {
+ if (!kobj_ns_current_may_mount(type))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ }
+ }
info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index d9a4f7f40f32..a6ee1f9a5018 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -210,7 +210,6 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3b4cd8296e41..529d8711baba 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1900,6 +1900,7 @@ extern int vfs_ustat(dev_t, struct kstatfs *);
extern int freeze_super(struct super_block *super);
extern int thaw_super(struct super_block *super);
extern bool our_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt);
+extern bool fs_fully_visible(struct file_system_type *);
extern int current_umask(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
index f66b065a8b5f..df32d2508290 100644
--- a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
+++ b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ enum kobj_ns_type {
*/
struct kobj_ns_type_operations {
enum kobj_ns_type type;
+ bool (*current_may_mount)(void);
void *(*grab_current_ns)(void);
const void *(*netlink_ns)(struct sock *sk);
const void *(*initial_ns)(void);
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type);
const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent);
const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj);
+bool kobj_ns_current_may_mount(enum kobj_ns_type type);
void *kobj_ns_grab_current(enum kobj_ns_type type);
const void *kobj_ns_netlink(enum kobj_ns_type type, struct sock *sk);
const void *kobj_ns_initial(enum kobj_ns_type type);
diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
index 73005f9957ea..38cd98f112a0 100644
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct mnt_namespace;
#define MNT_INTERNAL 0x4000
#define MNT_LOCK_READONLY 0x400000
+#define MNT_LOCKED 0x800000
struct vfsmount {
struct dentry *mnt_root; /* root of the mounted tree */
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 14105c26a836..4db29859464f 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ struct user_namespace {
kuid_t owner;
kgid_t group;
unsigned int proc_inum;
- bool may_mount_sysfs;
- bool may_mount_proc;
};
extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
@@ -85,6 +83,4 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
#endif
-void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns);
-
#endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */
diff --git a/ipc/namespace.c b/ipc/namespace.c
index 7ee61bf44933..4be6581d3b7f 100644
--- a/ipc/namespace.c
+++ b/ipc/namespace.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static int ipcns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
{
struct ipc_namespace *ns = new;
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* Ditch state from the old ipc namespace */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index f6c2ce5701e1..6fc1c8af44df 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -433,18 +433,6 @@ bool capable(int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
- * nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns
- * @cap: The capability in question
- *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
- * targeted at its own user namespace.
- */
-bool nsown_capable(int cap)
-{
- return ns_capable(current_user_ns(), cap);
-}
-
-/**
* inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode
* @inode: The inode in question
* @cap: The capability in question
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index bf46287c91a4..c9eaf2013002 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1825,11 +1825,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_FS;
/*
- * If unsharing a pid namespace must also unshare the thread.
- */
- if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
- unshare_flags |= CLONE_THREAD;
- /*
* If unsharing a thread from a thread group, must also unshare vm.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c
index 6b2588dd04ff..90cf1c38c8ea 100644
--- a/kernel/groups.c
+++ b/kernel/groups.c
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist)
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index 997cbb951a3b..8e7811086b82 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -126,22 +126,16 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;
struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns);
struct nsproxy *new_ns;
- int err = 0;
- if (!old_ns)
+ if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
+ CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET)))) {
+ get_nsproxy(old_ns);
return 0;
-
- get_nsproxy(old_ns);
-
- if (!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
- CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET)))
- return 0;
-
- if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- err = -EPERM;
- goto out;
}
+ if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/*
* CLONE_NEWIPC must detach from the undolist: after switching
* to a new ipc namespace, the semaphore arrays from the old
@@ -149,22 +143,16 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
* means share undolist with parent, so we must forbid using
* it along with CLONE_NEWIPC.
*/
- if ((flags & CLONE_NEWIPC) && (flags & CLONE_SYSVSEM)) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ if ((flags & (CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_SYSVSEM)) ==
+ (CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_SYSVSEM))
+ return -EINVAL;
new_ns = create_new_namespaces(flags, tsk, user_ns, tsk->fs);
- if (IS_ERR(new_ns)) {
- err = PTR_ERR(new_ns);
- goto out;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(new_ns))
+ return PTR_ERR(new_ns);
tsk->nsproxy = new_ns;
-
-out:
- put_nsproxy(old_ns);
- return err;
+ return 0;
}
void free_nsproxy(struct nsproxy *ns)
diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index 66505c1dfc51..ebe5e80b10f8 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ void free_pid(struct pid *pid)
struct pid_namespace *ns = upid->ns;
hlist_del_rcu(&upid->pid_chain);
switch(--ns->nr_hashed) {
+ case 2:
case 1:
/* When all that is left in the pid namespace
* is the reaper wake up the reaper. The reaper
diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
index 601bb361c235..42086551a24a 100644
--- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int pidns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
struct pid_namespace *ancestor, *new = ns;
if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/*
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 771129b299f8..c18ecca575b4 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) ||
gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) ||
- nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
new->gid = krgid;
else
goto error;
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) ||
gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) ||
gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) ||
- nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
new->egid = kegid;
else
goto error;
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid;
else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid))
new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid;
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
new->uid = kruid;
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) &&
!uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) &&
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID))
+ !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
goto error;
}
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) &&
!uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) &&
!uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) &&
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID))
+ !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
goto error;
}
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
new->suid = new->uid = kuid;
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) {
retval = set_user(new);
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
!uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid))
goto error;
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
!gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid))
goto error;
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
- nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
new->fsuid = kuid;
if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
@@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) ||
gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) ||
- nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
+ ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) {
new->fsgid = kgid;
goto change_okay;
diff --git a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c
index f6c83d7ef000..602e5bbbceff 100644
--- a/kernel/uid16.c
+++ b/kernel/uid16.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *, grouplist)
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index 69b4c3d48cde..5bbb91988e69 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
- .may_mount_sysfs = true,
- .may_mount_proc = true,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 9064b919a406..13fb1134ba58 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -101,8 +101,6 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
- update_mnt_policy(ns);
-
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/utsname.c b/kernel/utsname.c
index 2fc8576efaa8..fd393124e507 100644
--- a/kernel/utsname.c
+++ b/kernel/utsname.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int utsns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
struct uts_namespace *ns = new;
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
get_uts_ns(ns);
diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c
index 1d46c151a4ae..962175134702 100644
--- a/lib/kobject.c
+++ b/lib/kobject.c
@@ -931,6 +931,21 @@ const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj)
return kobj_child_ns_ops(kobj->parent);
}
+bool kobj_ns_current_may_mount(enum kobj_ns_type type)
+{
+ bool may_mount = false;
+
+ if (type == KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NONE)
+ return true;
+
+ spin_lock(&kobj_ns_type_lock);
+ if ((type > KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NONE) && (type < KOBJ_NS_TYPES) &&
+ kobj_ns_ops_tbl[type])
+ may_mount = kobj_ns_ops_tbl[type]->current_may_mount();
+ spin_unlock(&kobj_ns_type_lock);
+
+ return may_mount;
+}
void *kobj_ns_grab_current(enum kobj_ns_type type)
{
diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
index 3f40ea9de814..d954b56b4e47 100644
--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
+++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
@@ -1196,6 +1196,13 @@ static void remove_queue_kobjects(struct net_device *net)
#endif
}
+static bool net_current_may_mount(void)
+{
+ struct net *net = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
+
+ return ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
static void *net_grab_current_ns(void)
{
struct net *ns = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
@@ -1218,6 +1225,7 @@ static const void *net_netlink_ns(struct sock *sk)
struct kobj_ns_type_operations net_ns_type_operations = {
.type = KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET,
+ .current_may_mount = net_current_may_mount,
.grab_current_ns = net_grab_current_ns,
.netlink_ns = net_netlink_ns,
.initial_ns = net_initial_ns,
diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
index f97652036754..81d3a9a08453 100644
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static int netns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
struct net *net = ns;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
put_net(nsproxy->net_ns);
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index b4da80b1cc07..b442e7e25e60 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -56,9 +56,9 @@ static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
ns_capable(task_active_pid_ns(current)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
- uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
+ uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
- gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
+ gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c44b6fe6648e..b9d613e0ef14 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -768,16 +768,16 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
*/
static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
{
- int is_subset;
+ int is_subset, ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
current_cred()->cap_permitted);
+ if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ ret = -EPERM;
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (!is_subset && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
/**
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
*/
static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;