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authorGuillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>2019-12-06 12:38:43 +0100
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2019-12-06 21:05:14 -0800
commitcb44a08f8647fd2e8db5cc9ac27cd8355fa392d8 (patch)
tree55f331a172088407b73ce6b417ac68e91ca7f254
parent04d26e7b159a396372646a480f4caa166d1b6720 (diff)
downloadlinux-cb44a08f8647fd2e8db5cc9ac27cd8355fa392d8.tar.bz2
tcp: tighten acceptance of ACKs not matching a child socket
When no synflood occurs, the synflood timestamp isn't updated. Therefore it can be so old that time_after32() can consider it to be in the future. That's a problem for tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() as it may report that a recent overflow occurred while, in fact, it's just that jiffies has grown past 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID + 2^31. Spurious detection of recent overflows lead to extra syncookie verification in cookie_v[46]_check(). At that point, the verification should fail and the packet dropped. But we should have dropped the packet earlier as we didn't even send a syncookie. Let's refine tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() to report a recent overflow only if jiffies is within the [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval. This way, no spurious recent overflow is reported when jiffies wraps and 'last_overflow' becomes in the future from the point of view of time_after32(). However, if jiffies wraps and enters the [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval (with 'last_overflow' being a stale synflood timestamp), then tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() still erroneously reports an overflow. In such cases, we have to rely on syncookie verification to drop the packet. We unfortunately have no way to differentiate between a fresh and a stale syncookie timestamp. In practice, using last_overflow as lower bound is problematic. If the synflood timestamp is concurrently updated between the time we read jiffies and the moment we store the timestamp in 'last_overflow', then 'now' becomes smaller than 'last_overflow' and tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() returns true, potentially dropping a valid syncookie. Reading jiffies after loading the timestamp could fix the problem, but that'd require a memory barrier. Let's just accommodate for potential timestamp growth instead and extend the interval using 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r--include/net/tcp.h16
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 7d734ba391fc..43e04e14c41e 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -518,13 +518,23 @@ static inline bool tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(const struct sock *sk)
reuse = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_reuseport_cb);
if (likely(reuse)) {
last_overflow = READ_ONCE(reuse->synq_overflow_ts);
- return time_after32(now, last_overflow +
- TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);
+ return !time_between32(now, last_overflow - HZ,
+ last_overflow +
+ TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);
}
}
last_overflow = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp;
- return time_after32(now, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);
+
+ /* If last_overflow <= jiffies <= last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID,
+ * then we're under synflood. However, we have to use
+ * 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound. That's because a concurrent
+ * tcp_synq_overflow() could update .ts_recent_stamp after we read
+ * jiffies but before we store .ts_recent_stamp into last_overflow,
+ * which could lead to rejecting a valid syncookie.
+ */
+ return !time_between32(now, last_overflow - HZ,
+ last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID);
}
static inline u32 tcp_cookie_time(void)