LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data

Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop.  This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union.  Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

16 files changed, 242 insertions, 147 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index eab507f2b1cb..6f4fb37aac88 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -72,61 +72,15 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 	/* this union contains LSM specific data */
 	union {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
-		/* SMACK data */
-		struct smack_audit_data {
-			const char *function;
-			char *subject;
-			char *object;
-			char *request;
-			int result;
-		} smack_audit_data;
+		struct smack_audit_data *smack_audit_data;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
-		/* SELinux data */
-		struct {
-			u32 ssid;
-			u32 tsid;
-			u16 tclass;
-			u32 requested;
-			u32 audited;
-			u32 denied;
-			/*
-			 * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive.  See the
-			 * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage.
-			 */
-			u32 auditdeny;
-			struct av_decision *avd;
-			int result;
-		} selinux_audit_data;
+		struct selinux_audit_data *selinux_audit_data;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
-		struct {
-			int error;
-			int op;
-			int type;
-			void *profile;
-			const char *name;
-			const char *info;
-			union {
-				void *target;
-				struct {
-					long pos;
-					void *target;
-				} iface;
-				struct {
-					int rlim;
-					unsigned long max;
-				} rlim;
-				struct {
-					const char *target;
-					u32 request;
-					u32 denied;
-					uid_t ouid;
-				} fs;
-			};
-		} apparmor_audit_data;
+		struct apparmor_audit_data *apparmor_audit_data;
 #endif
-	};
+	}; /* per LSM data pointer union */
 	/* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */
 	void (*lsm_pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *);
 	void (*lsm_post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 5ff67776a5ad..23f7eb658d9c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -115,23 +115,23 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 
 	if (aa_g_audit_header) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
-		audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad.type]);
+		audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad->type]);
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad.op) {
+	if (sa->aad->op) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " operation=");
-		audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad.op]);
+		audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad->op]);
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad.info) {
+	if (sa->aad->info) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " info=");
-		audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad.info);
-		if (sa->aad.error)
-			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad.error);
+		audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad->info);
+		if (sa->aad->error)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad->error);
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad.profile) {
-		struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad.profile;
+	if (sa->aad->profile) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile;
 		pid_t pid;
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		pid = rcu_dereference(tsk->real_parent)->pid;
@@ -145,9 +145,9 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname);
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad.name) {
+	if (sa->aad->name) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.name);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
 		  void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
 {
-	sa->aad.type = type;
+	sa->aad->type = type;
 	sa->lsm_pre_audit = audit_pre;
 	sa->lsm_post_audit = cb;
 	common_lsm_audit(sa);
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
 	BUG_ON(!profile);
 
 	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
-		if (likely(!sa->aad.error)) {
+		if (likely(!sa->aad->error)) {
 			if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
 				return 0;
 			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
@@ -196,21 +196,21 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
 	if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
 	    (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
 	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
-		return sa->aad.error;
+		return sa->aad->error;
 
 	if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 
 	if (!unconfined(profile))
-		sa->aad.profile = profile;
+		sa->aad->profile = profile;
 
 	aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);
 
-	if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
 		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current);
 
-	if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
-		return complain_error(sa->aad.error);
+	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+		return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
 
-	return sa->aad.error;
+	return sa->aad->error;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 9982c48def4e..088dba3bf7dc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -64,11 +64,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
 	struct audit_cache *ent;
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, CAP);
+	sa.aad = &aad;
 	sa.tsk = task;
 	sa.u.cap = cap;
-	sa.aad.op = OP_CAPABLE;
-	sa.aad.error = error;
+	sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
+	sa.aad->error = error;
 
 	if (likely(!error)) {
 		/* test if auditing is being forced */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 5d176f2530c9..2f8fcba9ce4b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -67,22 +67,22 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 	uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
 
-	if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+	if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
-		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.request);
+		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.request);
 	}
-	if (sa->aad.fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+	if (sa->aad->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
-		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.denied);
+		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied);
 	}
-	if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+	if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid);
-		audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad.fs.ouid);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad->fs.ouid);
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad.fs.target) {
+	if (sa->aad->fs.target) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.fs.target);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -107,45 +107,47 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
 {
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-	sa.aad.op = op,
-	sa.aad.fs.request = request;
-	sa.aad.name = name;
-	sa.aad.fs.target = target;
-	sa.aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
-	sa.aad.info = info;
-	sa.aad.error = error;
-
-	if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) {
+	sa.aad = &aad;
+	aad.op = op,
+	aad.fs.request = request;
+	aad.name = name;
+	aad.fs.target = target;
+	aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
+	aad.info = info;
+	aad.error = error;
+
+	if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
 		u32 mask = perms->audit;
 
 		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
 			mask = 0xffff;
 
 		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
-		sa.aad.fs.request &= mask;
+		sa.aad->fs.request &= mask;
 
-		if (likely(!sa.aad.fs.request))
+		if (likely(!sa.aad->fs.request))
 			return 0;
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 	} else {
 		/* only report permissions that were denied */
-		sa.aad.fs.request = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+		sa.aad->fs.request = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
 
-		if (sa.aad.fs.request & perms->kill)
+		if (sa.aad->fs.request & perms->kill)
 			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 
 		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
-		if ((sa.aad.fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
+		if ((sa.aad->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
 		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
-			sa.aad.fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
+			sa.aad->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
 
-		if (!sa.aad.fs.request)
-			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error;
+		if (!sa.aad->fs.request)
+			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
 	}
 
-	sa.aad.fs.denied = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+	sa.aad->fs.denied = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
 	return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 4ba78c203af1..3868b1e5d5ba 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -103,7 +103,33 @@ enum aa_ops {
 };
 
 
-/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data portion of common_audit_data */
+struct apparmor_audit_data {
+	int error;
+	int op;
+	int type;
+	void *profile;
+	const char *name;
+	const char *info;
+	union {
+		void *target;
+		struct {
+			long pos;
+			void *target;
+		} iface;
+		struct {
+			int rlim;
+			unsigned long max;
+		} rlim;
+		struct {
+			const char *target;
+			u32 request;
+			u32 denied;
+			uid_t ouid;
+		} fs;
+	};
+};
+
+/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data structure */
 #define aad apparmor_audit_data
 
 void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index 7ee05c6f3c64..c3da93a5150d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 	audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.target);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->target);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -41,10 +41,12 @@ static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			   struct aa_profile *target, int error)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-	sa.aad.op = OP_PTRACE;
-	sa.aad.target = target;
-	sa.aad.error = error;
+	sa.aad = &aad;
+	aad.op = OP_PTRACE;
+	aad.target = target;
+	aad.error = error;
 
 	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa,
 			audit_cb);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 9516948041ad..e75829ba0ff9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str)
 {
 	if (audit_enabled) {
 		struct common_audit_data sa;
+		struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-		sa.aad.info = str;
+		sa.aad = &aad;
+		aad.info = str;
 		aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL);
 	}
 	printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 97ce8fae49b3..ad05d391974d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -588,10 +588,12 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 			error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
 		} else {
 			struct common_audit_data sa;
+			struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 			COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-			sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
-			sa.aad.info = name;
-			sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
+			sa.aad = &aad;
+			aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
+			aad.info = name;
+			aad.error = -EINVAL;
 			return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
 					__aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL,
 					&sa, NULL);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 906414383022..f1f7506a464d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -964,11 +964,13 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info,
 			int error)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-	sa.aad.op = op;
-	sa.aad.name = name;
-	sa.aad.info = info;
-	sa.aad.error = error;
+	sa.aad = &aad;
+	aad.op = op;
+	aad.name = name;
+	aad.info = info;
+	aad.error = error;
 
 	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, __aa_current_profile(), gfp,
 			&sa, NULL);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 25fd51edc8da..deab7c7e8dc0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -70,13 +70,13 @@ struct aa_ext {
 static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-	if (sa->aad.iface.target) {
-		struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad.iface.target;
+	if (sa->aad->iface.target) {
+		struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad->iface.target;
 		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name->base.hname);
 	}
-	if (sa->aad.iface.pos)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad.iface.pos);
+	if (sa->aad->iface.pos)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad->iface.pos);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -94,13 +94,15 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name,
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.aad = &aad;
 	if (e)
-		sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
-	sa.aad.iface.target = new;
-	sa.aad.name = name;
-	sa.aad.info = info;
-	sa.aad.error = error;
+		aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
+	aad.iface.target = new;
+	aad.name = name;
+	aad.info = info;
+	aad.error = error;
 
 	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
 			audit_cb);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index 72c25a4f2cfd..2fe8613efe33 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 
 	audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu",
-			 rlim_names[sa->aad.rlim.rlim], sa->aad.rlim.max);
+			 rlim_names[sa->aad->rlim.rlim], sa->aad->rlim.max);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -50,12 +50,14 @@ static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
 			  unsigned long value, int error)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-	sa.aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT,
-	sa.aad.rlim.rlim = resource;
-	sa.aad.rlim.max = value;
-	sa.aad.error = error;
+	sa.aad = &aad;
+	aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT,
+	aad.rlim.rlim = resource;
+	aad.rlim.max = value;
+	aad.error = error;
 	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
 			audit_cb);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 1a70fa26da72..00f3860c2370 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
 	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ",
-			 ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
-	avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
-			ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
+			 ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+	avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass,
+			ad->selinux_audit_data->audited);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
 }
 
@@ -452,9 +452,9 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
-	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
-			   ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
-			   ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
+	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
+			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
+			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
 }
 
 /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
@@ -464,10 +464,12 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 		unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
 	if (!a) {
 		a = &stack_data;
 		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
+		a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -481,12 +483,12 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 	    (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
 		return -ECHILD;
 
-	a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
-	a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
-	a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
-	a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
-	a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
-	a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
+	a->selinux_audit_data->tclass = tclass;
+	a->selinux_audit_data->requested = requested;
+	a->selinux_audit_data->ssid = ssid;
+	a->selinux_audit_data->tsid = tsid;
+	a->selinux_audit_data->audited = audited;
+	a->selinux_audit_data->denied = denied;
 	a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
 	a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
 	common_lsm_audit(a);
@@ -523,7 +525,7 @@ inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	if (unlikely(denied)) {
 		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
 		/*
-		 * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY!  Setting a bit in
+		 * a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY!  Setting a bit in
 		 * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
 		 * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
 		 * permission.  Take notice that this is unrelated to the
@@ -532,15 +534,15 @@ inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		 *
 		 * denied == READ
 		 * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
-		 * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
+		 * selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
 		 *
 		 * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
 		 * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
 		 * ACCESS
 		 */
 		if (a &&
-		    a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny &&
-		    !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
+		    a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny &&
+		    !(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
 			audited = 0;
 	} else if (result)
 		audited = denied = requested;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 28482f9e15b8..3861ce4b1007 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1420,6 +1420,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
 			       int cap, int audit)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	u16 sclass;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -1427,6 +1428,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
 	int rc;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.tsk = current;
 	ad.u.cap = cap;
 
@@ -1492,9 +1494,11 @@ static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
 				unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
 	ad.u.inode = inode;
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
 }
 
@@ -1507,9 +1511,11 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
@@ -1522,9 +1528,11 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
 	ad.u.path = *path;
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
@@ -1543,11 +1551,13 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	int rc;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
 	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
@@ -1577,6 +1587,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid, newsid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	int rc;
 
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
@@ -1587,6 +1598,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
@@ -1631,6 +1643,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	u32 av;
 	int rc;
@@ -1640,6 +1653,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
 	av = DIR__SEARCH;
 	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
@@ -1674,6 +1688,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	u32 av;
 	int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
@@ -1685,6 +1700,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
 	ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1970,6 +1986,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -2009,6 +2026,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	}
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
 
 	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
@@ -2098,6 +2116,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 					    struct files_struct *files)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
 	struct tty_struct *tty;
 	struct fdtable *fdt;
@@ -2135,6 +2154,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
 	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
 	for (;;) {
@@ -2472,6 +2492,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
@@ -2483,6 +2504,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 		return 0;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
@@ -2491,8 +2513,10 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
@@ -2656,6 +2680,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 perms;
 	bool from_access;
 	unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
@@ -2668,10 +2693,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 		return 0;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.inode = inode;
 
 	if (from_access)
-		ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
+		ad.selinux_audit_data->auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
 
 	perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
 
@@ -2737,6 +2763,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
 	int rc = 0;
 
@@ -2751,6 +2778,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@@ -3345,10 +3373,12 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	u32 sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
 	sid = task_sid(current);
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
@@ -3721,12 +3751,14 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 {
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
 
 	if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
 		return 0;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.net.sk = sk;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -3805,6 +3837,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		char *addrp;
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 		struct common_audit_data ad;
+		struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
 		unsigned short snum;
@@ -3831,6 +3864,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 				if (err)
 					goto out;
 				COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+				ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 				ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
 				ad.u.net.family = family;
 				err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
@@ -3864,6 +3898,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 			goto out;
 
 		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+		ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 		ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net.family = family;
 
@@ -3897,6 +3932,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
 	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
 		struct common_audit_data ad;
+		struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
 		unsigned short snum;
@@ -3922,6 +3958,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
 
 		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+		ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 		ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
@@ -4012,9 +4049,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	int err;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.net.sk = other;
 
 	err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
@@ -4042,8 +4081,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
@@ -4080,9 +4121,11 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	char *addrp;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4111,6 +4154,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4135,6 +4179,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return 0;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4471,6 +4516,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	char *addrp;
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 netlbl_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4488,6 +4534,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 		return NF_DROP;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
@@ -4576,6 +4623,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 proto;
 
@@ -4584,6 +4632,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
@@ -4607,6 +4656,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	char *addrp;
 	u8 secmark_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4653,6 +4703,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	}
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
 	ad.u.net.family = family;
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
@@ -4769,11 +4820,13 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = ipc_perms->security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -4794,6 +4847,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4804,6 +4858,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4824,11 +4879,13 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4868,6 +4925,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4889,6 +4947,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 	}
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
@@ -4913,6 +4972,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = task_sid(target);
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4920,6 +4980,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 	msec = msg->security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
@@ -4935,6 +4996,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -4945,6 +5007,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4965,11 +5028,13 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -5027,6 +5092,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int rc;
 
@@ -5037,6 +5103,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -5057,11 +5124,13 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 005a91bcb200..fa13f17ce0ff 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -46,6 +46,22 @@ struct avc_cache_stats {
 	unsigned int frees;
 };
 
+struct selinux_audit_data {
+	u32 ssid;
+	u32 tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	u32 requested;
+	u32 audited;
+	u32 denied;
+	/*
+	 * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive.  See the
+	 * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage.
+	 */
+	u32 auditdeny;
+	struct av_decision *avd;
+	int result;
+};
+
 /*
  * AVC operations
  */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 2ad00657b801..ccba3823d9ef 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -185,6 +185,15 @@ struct smack_known {
  */
 #define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 5
 
+/* SMACK data */
+struct smack_audit_data {
+	const char *function;
+	char *subject;
+	char *object;
+	char *request;
+	int result;
+};
+
 /*
  * Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set
  * to save some stack
@@ -192,6 +201,7 @@ struct smack_known {
 struct smk_audit_info {
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	struct common_audit_data a;
+	struct smack_audit_data sad;
 #endif
 };
 /*
@@ -311,7 +321,8 @@ static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
 {
 	memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
 	a->a.type = type;
-	a->a.smack_audit_data.function = func;
+	a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad;
+	a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func;
 }
 
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index cc7cb6edba08..2af7fcc98a71 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -275,9 +275,9 @@ static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
 static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
-	struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->smack_audit_data;
+	struct smack_audit_data *sad = ad->smack_audit_data;
 	audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s",
-			 ad->smack_audit_data.function,
+			 ad->smack_audit_data->function,
 			 sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
 	audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
@@ -310,11 +310,12 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
 		return;
 
-	if (a->smack_audit_data.function == NULL)
-		a->smack_audit_data.function = "unknown";
+	sad = a->smack_audit_data;
+
+	if (sad->function == NULL)
+		sad->function = "unknown";
 
 	/* end preparing the audit data */
-	sad = &a->smack_audit_data;
 	smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
 	sad->subject = subject_label;
 	sad->object  = object_label;